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Chapter 6 
Cultural policy in Italy: Origins, historical development 
and recent trends 
As was observed in the preceding chapters, the study of issues relating 
to cultural policy-making has been dominated, in Italy, by the legal 
disciplines107. The main consequence of this strong legalistic approach is 
that the available literature to the cultural policy researcher tends to 
favour a 'single-issue' format. That is, articles and books tend to focus on 
a single question, usually concerning the technicalities and the 
consequences pertaining to the introduction of a new item of legislation, 
or more generally reforms undergone by the corpus of rules and 
legislation that make up, effectively, Italian cultural policy. As a result, 
public policies for the arts and culture as they have been developing in 
the Italian context over time have not been the object of a systematic or 
broad-ranging analysis in a way comparable to other main European 
countries, and the UK in particular. Another consequence of the legal 
emphasis of research into public policies for the cultural sector is that 
publications become outdated as soon as new legislative acts are 
promulgated, and, as chapter 3 has shown, this tends to happen in Italy 
with uncommon frequency and regularity. 
107 The predominance of the legal approach to the discussion and practice of cultural 
policy might indeed be at the root of the apparent lesser emphasis, in the Italian context, 
on auditing and evaluation. It might be argued that, precisely because of the hold that 
the legal disciplines have on the Italian debate, this has been less liable to appropriate 
teachings from the management and business studies disciplines, as has been the case 
in the UK. 
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The field of cultural policy studies is a very young one within Academia 
and one that has properly taken off only in the last thirty years or so 
(Kawashima 1999). And yet, a significant body of literature can already 
be found (in the UK, France, the Scandinavian countries and in many 
other main European countries) that deals with many aspects of cultural 
policy making, its historical development and its relationship to the 
historical, political and cultural contexts of each country. In the UK, a 
number of texts have indeed become "classics" within the field (see 
Bennett 2004)108. However, a comprehensive body of literature of a 
similar nature cannot be found in Italy for the many reasons already 
explored in the preceding chapters. One of the very few significant 
108 So, the cultural policy researcher who wants to devote his or her attention to the 
historical development of the British Arts Councils can refer, for instance, to the time- 
honoured work by Hutchinson The Politics of the Arts Council (1982), Pick's Vile Jelly 
(1991), White's The Arts Council of Great Britain (1975) or the already mentioned article 
on the Arts Council published by Raymond Williams in 1979. In addition, more recent 
attempts to delineate the historical development of the bodies involved in distributing 
public resources to the arts sector have been proffered - among others - by Andrew 
Sinclair (1995), Hewison (1995), Quinn (1997) and Witts (1998). Bennett (1995) has 
identified the prominent rationales behind British cultural policies over time, and the 
available cultural statistics concerning the UK cultural sector have been collected and 
clearly presented in Selwood (2001), together with a critical discussion of their current 
use and abuse. Furthermore, a number of individuals who worked in arts administration 
or held crucial positions within the Arts Council have recorded their experiences in 
books which have proved extremely useful in aiding the reconstruction not only of the 
cultural organizations' history, but also of the cultural climate prevailing in Britain at the 
time of their involvement in arts policy-making. The most illustrious examples are Hugh 
Jenkin's The Culture Gap (1979), Roy Shaw's The Arts and The People (1987), and 
John Tusa's Art Matters (1999) (Hugh Jenkins was minister for the Arts from 1974 to 
1976; Roy Shaw became Secretary-general of the Arts Council in 1975; John Tusa has 
been Managing Director of the Barbican Centre in London since 1995). For the 
historically minded researcher, the already mentioned works by Minihan (1977) and 
Pearson (1982) represent an invaluable source of information on the origins, in the 19`h 
century, of the official involvement of the British state in the cultural sphere. This is just 
a small section of the available literature on cultural policy, but it is representative of the 
approach to cultural policy research as it has come to flourish in the UK. All the 
references referred to above are characterized by the view that public policies for 
culture can only be fully understood when discussed in relation to the broader political, 
social and cultural circumstances of the country that originated them. Furthermore, 
many of them explicitly adopt an interdisciplinary approach in order to deal with such a 
complex and multifaceted subject matter. 
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exceptions is represented by the study in two volumes edited by 
Vincenzo Cazzato that investigates Italian cultural institutions and 
policies in the 1930s. Cazzato's work was published in 2001 by the 
official publishing body of the Italian State (the Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca 
dello Stato) on behalf of the Ministry for Heritage and Cultural Activities. 
Despite the central role of the discussion of crucial legal texts, Cazzato 
and his colleagues also attempt to understand and explain the legal 
developments in the cultural sphere by systematically placing them in the 
cultural and political context of Fascist Italy. However, in view of the 
limited temporal scope of this work, it does not suffice to fill the gap in the 
extant literature, and it remains an exception to the general approach to 
the topic prevalent in Italy, rather than the norm. This would seem to 
point towards the conclusion that the critical remarks made in 1996 by 
Bianchini et al. are still largely valid today. Bianchini and his co-authors 
lamented that a problem in the extant literature is "the dearth of critical 
analysis, historical contextualization, and interpretation which relates 
cultural policies to party political priorities and strategies, to intellectual 
debates, and to changes in patterns of cultural consumption" (Bianchini 
et al. (1996,291). 
The only significant exception to this dreary scenario is the literature on 
arts economics which has been flourishing in Italy in the last two or three 
decades. Examples of the growing interest in the themes of cultural 
economics are the series of books published by the International Centre 
for Arts Economic at the Universita' Ca' Foscari in Venice, the Etas and 
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the Electa series of books on various aspects of museum 
management109. Another type of published material of growing popularity 
is represented by case studies publications, such as the three volumes 
edited by Antonio Floridia (2000; 2001, and 2003 with Misiti) on various 
aspects of regional cultural policy in Tuscany. Significantly - and 
consistently with the popularity of the discipline of cultural economics in 
Italy - one of only two academic periodical publications especially 
devoted to the discussion of issues of cultural policy is the journal 
Economia delta Cultura. The only other relevant periodical publication is 
the online journal Aedon, which focuses on the analysis of legislation 
pertinent to the cultural sector. 
As a result of this situation, the most comprehensive and exhaustive 
pieces of writing on Italian cultural policy are still, from many points of 
view, the National Report compiled for the Council of Europe in 1995 and 
the accompanying Report published in the same year and written by 
Christopher Gordon. However, as we have seen, the framework for 
cultural policy-making in Italy (as well as the respective competencies of 
the various tiers of government) has changed dramatically since then. 
Therefore, while still a useful tool for a historical reconstruction of cultural 
policy's administrative framework in the Italian context, the above- 
mentioned documents are sadly extremely outdated. A systematic and 
109 Silvia Bagdadli's book entitled 'The Museum as Firm' (ll Museo come Azienda) on 
the management of museums, and Guido Guerzoni and Silvia Stabile's 'The Rights of 
Museums' (I Diritti del Muse! ) on how to reconcile copyrights regulations with the 
economic exploitation of museums are representative of the type of work published in 
the Etas series. The Electa publications consulted in the course of the preparation of 
this thesis were Montella (2003) and Zan (2003). 
-- 222 
critical review of the more recent unfolding of the process of law-making 
vis ä vis the cultural sector and its political and cultural implications has 
not been published yet. Thus this chapter, despite its obvious limitation of 
space and scope, constitutes an attempt to filling this gap. The present 
chapter will provide, first of all, an updated review of the legal and 
bureaucratic mechanisms for the public support of the cultural sector in 
Italy. The final part of the chapter will focus on the hitherto largely 
unexplored territory of the most recent legal and administrative 
developments in Italian cultural policy and highlight their links to broader 
political and economic phenomena of a global nature, with a view of 
drawing a parallel with the observations and interpretations presented in 
chapter 5 with regards to Great Britain. 
CULTURAL ASSETS VS. PERFORMING ARTS: AN ITALIAN PECULIARITY 
Though aiming to present as wide a picture of Italian cultural policy as 
possible, the chapter will focus on the sector of the beni culturali, or 
"cultural assets". The analysis of the Italian case will therefore be based 
on an in-depth discussion of the county's heritage policy. Heritage is 
indeed the section of the Italian cultural sector that has always been a 
privileged area in the public policy making process. It consequently 
represents the ideal object of analysis for a study of the trends and 
changing attitudes within the Italian cultural policy debates1° (a detailed 
110 In 2002 the current Minister for Culture, Giuliano Urbani wrote: "Within our Ministry - 
you must understand - the artistic patrimony is the most important thing, though with no 
offence meant to the performing arts and sport". Urbani's actual words are: "Nei nostro 
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discussion of what the category of beni culturali include and the relevant 
legislation, can be found in the Appendix). This decision, on the one 
hand, is determined by the necessity of limiting the scope of the analysis 
due to the inevitable limitations of time and space that this thesis 
imposes. However, on the other hand, it also rests upon a distinction that 
is peculiar to the Italian cultural policy model. A traditional feature of 
Italian cultural policy is indeed what Palma and Clemente di San Luca 
(1987,68) define as the separation between the traditional arts (painting, 
sculpture, architecture, poetry and literature) and the representative arts 
(cinema, theatre and music). The State's approach to funding and 
promotion, in Italy, has been very different for each of the two sectors. 
Indeed, responsibilities for the performing arts and the beni culturali only 
came under the same Ministry in 1998, with the creation of the new 
Ministero per i Beni e le Attivitä Culturali. Following the destitution of the 
Fascist regime, responsibilities for the performing arts were transferred to 
the Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri (equivalent to the Prime Minister 
Office) and subsequently to the Ministero del Turismo e dello Spettacolo 
(Ministry for Tourism and the Live Performing Arts) which was abolished 
as a result of a public referendum in 1993 (Bianchini et al. 1996,293). 
The performing arts therefore remained under the responsibility of the 
Presidenza until the establishment of the first Italian 'unified' Ministry for 
cultural assets and cultural activities in 1998. 
Ministero, vol capite bene, il patrimonio artistico e la cosa piü importante, senza nulla 
togliere n6 alto spettacolo n6 alto sport" (Urbani 2002,16). 
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In their attempt to explain the historical origin of such a sharp separation 
between the traditional and representative arts (which has for such a long 
time significantly hindered the possibility of elaborating and implementing 
an organic and comprehensive cultural policy), Palma and Clemente di 
San Luca (1987,69 and 100-101) suggest that this state of affair was an 
inheritance of the Fascist cultural administration. The distinction between 
art forms indeed mirrors the organizational separation established by the 
regime between the Ministry for National Education and the Ministry for 
Popular Culture (often referred to as Minculpop). The former institution 
had responsibilities not only for the education sector, but also for the 
'national heritage'. According to Bianchini et at. (1996,292) such a 
coupling is "rooted in the Italian tradition of emphasizing the importance 
of high culture and the heritage in the formation of national 
consciousness and citizenship". In the light of this consideration, the 
attempt on the part of the Ministry for National Education to resist the 
expansion of the regime's interest in cultural policy and strategy becomes 
even more significant. The Ministry for Education actively resisted 
pressures from the Fascist echelons and actively fought to retain control 
over the national artistic patrimony (Palma and Clemente di San Luca 
1987,69). Furthermore, the Ministry for Education also made a clear 
attempt to include modern art within its remit by establishing the Office of 
Contemporary Arts in 1940 (which never became operational though, 
because of Italy's entry into WWII later that year) (ibid., 100). The 
Minculpop, on the other hand, was the prime actor in Italian cultural 
policy-making during Fascism for the sectors of film, the performing arts, 
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publishing and radio, with responsibilities not just for funding and 
administration, but - crucially - also for propaganda and censorship 
(Bianchini et al. 292). 
As a matter of fact, the fragmentation that characterized Italian cultural 
policy until the late 1990s originated directly from the organizational 
structure of the administrative infrastructure for the cultural sector that the 
Italian Republic inherited from the Fascist regime. The immediate 
successor of the Fascist Ministry of National Education, the Ministero 
della Pubblica Istruzione, indeed took over all its areas of responsibility, 
including the Direzione delle Antichita' e Belle Arti (Directorate for 
Antiquities and Fine Arts) which dealt with policies for the archaeological 
and artistic heritage (that is, in today's terminology, the beni cultural, ) 
(Bianchini et al 1996,293). As far as the Minculpop is concerned, the 
above-mentioned Ministry of Tourism and the Live Performing Arts, 
stemmed directly form its dissolution following the demise of the Fascist 
rule (Palma and Clemente di San Luca 1987,100-101). 
One further reason for the predominance of the heritage sector in the 
Italian cultural scene is self-evident: according to Unesco, over 40% of 
the world's cultural heritage is located in Italy (Gordon 1995,1)'1', and, 
as Zerboni (2001,103) reports, there are 2,099 monuments and sites of 
archaeological or artistic interest spread all over the country (though 
111 This statistic Is often cited in the cultural policy literature and stated as fact, despite 
the fact that no supporting evidence for this statement seems to be available. 
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about half of them is concentrated in the South). Furthermore, Italy 
currently boasts 39 out of Unesco's 750 World Heritage Sites, more than 
any other country (Arie 2004). 
As Sergio Romano, at one time working for Italy's Ministry for Foreign 
Affairs12 explains, Italy has "the largest 'open air' heritage in the western 
world (Romano 1984,12; see also Zed 1988). The practical 
consequences of possessing such a rich cultural patrimony is that it 
might in fact represent a liability rather an asset. No other country but 
Italy has had to tackle the huge task of administering and protecting such 
an important and substantial archaeological and architectural heritage 
that is, to quote Romano again, "unguarded and unguardable" (Romano, 
ibid. ). As Salvatore Settis (2002,10) explains, the peculiarity (and, in his 
opinion, the strength) of the Italian model lies precisely in the capillary 
diffusion, across the Italian soil, of a cultural heritage of which only a 
small percentage is to be found between the walls of a museum. As 
Romano (ibid. ) sharply observes, however, the end result of Italy's 
extraordinary artistic, architectural and archaeological endowment is, in 
reality, that "Italy has become a gigantic 'cultural warehouse" 13, an 
historical depository to which the laws of profit and economy do not 
apply"' 14 
112 Sergio Romano was Italian Ambassador to NATO in the 1980s, and had formerly 
covered the position of Head of Cultural Relations at the Italian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs. 
113 This is a view that Romano does not behold alone. Significantly, Antonio Paolucci -a 
cultural administrator (soprintendente) who covered, for a short while, the position of 
Minister for Beni Culturali - entitled his collection of essays and articles published in 
1997 Museo Italia. 
114 The contrasting view expressed by Settis (2002,10) is that, in fact, it is the very 
widespread presence of an organic and coherent body of artistic and cultural riches 
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THE THREE PHASES OF ITALIAN CULTURAL POLICY 
The field of heritage policy is indeed the area where the phenomena of 
growing instrumentalism that have been discussed with regards to the 
UK have given rise to most interesting developments which are so 
uncharacteristic of the Italian cultural policy tradition, as to be - for this 
very reason alone - worthy of closer scrutiny. In order to make sense of 
such a complicated scenario, this chapter will begin with a critical 
discussion of the historical evolution of the legislation concerning the 
cultural sector, focussing, for practical reasons, on the most crucial 
phases of the legal developments of Italian cultural policy. Indeed, as 
Carta (1999,43) argues, the interpretation of the value and the symbolic 
functions of the cultural patrimony and its fruition by the public - as well 
as the norms that regulate them - require a historical analysis of their 
formation (because they are closely dependant on the social and political 
processes that originated them). 
On the basis of a number of crucial pieces of legislation affecting Italian 
heritage policy, the discussion will show how it is possible to distinguish 
three different phases in the development of the Italian State's direct 
involvement in cultural matters and the financial support for the 
preservation of the country's cultural and artistic heritage. 
(which he sees as the result of a coherent plan on the part of the Italian institutions) that 
makes the Italian model appealing to Italy's foreign visitors and observers. 
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" From the Unification of Italy to the Fascist era: the crucial legal act 
of this period is law 1089 of 1939 on which the administration of 
cultural assets was based until the process of legal reorganization 
and reform that started in the mid 1990s (but which, in its spirit, 
still represents an important guiding principle for many aspects of 
the legislation affecting heritage policy); 
" The period between the postwar years and the 1970s: one of the 
most important events of this period is represented by the 
creation, in 1975, of the first Ministry fully devoted to the cultural 
assets, and the first attempts to decentralise cultural policy, by 
involving the Regions in cultural administration. 
" The period from the 1980s to the present day: This period has also 
witnessed the so-called 'cultural assets boom' (Council of Europe 
1995,30) and the flourishing of the interest and debate over the 
economic potential of the beni culturali. Arguments on the cultural 
assets' contribution to the national economy (through cultural 
tourism) and especially the local and regional economy has gained 
common currency during this phase. This has been, indeed, a very 
intense period which has witnessed the involvement of the beni 
culturali in a number of projects and schemes developed by other 
non-cultural government departments. As was mentioned earlier, 
the year 1998 also witnessed the institution of the Ministero per i 
Beni e le Attivitä Cultural!, the first unified Ministry for Culture since 
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the dissolution of the Fascist regime. This crucial year in recent 
Italian cultural policy also witnessed the elaboration of the already 
mentioned Testo Unico sui Beni Culturali ed Ambientali, a single 
legal document which brought together and tried to simplify and 
tidy up the impressive and often inconsistent body of laws with 
pertinence to the cultural sector. An especially significant 
development in this phase is represented by the decree (decreto 
legislativo) n. 63 of 2002, which introduced - as will be discussed 
at length later on in this chapter -a number of important changes 
in the relationship between the Italian State and its cultural 
patrimony. In particular, it will be argued that this piece of 
legislation highlights important changes in the attitude of the 
government with respect to the role of the cultural heritage and 
patrimony of Italy in the broader economic sphere, and a clear 
move towards explicitly instrumental views of "cultural assets" 
which seem to parallel those currently prevalent in the UK. 
In addition to the pertinent laws, the analysis of this latter phase of Italian 
cultural policy will focus in particular on two texts which were chosen 
because they are representative of the main positions within the current 
cultural policy debate in Italy. These consist of the book published in 
2002 by the then Italian Minister for Culture Giuliano Urbani, entitled 11 
Tesoro degli Italiani ("The Treasure that Belongs to the Italian People"). 
The book presents the official view of the Berlusconi government 
presently in power on the future of Italian cultural policy, and delineates 
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the role that the envisaged reformed management of the country's 
cultural patrimony will play in the government's economic plans for the 
future of the country. The other publication is the vitriolic book published 
by the art historian and former director of the Getty Research Institute of 
Art History in Los Angeles, Salvatore Settis (2002) and polemically 
entitled Italia S. p. A. 15. Whilst Settis' book is both in tone and structure, 
more a pamphlet than an academic exposition on the situation of cultural 
policy as can be observed in Italy today, it is significant as it represents a 
widely spread view among the Italian intellectual elite and the 
professionals working in the field of cultural management. As it will 
become clearer as the discussion unfolds and tackles the historical 
development of Italian cultural policy, over the last fifteen or twenty years 
a clear and dramatic shift of priorities has occurred in Italian cultural 
policy, whereby an increasing instrumentalism seems to have 
progressively shadowed the once predominant values of cultural 
preservation and conservation. Such developments have caused great 
concern among cultural and political commentators as well as cultural 
administrators. Settis is indeed a most vehement spokesperson for the 
fears and unease of the intellectual elites vis 6 vis recent evolutions in the 
rationales and values that underpin cultural policy-making in Italy. 
Significantly, as Settis (2002,43-44) himself remarks, little preoccupation 
115 According to Italian commercial law, the acronym S. p. A. (Societa' per Azioni) 
indicates a company set up on the basis of a capital and through a legal act of official 
nature (prepared by a specially trained professional) whose activities are guided by an 
official statute. The capital of the S. p. A. is represented by shares (either quoted or 
unlisted), and whoever acquires shares, becomes a partner within the company. The 
role of the S. p. A in relation to cultural administration will be discussed in greater detail 
later. 
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has been shown for the interpretation of the origins - political as well as 
cultural - of this phenomenon. As a result, no systematic attempt has so 
far been made, in Italy, to explain recent developments in cultural policy 
in relation to the broader Italian and international political context. 
However, it is my belief that what has happened in Italy - and has been 
felt as a profound departure from a long-standing cultural and political 
tradition - can be inscribed in the broader, in fact global, set of trends 
and changes that have already been discussed in chapter 5 with regards 
to the UK. 
PHASE I: THE PRESERVATION OF THE CULTURAL HERITAGE FROM THE PRE- 
UNITARY TIMES TO THE DEMISE OF FASCISM 
As Sergio Romano (1984,12) explains, the size and importance of the 
artistic and archaeological patrimony that Italy is responsible for is such, 
that "Italy never really had the choice between a laissez-faire and an 
interventionist approach to the management of the cultural heritage". 
Furthermore, he continues, "[w]hereas in other countries the scarcity of 
financial resources and the requirements of modernisation force the 
authorities to make a choice, to reach agreement within the cultural world 
on the criteria to be adopted for [their] choices, the Italian State is 
expected, in theory, to preserve everything" (Romano, ibid., 13). The 
reasons behind what Romano (ibid. ) critically describes as the 'ideology 
of indiscriminate conservation' have been at the centre of much 
discussion. According to Romano (ibid. ) this attitude to conservation has 
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prevailed in Italy because, on the one hand, it has been favoured by the 
Italian intelligentsia, and on the other, it is perfectly suited to the indolent 
and slow-moving nature of the Italian political system. A contrasting, and 
more idealistic interpretation of the undoubtedly distinctive Italian 
situation is offered by Settis (2002,19-20). Similarly to Sergio Romano, 
he also draws attention to the fact that Italy can boast a percentage of the 
cultural patrimony still to be found in situ (that is, in the environment 
within which it was originally produced) which is much higher than in any 
other country, but he gives a much more positive interpretation of this 
state of affairs. For Settis (ibid. ), the root of the Italian peculiarity lies in 
history, and precisely in the fact that Italy did not experience dramatic 
events such as the iconoclasm of the Protestant movement that affected 
Northern Europe or the frenzy of destruction that accompanied the 
French Revolution116. In addition, the relative stagnation of the economy 
in large areas of the country (an element also judged significant by 
Romano) that lasted centuries, and the innate conservative tendencies of 
the Church and the noble class in Italy, all contributed to the preservation 
of the country's heritage. As Romano (1984,12) further explains: 
If Italy had had a mercantile revolution in the 17th century, and an 
industrial revolution between the second half of the 18th and the first 
half of the 19`h centuries, its bourgeoisie, enriched by trade and 
116 Genovese (1995,24) puts forward a different interpretation still. In her opinion, the 
practice of heritage preservation stems precisely from the French Revolution. She sees 
the notion and values of heritage preservation as being directly related to the 
establishment of the concept of the appropriation of the historical and artistic patrimony 
on the part of the people that is a legacy of the Revolution. That is, the state takes it 
upon itself to preserve and look after the archaeological, artistic and historical heritage 
because it belongs to its people. This is, however, a questionable interpretation, since - 
as I will show later in this thesis - practices of heritage preservation in Italy were already 
in place, in Italy, well before the 180' century (see pp. 230 ff. ). 
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manufacturing, would have demolished Renaissance palaces to build 
more comfortable homes, pulled down the medieval walls and gutted 
the medieval quarters to make way for their private carriages and public 
transport, and undergone a much quicker process of secularisation, to 
the detriment of churches, and the ecclesiastical heritage. 
Settis (2002,20) distances himself from Romano's position in that he 
firmly believes that equally important in the development of what he calls 
the 'Italian model' was the precocious development, in Italy, of a 'culture 
of conservation' that had the highest consideration not only for the 
cultural heritage itself, but also for its relationship to territory and locality. 
Furthermore, according to Settis (bid. ), not only were this attitude and this 
model of conservation responsible for the survival of the great Italian 
artistic heritage, but they also seemed to constitute such an efficient and 
successful model as to have been largely exported - over time - across 
Europe and beyond. 
It will thus come as no surprise that the history of direct state involvement 
in the protection of its artistic patrimony has a very long history in Italy. In 
fact, it predates the very birth of the Unitary Italian state in 1860. It is 
interesting to observe that Italians never really constituted a distinctive 
ethnic group, that is to say, they did not represent a 'people' before the 
unification process took place. As the historian Nicholas Doumanis 
(2001,9) explains, "[w]hen the Italian nation-state was established in 
1860, the new political order was well aware that the task of creating a 
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nation of Italians, of creating an ethnic identity, was before them"117. This 
is consistent with the view expressed by Pinna (2001,63) that "when 
Italy was first unified, the new national government set up a cultural 
policy that was designed to destroy the symbols of the former Italian 
states dating from the period before unification. At the same time, it 
sought to construct and disseminate other symbols, namely those of a 
new nation"' 18. 
Significantly, thus, in the territory that is now Italy, the preoccupation to 
define and establish policies for the cultural patrimony pre-dated the very 
formation of a national consciousness and a national spirit. The pre- 
unitary States in the Italian peninsula had already developed a rather 
sophisticated and advanced corpus of laws and regulations that were in 
place with the explicit aim of preserving Italy's immense artistic heritage 
for the generations to come (Settis 2002,14). In his historical and 
semiotic reconstruction of the formation of the notion, values and legal 
status of the beni culturali in the Italian context - Maurizio Carta (1999, 
chapter 2) convincingly argues that the first civilization to elaborate 
specific administrative and legal tools for the protection of artistic and 
cultural objects was Republican - and, later, Imperial - Rome (see also 
"' However, Doumanis (2001,10) also believes that "italianita'" constituted a form of 
'cultural capital' that predated the Risorgimento in that it had long been employed by 
Italian elites to locate themselves in the wider world". 118 Obviously, when speaking about the destruction of symbols on the part of the pre- 
unitary states, Pinna does not refer to the physical destruction of objects of artistic or 
historical importance. Instead, he refers to what he calls 'de-symbolization' of the 
cultural inheritance of the old states, obtained through a 'diaspora of cultural assets' 
(Pinna 2001,63). He clarifies this notion thus: "In particular, the arts objects collected in 
the residencies of the old ruling houses were moved elsewhere and management of the 
cultural heritage was entrusted to the central government" (ibid. ). 
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Mirri 2000,11). The activity of instituting norms and tools for the 
preservation of objects of artistic value obtained as spoils of war 
represents the prehistory of state involvement in cultural matters in the 
territories that would eventually become Italy. The meaning of the spoils, 
the object of Rome's care and protection, shifted from that of material 
objects to that of symbols, whereby they came to stand for Rome's 
military and cultural superiority over its enemies (Carta 1999,43). 
Following from his discussion of Ancient Rome, Carta (ibid., 46) 
maintains that 'intentional policies of conservation' underline a notion of 
the cultural patrimony that views it as a sort of 'genetic patrimony of a 
territory' represented by the ensemble of the material evidences, the 
stories, the rituals and customs as they have been codified within a 
certain area by a certain social ordainment. 
If we espouse Carta's theorization according to which Italian cultural 
policy is embedded in attitudes and regulations established centuries 
before the Italian nation state was born, then we would have to conclude 
that the first policies specifically targeted to the protection of works of art 
date as far back as the IV century AD. A number of rulings were emitted 
by the Pontifical State between the year 346 and 408 that aimed at the 
suppression of pagan cults and temples. Despite the determination - 
apparent from the text of the decrees - to successfully suppress any 
form of pagan religious expression, other rulings were also emitted that 
ordered, with equal vehemence, that the pagan temples, in virtue of their 
architectural and aesthetic value (in so far as they represented public 
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monuments and were built on land that was of papal property) ought to 
be not just spared from destruction, but actively protected. The first 
legislative measure promulgated primarily to regulate the protection of 
monuments was the Edict of Maggioranus, issued by the Church in 455 
AD (Carta 1999,47). 
The legislation for the preservation of the artistic and architectural 
heritage continued to develop ever since. Another important phase in this 
evolutionary process is represented by the XVII century. It was around 
this time that the definition of the norms affecting the cultural patrimony 
constituted by artistic and historical objects comes into sharper focus, 
both from a legal and technical perspective. As a result, it is in the XVII 
century that the legal and administrative category of 'artistic and historical 
patrimony' finds a more precise formulation and witnesses a broadening 
of its boundaries (Carta 1999,48). This theoretical work of definition of 
the legal nature of heritage provided the basis for the flourishing of norms 
and rulings in the second half of the XVIII and the XIX centuries. In 1773, 
for instance the Republic of Venice decided in favour of the drawing up of 
an official Catalogue of the artistic and cultural objects present on its 
territory listed area by area. Moreover, every six months, especially 
appointed inspectors were to report to the Republican government on the 
conditions of the cultural objects listed in the Catalogue, and offer 
suggestions on the interventions required for their optimal conservation. 
(Rossano and Rossano 2002,29). The Catalogue therefore represented 
-- 237 
in all respects a fully fledged and official tool of cultural and heritage 
preservation. Another crucial legislative act, which was to prefigure an 
important aspect of modern Italian cultural policy, is represented by the 
1802 edict promulgated in the Pontifical State by Pope Pio VII. This 
decree sanctioned the State's right to protecting its movable cultural 
patrimony in its entirety, by imposing the duty of registration of all artistic 
objects to the papal authorities. The importance of this decree lies in the 
fact that the state's right to ensure the preservation of objects of artistic 
value was not limited to the objects of property of the state itself, but it 
also extended to those that belonged to private individuals (Rossano and 
Rossano 2002,30). A later decree emitted in 1820 by Cardinal Pacca, 
imposed further obligations on the proprietors of artistic objects, who 
were now expected to inform the authorities of any movements of the 
works of art in their possession, and had to allow commissions of experts 
to periodically examine them (ibid. ). These measures for the protection of 
the cultural heritage were clearly the result of the diffusion of the notion of 
the universal value of culture that had been made popular across Europe 
by the Enlightenment movement. The notion of reason as the common 
characteristic to all human beings had brought with it a new 
understanding of art and culture. Coupled with the Enlightenment belief in 
the values of the 'common good' and 'happiness for all', the regulations 
promoting heritage preservation that see the light in this period represent 
a clear expression of the new cultural climate (Musi 1995,19). In the 
intention of the legislators, the effective beneficiary of the heritage 
preservation effort was to be humanity as a whole. In this perspective - 
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which found an enthusiastic spokesperson in Quatremere de Quincy - 
the ultimate aim of the protection and the promotion of the cultural 
heritage becomes "that of civilization, of the perfecting of the measures to 
obtain happiness and pleasure, of the promotion and progress of 
education and reason, of the improvement, in a single word, of 
humanity". 119 The Papal legal measures were very influential across the 
Italian peninsula, and indeed, similar norms were issued by most other 
pre-unitary states. Similar regulations were issued, for instance, in 1818 
in the Duchy of Lucca, in 1822 in the Realm of Naples and they were still 
in vigour after Unification following the article 5 of law n. 286 of 1871, 
which extended the pre-existing norms to the newly created state 
(Rossano and Rossano 2002,30; Carta 1999,53)120. The first original 
act of legislation promulgated by the new Italian state especially for the 
heritage sector, in fact, came about as late as 1902 (Genovese 1995, 
30). The 1902 legislation was further perfected in 1909, when - for the 
first time - measures for the protection of objects of historical, artistic and 
archaeological interest on the part of the state were officially introduced, 
regardless of whether those objects were of public or private property 
(Rossano and Rossano 2002,111)121. 
119 De Quincy quoted in Carta (1999,51). 
120 It is interesting to note that, paradoxically, the only pre-unitary state that did not have 
a legislation specifically devoted to the protection of the cultural heritage was the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, which led the military campaign that resulted in the unification of 
Italy (Carta 1999,57). 
121 Indeed, according to the 1995 National Report on Italian cultural policy, "this long 
legislative deadlock was due to the difficulty in reconciling two apparently contrasting 
principles: public interest in the cultural heritage and the inviolability of private property" 
(Council of Europe 1995,21). 
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From the very beginning thus, Italian cultural policy was characterised by 
the central role of norms for the protection of the heritage, in the context 
of what was, according to Carta (1999,56) a 'negative' (in the sense of 
passive) notion of the heritage, merely founded on the values of 
preservation of the existing cultural patrimony rather than on proactive 
strategies of heritage promotion. In the years immediately following the 
Unification, the debate was dominated by the crucial issue of choosing 
between centralization and decentralisation of cultural administration. 
Despite the similarities among them, heritage conservation policies were 
based on legislative bodies and administrative structures that were 
different among the various pre-unitary states. The options available 
then, were to either unify - and thus centralize - methodologies and tools 
for heritage preservation, or to allow them to develop according to local 
needs and on the basis of the regional models already in place (Carta 
1999,56). The alternative that eventually prevailed was the centralization 
of heritage policy. According to Carta (ibid. ), the already mentioned belief 
in the universal nature of culture might have had a role in making the 
centralizing option look more appealing to the administrators of the newly 
unified Italy. Indeed, among influential intellectuals at the time a view 
gained currency that saw museums no longer as rooted in their local 
reality and territory. On the contrary, museums came to be seen as the 
ultimate instrument in the full appreciation and learning of classical art, to 
the extent that this period witnessed the theorization of the dislocation of 
works of art and archaeological relics from the place of their discovery to 
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purpose built museums. This, it was felt, would facilitate the intellectual 
reconstruction of the evolution of art in ages past. 122 
The decision to opt for a centralised model of heritage policy has been, in 
Pinna's view, most decisive in determining the future developments of 
Italian heritage policy: 
This centralised management resulted in the deliberate destruction 
of the symbolic and cultural significance of the heritage of the 
various Italian communities, and emphasis was inevitably placed 
more on the material aspects of the objects, as distinct from their 
signification in any historical context. This, then, is how 'heritage' 
was transformed into 'cultural assets' (Pinna 2001,63; See the 
Appendix). 
This approach to cultural policy, Pinna continues (ibid. ) produced two 
significant outcomes. First of all, the emphasis was placed on heritage 
conservation rather than on public access to it. This had a positive effect 
in so far as it resulted in the creation of heritage preservation institutions 
and regulations among the best in the world. However, the prioritisation 
of heritage preservation also meant that ordinary Italians were largely 
removed from their own cultural patrimony, and that Italy has - as a 
result - failed in establishing an effective and visitor-friendly museum 
122 Giuseppe Fiorelli, Minister for Public Education in the mid-1880s, famously defended 
this position in two famous reports (published in 1883 and 1885). He explicitly presented 
a conception of the cultural patrimony as fundamental educational tool for the artistic 
instruction and the humanistic formation of the new generations, whilst also underlining 
the important function of the heritage towards the deeper understanding and 
comprehension of a now united Italy (Genovese 1995,31). 
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organization. Hence the numerous museums of archaeology that would 
be more appropriately labelled - as Pinna (ibid. ) polemically argues - as 
'museums- storehouses', since objects are often exhibited with the only 
accompaniment of their inventory numbers, without any explanatory 
material for the benefit of visitors. Pinna (ibid. ) concludes his tirade 
against the current attitude to heritage policy in Italy thus: 
The state's restrictive interpretation of 'cultural assets' and 
'guarantors of ownership' meant that museums became places 
where being open to the public was tolerated as a minimum 
concession - to the true owners of the public heritage 
themselves! It is a fact that citizens are often regarded as a 
dangerous source of potential damage to valuable objects123. 
As will become clearer as the discussion progresses and includes more 
recent heritage policies in Italy, preservation was from the very 
establishment of a legal and administrative framework for heritage policy, 
the number one priority124. And, interestingly, expressions of unease for 
such a status quo as that expressed by Pinna, and protestations against 
the marginal role of explicit 'access' policies are, in the Italian context, 
less frequent than could be expected. 
123 It might be argued, though, that the picture painted by Pinna is not accurate any 
longer. At least, this is what a recent publication by the Ministero per I Beni e le Attivita 
Culturali seems to suggests. The pamphlet indeed boasts that Italy is the country within 
Europe with the highest number of archaeological sites open to the public. Equally, the 
document would seem to argue that the number of monuments, museums, parks that 
are open all day and over bank holidays in Italy is higher than the European average 
(Mbac 2005,20-1). It has to be said, though, that the pamphlet does not explain on the 
basis of what data these conclusions are reached, nor does it presents any specific 
comparison with opening hours and accessibility in other European countries. Such 
claims might therefore be best accepted with a certain caution. 
124 The 1995 National Report in conclusion of its overview of cultural policies between 
the 19`h and the early 20t centuries, explicitly admits this: As a whole, the protection 
system has been conceived according to a typical policy of guarantee, liberal in spirit 
without promotion aims" (Council of Europe 1995,23). 
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As was mentioned earlier, the Fascist era was an extremely important 
phase in the development of Italian cultural policy. During this time, 
indeed, a number of substantial organizational changes were made, both 
at the central and local levels (Cazzato and Rizza 2001,12). As a matter 
of fact, a number of later legal and administrative initiatives represented 
the continuation and the perfecting of norms that had been first 
introduced in the 1930s (ibid., 15). The phenomenal legislative activity 
that flourished in the 1930s, however, also represents the culmination of 
the long process of establishing a complex set of norms and regulations 
for the heritage sector that has been just discussed above. This is indeed 
an aspect of Fascist cultural policy that has been largely overlooked by 
the English-speaking academic community. Whilst there are a great 
numbers of publications available on many different aspects of Fascist art 
and culture, the administrative aspects, and the issue of the normative 
elaborations carried out by the regime have not caught the interest of 
researchers and commentators. 
In a way, this could be seen as a consequence of the characteristics of 
the Fascist regime itself. As it has been observed from many parts, 
Fascism's cultural strategy was subordinated to the regime's broader and 
fundamental commitment to 'making the Italians' (Doumanis 2001,140). 
The Liberal regimes that preceded it had indeed targeted their efforts to 
build a national spirit within a unified Italy merely to the educated higher 
middle classes. This was, according to Nicholas Doumanis (ibid. ) as 
much the result of a widespread elitism, as part of a political strategy that 
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was weary of the subversive potential inherent in mass politicisation. 
Fascism's plans to forge a national culture and identity for the Italian 
people, however, entailed a much more inclusive notion of the grande 
nazione ('great nation') they wanted to turn Italy into. The regime's motto, 
to 'bring the masses into the state' leaves very little doubt about it 
(Doumanis ibid. ). It has been argued that Italian Fascism equates to a 
political project that had its ultimate goal in the re-creation of the self, that 
is, in the . moulding of the Italian people with a view to 'create new 
identities as citizens of Fascist Italy' (Berezin 1997,5). As Doumanis 
(ibid., 146) further explains: 
Mussolini sought to develop a national culture that engaged directly 
with the masses, that appealed to their sensibilities and which they 
might find emotionally uplifting. The new national culture was to be 
celebrated through new rituals and commemorative practices, 
through the creation and adoration of new or reinvented symbols and 
sacred objects. [... ] In most ways, Mussolini's government was 
demonstrably incompetent, but where it showed considerable 
ingenuity was in recognizing the importance of culture in politics. Its 
attempts to solve the problem of mass politics by allowing for cultural 
instead of political participation was probably Italian Fascism's most 
distinctive contribution to modern politics. 
Unsurprisingly then, the ritual forms of mass cultural participation and 
mobilization perfected by the Fascist regime have been the aspects of 
culture and policy that have been most commonly researched and written 
about. Ostensibly, despite the broad-ranging nature of the regime's 
cultural reformation and reorganization 125, public spectacle was the 
125 As Mabel Berezin (1997,5) puts it, "[t]he regime 'fascistified' Italy's principal cultural 
and social institutions". Indeed, it reorganised the educational system, it took over the 
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preferred vehicle for the expression of the Fascist identity project. In spite 
of the extensive restructuring of the educational system, Italy during the 
Fascist Ventennio was a country with large areas inhabited by an illiterate 
population that did not use the national language in everyday life, and 
where access to culture was strongly limited126. As a matter of fact, only a 
small elite had the privilege to enjoy Italian high culture and the great 
Italian artistic heritage (Berezin 1997,47). Therefore, from the regime's 
perspective, 'public spectacle' - that is grand public ritualistic events - 
were the perfect tool to reach a broadly culturally unsophisticated 
populace. Despite the obvious propagandistic nature of this type of 
official cultural intervention, in its attempt to successfully reach its public, 
Fascist cultural policy also challenged the accepted boundaries of 
culture, and succeeded in exposing new social groups (such as the 
working and lower-middle classes, both urban and rural) to cultural 
experiences never encountered before (Stone 1998,6). It is beyond 
questioning that from 1922 onwards, "spectacle replaced aesthetics as a 
defining force within popular Fascist cultural practice" (Berezin 1997,41). 
Great events, exhibitions, expositions, fairs and processions with a 
distinct ritualistic flavour ensured that spectacle became the regime's 
privileged form of political communication. In her study of the culture and 
politics of Fascist Italy, Maria Stone (1999) concentrates her analysis on 
administration of the most prestigious cultural and artistic institutions as well as the 
more popular ones (cinema, theatre, publishing and the press). It also created a 
nationwide network of voluntary cultural and leisure organizations that managed to 
involve men and women of all ages and from every corner of the country into the official 
rituals and cultural activities promoted by the regime itself. 126 Berezin (1995,47) offers a synthetic yet forceful picture of the social and educational 
condition of Fascist Italy: "In 1922, Italy was a country with an urban industrial north, a 
vociferous working class, an illiterate and underdeveloped peasant south, and a quasi- 
educated and economically disadvantaged middle class". 
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the regime's 'exhibiting culture'. She argues that exhibitions were a 
fundamental element in Fascist cultural policy, because they represented 
the meeting point between the dictatorship itself and the producers and 
consumers of culture. In Stone's own words, "[e]xhibitions, as places of 
cultural exchange, together with the practices and institutions of 
patronage such as commissions, competitions, and artists' unions, were 
major locations for the unfolding of Fascist arts policy" (Stone 1998,16). 
Fascism's particular interest in 'big events' is indeed confirmed by its 
substantial legislative activity in this field (Cazzato 2001,13). 
These more ostentatious and grand events, as well as forms of low or 
mass culture (such as - for instance - cinema, radio and the press) have 
flourished, over time, into fertile grounds for academic analysis. However, 
the innovations brought about by the Fascist regime in the field of 
heritage policy, both on the legal and administrative levels - though less 
immediately obvious and not as showy a phenomenon as the regime's 
intervention in other cultural spheres - are nevertheless equally 
significant. In fact, many of the innovations and changes that took place 
within the temporal scope of the Fascist Ventennio affected Italian 
policies for the beni culturali until well into the 1990s. In a powerful 
metaphor, Sabino Cassese suggests that the legislation produced 
between the 1930s and 1940s represents a genuine 'mine', from which a 
number of precious inspirations would be consistently drawn in later 
times (Cassese 2001,22). 
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Public intervention in the arts was indeed first institutionalised and 
theorised in the Fascist period, giving rise to the first real example of a 
coherent Italian cultural policy (Palma and Clemente di San Luca 1987, 
69). The Thirties witnessed a great acceleration of the process of 
legislative elaboration; this was preceded and accompanied by a 
remarkably intense activity encompassing the design of new projects and 
the proposal of new laws. The debate around the norms, the institutions 
and changes that were needed in the field of heritage policy also gained 
great momentum at this time (Cassese 2001,21). This increase in the 
speed with which new laws were introduced, new institutions created and 
public administration reformed, was a phenomenon that characterized 
many fields of Italian public life during Fascism. However, according to 
Cassese (Ibid. ), this gathering speed of processes of change was 
particularly significant in the sphere of what we refer to - in today's 
terminology - as beni culturali. In his view, the principal characteristic of 
public intervention in the heritage field during the 1930s was the 
impressive scope of the plans that were drawn for the sector (Cassese 
2001,21-22). In what was effectively a short span of time, a strikingly 
large number of new measures and laws (of which law n. 1089 of 1939 
represents but the apex) were suggested, proposed, discussed and 
finally approved which affected numerous elements of the public cultural 
sphere. Moreover, the regime went beyond mere legislation in order to 
tackle managerial and administrative issues, as proven by the 
establishment of new institutions, such as - for instance - the Istituto 
Centrale di Restauro (Central Institute for Restorations). Cassese (2001, 
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22) stresses the point that such measures are especially significant in 
view of the fact that, at the time, the broad-ranging and complex notion of 
bene culturale had not been fully elaborated yet. Therefore, the fact that, 
at such an early point in time, links were explicitly and officially made 
between areas of the cultural sector that were felt as contiguous (and that 
would be eventually be brought coherently together in the rhetoric of the 
bene culturale), appears to Cassese to be 'almost miraculous' (Cassese 
2001,22). 
The reasons for such a flourishing of measures for the heritage and 
cultural sectors are manifold and complex. Ostensibly, the Thirties 
represented a time of general upsurge of activities in public life, as a 
direct result of the grave economic crisis that hit Italy around that time, 
and of the developments in the political sphere. Paradoxically, it is 
arguable that had Italy not been facing a disastrous economic crisis and 
the likely prospect of a world war, it would have been much harder to 
obtain such a prompt consensus around the need of the State to develop 
a policy for the arts and culture. This, in turn, implied that the State would 
have to take upon itself duties that had belonged, up until then, to the 
private sphere, so as to protect the cultural heritage even at the cost of 
limiting drastically the rights of private owners of cultural goods. 
Furthermore, it was probably the very lack of democracy that allowed to 
cut corners, thus reducing dramatically the times required to turn bills into 
actual laws, by sidestepping lengthy parliamentary debates and votes 
(Cassese 2001,23). 
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Cassese (bid. ) argues that it was precisely the regimes' authoritarian 
nature that allowed it to interfere so heavily in the private sphere, to an 
extent that would have been just unthinkable for any liberal government. 
Hence a further paradox: in many ways, it was precisely the authoritarian 
and illiberal element within the Fascist regime that might have 
represented an incentive to ensure that provisions were made (both 
through legislative and administrative measures) so that the Italian 
cultural patrimony could be preserved for the benefit of future 
generations. Finally, another factor that contributed to the boost of 
popularity of heritage issues during Fascism was surely the regimes' 
cultural affinity with Italy's Roman past. Fascist ideology was based on a 
strong intellectual and ideological link with Roman culture in which 
Renaissance culture was also embedded, as well as the numerous 
neoclassical artistic currents that followed. Preserving archaeological and 
artistic objects from these eras therefore, had a special cultural 
significance for the regime (Cassese 2001,23). In conclusion, the first 
half of the 20th century witnessed the shift from a phase in which juridical 
institutions appeared to be largely uninterested in cultural matters127 to a 
new era, characterised by a legislative production of very high quality in 
the field of heritage, if limited to purposes of cultural preservation 
(Valentino 1999, XV). 
127 This is confirmed by the fact that pre-unitary laws were simply extended to the 
unified country, and that the legislative activity following unification was extremely 
scanty. The first law for cultural preservation was issued by the unified Italy as late as 
1902 (Genovese 1995,30). 
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If one were to single out the most influential piece of legislation produced 
by the Fascist regime, this would undoubtedly be the law n. 1089 of 
1939. The enduring influence of this legislative act over time is confirmed 
by the observation that the 1999 Testo Unico closely reflects its thematic 
structure. Indeed, law 1089/1939 had articulated the various measures 
for cultural preservation and valorisation that it set out across eight 
different main directives which correspond almost exactly to the eight 
sections into which the Testo Unico is divided (Zerboni 2001,115). 
Furthermore, law n 1089 also introduces the exclusion from the 
measures for preservation of all works of art whose creator was still alive 
or that had been produced in the fifty years preceding the implementation 
of the law. This statute was re-confirmed in the 1999 Testo Unico 
(Rossano and Rossano 2002,112 and Zerboni 2001,117). 
There is widespread agreement among commentators that the strand of 
legislative activity of which the 1939 law is an example, is a clear sign of 
the programmatic ratio operating at the time and resulting in Italy's first 
real cultural strategy (Carta 1999,64)128. The law 1089 of 1939 
envisages a system of heritage protection whose responsibility was 
primarily entrusted to the Ministero dell'Educazione Nazionale (eventually 
renamed Ministero delta Pubblica Istruzione, that is, the Education 
128 One of the main reasons why it can be rightfully argued that the first 'proper' cultural 
strategy was established in Italy in this phase is the remarkable breadth of scope of the 
normative production. Indeed, this involved not only the protection of the artistic and 
historical heritage by the law n. 1089 of 1939 here under discussion, but also the 
protection of archives and documentary heritage with the law n. 2006 of 1939 and even 
the environment (bellezze natural! ) with the law n. 1497 of 1939 (Council of Europe 
1995,23-24; Mirri 2000,12-13). 
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Ministry) which was assisted in its tasks by a number of Direzioni generali 
delle antichita' e delle belle arti e delle accademie e biblioteche that were 
spread all across the country and that had been instituted in two waves, 
in 1875 and 1916 (Mirri 2000,12). This administrative structure has 
largely survived the lifespan of the law as it is clearly reflected in the 
Soprintendenze offices that are presently in charge of the preservation, 
restoration and administration of cultural assets at the local level. The 
first articles of the first section of the law identify the targets of the 
conservation effort in objects that are deemed deserving of state- 
sponsored preservation in virtue of their historical, artistic, archaeological 
and ethnographic interest. Moreover, a scale of various levels of interest 
was introduced (in order to evaluate the importance of each individual 
object of art) which culminated with the cultural objects classified as 
"exceptional"129. The system of protection put in place by the Ministry and 
the regional and local offices was closely related to the enforcement of a 
listing process based on such classifications (Ibid. ). It is thus clear that 
the system established by the law n. 1089 relied on the premise of the 
exceptional nature of cultural assets, independently of whether they 
belonged to the state or to private owners (Barbati et al. 2003,13). More 
significant is the observation that one of the guiding principles of the new 
legislation was the belief that the state had the right, as well as the duty, 
to get involved in the administration and restoration of those privately 
owned cultural assets that were recognised to have a cultural 
significance for the national community as a whole. 
129 For the cultural objects of 'exceptional' artistic importance, the law envisaged the 
possibility of issuing expropriation orders and to forbid their exportation (Serio 2001a, 
334). 
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In the light of this necessarily brief discussion of the administrative and 
normative structure introduced by the law n. 1089, a number of important 
observations can be made. Firstly, the very notion of cultural assets that 
underlies the legislative act is obviously a result of the dominant ideology 
of the "masterpiece". According to this ideologia del capolavoro, at the 
centre of heritage policy is the notion of the exceptional work of art that 
can be appreciated independently from its local and cultural context in 
virtue of its objective artistic quality (Serio 2001a, 333). Even the 
legislation for the bellezze naturali (the environment endowed with 
particular natural beauty) shows clear traces of this attitude to art and 
beauty. Law n. 1497 of 1939 conceives environmental protection not as a 
crucial aspect of the preservation of an ecological equilibrium, but rather 
focuses on the very partial and superficial conception of the preservation 
of landscape judged on purely aesthetic terms as the volto delta patria 
(the 'face of the homeland') (Serravalle 1995,59-60 and Ventura 2001, 
448). As Mario Serio further explains, the state admitted the need to 
protect the environment only to the extent to which a beautiful landscape 
could be functional to the enjoyment of monuments, by providing the 
ideal perspective, lighting and dignity (prospettiva, luce and decoro) 
(Ibid. ). This is an obvious consequence of the neo-idealistic conception of 
art and its role in society prevalent in Italy around this time that was 
discussed in Chapter 4. 
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Secondly, the system of heritage policy as defined by the 1939 law is a 
very centralised one, which is probably not surprising considering that it 
emanated from a totalitarian regime. Fascism's centralizing impetus was 
but the culmination of a process that had begun over forty years 
previously, when the administrative structures of the unitary Italian State 
had begun developing according to a fairly centralized model (Serio 
2001 a, 331 and Serio 2001 b, 615). Another important feature of heritage 
policy in this period is that the very authoritarian nature of the Fascist 
government allowed the state to intervene in the private sphere and 
extend its right to impose listings and limitations to privately owned 
cultural objects. One of the explicit aims of the law n. 1089/39 was indeed 
to withdraw from their normal use (and therefore both from the economy 
and the citizens) a selective, yet rather large, number of objects 
(archaeological relics, painting, artistic objects, etc. ) which - in view of 
their rarity or artistic and historical importance - were deemed worthy of 
special attention and care. On this ground, it thus seemed opportune, 
and even desirable, for these objects to be removed from their natural 
and usual practical functions in order to avoid the risks of damage and 
the wear and tear they involve. The ultimate aim of this process was to 
endow these objects with the much nobler and eternal function of 
historical document of a set of aesthetic and cultural values. To achieve 
this end, the law gave the public authority the power to establish 
extensive vincoli (preservation requirements) to movable objects, 
individual buildings and even to entire areas130. A vincolo withdraws the 
130 The establishing of vincoli corresponds roughly to the process of listing period 
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chosen cultural assets from any economic use that could have damaging 
effects and that would not be conducive to the assets' future 
preservation. In the name of the preservation of the national cultural 
patrimony, the establishment of vincoli could even turn the very purpose 
for which an object was originally created into a legally improper use 
(Montella 2003,49)13'. Article 23 of law n. 1089 also sanctioned the 
principio d'inalienabilitä of the cultural objects in the public domain; that 
is, it forbids the sale of any publicly-owned object of historical or artistic 
interest (Ibid., 63). The inalienabilitä of cultural assets became indeed a 
crucial tenet of Italian public policy, and was reinforced by the codice 
civile (civil code) introduced in 1942. The civil code decrees that 
unmovable goods of historical, archaeological or artistic importance, as 
well as the collections housed in museums, galleries, archives and 
libraries can be of either public or private property. Article 822 of the code 
also specifies that when they are of public property, cultural assets fall 
within the category of demanio pubblico, and this has crucial implications. 
First and foremost, the demanialitä of cultural assets implies their 
inalienabilita' but also, more generally, their incommerciabilitä, that is the 
impossibility for cultural assets of public property to be sold for profit 
(Rossano and Rossano 2002,144; see also Montella 2003,63-64 and 
Cofrancesco1999,93). 
buildings in Britain. However, in the Italian system, not only buildings, but also movable 
objects might be subjected to extensive vincoli. 
131 The law n. 1089 even ratifies the principle according to which archaeological objects 
not yet discovered are property of the State (Giancotti 1998,20). This is quite significant 
if we consider that experts believe that only about 30% of what has been created and 
produced in antiquity has been so far brought to life (Dell'Orso 2002,25). 
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It thus appear evident that the cultural policy system, as it came to be 
defined in Italy from the late 1930s onwards, was based on the value of 
preservation, over and above any consideration of the economic value of 
the protected cultural objects, and on the duty of the public administration 
to provide and manage this activity of protection. The literature displays 
wide agreement on the fact that tutela (preservation) was the number one 
priority for Italian cultural policy since its very inception. The word tutela 
appears for the first time in the already mentioned legislation of 1909, 
and its derivation from the Latin tueor, meaning to defend, leaves no 
doubt as to the state's approach to heritage policy (Rossano and 
Rossano 2002,117). The primary goal of the activity of tutela of the 
cultural patrimony coincided with an attempt to avoid the absolute 
liberalization of the objects that were part of art collections (private ones 
as well as public). The practice of tutela is based on norms and 
regulations that strive to hinder the economic exploitation of the cultural 
assets by severely limiting the possibility to sell them. The marketplace 
alone, within a capitalist system, provides no limitations related to the 
nature of the goods for sale, which is irrelevant in a context where the 
logic of maximum profit rules. Francesco Ventura thus defines tutela as 
the production of mechanisms mediating between economic calculation 
and profit on the one hand, and the rights of the cultural patrimony based 
on the principle of the public interest on the other (Ventura 2001,447). It 
is precisely on the basis of such public interest that the national 
government and the local authorities, each according to its own remit, are 
engaged in ensuring that the processes aiming at the conservation, 
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salvaging and restoration of the country's cultural patrimony are 
effectively implemented (Ibic). 
For this reason, the Italian system is founded on a conception of cultural 
preservation that identifies as one of its fundamental objectives the non- 
dispersion of cultural goods - and, in this respect, it is considered to be 
one of the strictest in the world (Serravalle 1995,58). However, this 
seems to be a very passive and conservative interpretation of the 
concept of tutela (Jalla, 2003,10). The extensive use of the legal device 
of the vincolo means that, in many ways, cultural preservation seems to 
be restricted to a set of ample limitations imposed on the private owners 
of cultural and artistic objects (D'Angelo 1995,45 and Serravalle 1995, 
58-59). 
For the reasons discussed above, the Fascist regime had always been 
very interested in arts and artists. As early as 1923, Mussolini, speaking 
at the opening of a contemporary art exhibition in Milan, declared that it 
would be impossible to expect to run a country ignoring its arts and 
artists, and a government that decided to do so, especially in a country 
like Italy, would simply be stupid132 (Margozzi 2001a, 27). Fifteen years 
later - in the period when, as we have seen, the regime's cultural policy 
progressively took on a more concrete form through an intense legislative 
activity - the Minister for National Education, Giuseppe Bottai, in the first 
132 Mussolini's exact words were: "Non si pub governare ignorando I'arte e gli artisti [... ]. 
In un paese come I'Italia sarebbe deficiente un governo the si disinteressasse dell'arte 
e degli artisti". (Quoted in Margozzi 2001 a, 27). 
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issue of the periodical Le Arti, proclaims that according to Fascist 
doctrine, art is an indispensable element in the education of the masses 
(Margozzi 2001 a, 27)133. It is beyond doubt that the Fascist regime had a 
very instrumental notion of the arts and culture, in so far as it saw them 
as a powerful tool for persuasion and moulding public opinion. However, 
it is significant that, despite the difficult economic situation of the country 
when the regime took power, the economic exploitation of the rich Italian 
cultural patrimony was never appealed for. The arts and culture were 
indeed seen as a tool, but mainly as a tool towards the achievement of 
the 'fascistization' of Italian society and its people. It was the educational 
and therefore 'civil' potential of the arts that was consistently 
emphasised. The 1933 Manifesto della pittura murale (Manifesto for 
mural art) is a perfect example of the regime's attitude to culture. The 
manifesto clearly states that in the Fascist state arts are meant to have a 
social function, that is, an educational role. The manifesto reaches the 
conclusion that, thanks to such an educational role, art will become again 
what it once was within the most sophisticated and developed ancient 
civilizations: a "perfect tool of spiritual government" (Margozzi 2001b, 
125-126). 
This notion of the civic function of culture came to its culmination during 
Fascism (for obvious reasons), but it was not extinguished with the 
demise of the regime. In fact, as Chapter 4 has shown, this seems to 
133 In Bottai own words, the Fascist state "nella sua dottrina unitaria, considera I'arte 
I'elemento indispensabile dell'educazione delle masse" (Quoted in Margozzi 2001 a, 27). 
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represent a very deep seated belief within the Italian tradition. Most 
recently the respected art historian Salvatore Settis -a personality whom 
one would normally most certainly not associate with Fascist values - 
concluded a brief historical reconstruction of the birth of the museum 
institution in Italy by writing that: "the citizens are the heirs, and therefore, 
the owners of the country's cultural patrimony - both its monetary value 
as well as its symbolic and metaphoric value, that is as incarnation of the 
State and of its historical memory; as a sign of belonging, as 
representation of the citizenship and identity of the country. The cultural 
patrimony thus assumes a remarkable civil function" (Settis 2002,24; 
emphasis in the original)134. Settis (2002,26) is therefore convinced that 
in the Italian tradition, the administration and the protection of the cultural 
patrimony have never been intended merely in a 'patrimonial-proprietary' 
sense, because the financial value of monuments and artistic objects was 
always seen as subordinate to their civic function13s 
Since this view is so embedded in Italian culture, it logically follows that 
the dispersion and the degradation of the cultural patrimony comes to be 
interpreted as a damage to the patria. Patria can be translated as 
'motherland', but its meaning has, in the Italian language, a much 
134 '1 cittadini sono gli eredi eI proprietari del patrimonio culturale, tanto nel suo valore 
monetario the nel suo valore simbolico e metaforico, come incarnazione dello Stato e 
della sua memoria storica, come segno d'appartenenza, come figura della cittadinanza 
e dell'identita' del Paese. II patrimonio culturale assume in tal modo una notevolissima 
funzione civile". 
135 In Settis' own words: "Nella tradizione Italiana, la gestione e la tutela del patrimonio 
culturale non sono state mai intese in senso meramente patrimoniale-proprietario. Si 
sono sempre 'fatti I conti' (se no, palazzo, quadri e chiese non sarebbero piü dove sono) 
ma si 6 sempre pensato the il valore venale di monumenti e oggetti d'arte fosse 
subordinato all funzione civile del patrimonio artistico" (Settis 2002,26). 
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stronger emotional nuance: the word patria, after all, shares the same 
root of the word patriotism ('patriottismo' in Italian). Patria is indeed the 
'land of the fathers', and pater (Latin for 'father') is the etymon for 
'patrimony'. As the etymology of the word clearly shows, the ancient 
historical and artistic objects, once in possession of royal and noble 
families, the Church and local communities become, in the contemporary 
world, the inheritance of the nation as a whole. The ensemble of the 
various local cultural patrimonies to be found within a country therefore 
belongs in primis to the people of that country, but could ultimately be 
seen as representing the patrimony of the entire humanity, as in the 
perspective currently accepted with regards to the arts and culture 
(Ventura 2001,446). Francesco Ventura (Ibid. ) further observes that the 
word nazione (nation) derives from the Latin nasci (to be born), and in 
view of its etymology he argues that the term indicates 'an ethnic unity 
aware of its own cultural peculiarity'. The various cultural values that are 
attributable to the objects and the cultural expressions that make up the 
cultural patrimony are therefore also peculiar to those very people, 
although they become - as a result of the globalisation processes at work 
in the contemporary world - also patrimony of all the people in the world. 
It is as a consequence of the adoption of this line of reasoning - Ventura 
argues - that within the space of a century and a half, a strategy of tutela 
has been developing in the Western world which begun with the 
protection of art collections and architectural monuments only to expand, 
over time, also to the urban patrimony, and encompassing, eventually 
(through the ecological movement for the protection of the environment) 
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the whole planet (Ventura 2001,446). Situated in this intellectual context, 
the indisputable centrality of tutela within the Italian cultural policy model 
is more easily understood136. In legal terms, this priority was embodied in 
the principle of the esigenza-sufficienza della conservazione expressed 
by law n. 1089, which identified the ultimate goal of the state's activities 
in the heritage sphere with the protection of the cultural patrimony from 
all possible eventualities - both material and juridical - that might 
jeopardise its integrity (Barbati et al 2003,13). As the following sections 
of the chapter will demonstrate, cultural preservation remained the 
uncontested priority in Italian heritage policy for a few decades longer 
until the 1980s, when things finally seemed to change radically. 
PHASE II: FROM THE POSTWAR YEARS TO THE 1970S 
Although at the conclusion of WWII Italy found itself freed form the 
authoritarian regime that had led her into a disastrous world conflict, the 
postwar years represented a very difficult and tumultuous time for the 
Italian nation. However, these were also years during which social and 
economic changes seemed to accelerate considerably, so that - in the 
twenty-year period between the 1950s and 1970s - Italy became 
unrecognisable from its pre-war self. This period was indeed 
characterised by a mass migration of enormous proportion and without 
'36 In 1995, the National Report on Italian Cultural Policy formally acknowledged the 
predominance of the preservation-based approach to cultural policy-making: "As 
regards overall culture, and planning trends in this field, we can mention the pre- 
eminence of the 'defence' dimension as opposed to enhancement and promotion: a pre- 
eminence evidently involving the awareness of a unique heritage of properties, but 
which is still reluctant to 'think' about culture as a value for the social and economic 
development of the country". (Council of Europe 1995,10; emphasis in the original). 
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equal precedent. In addition to emigration to foreign countries, over a 
period of about ten years about 12 million people moved from the 
impoverished South to the North and Centre of mainland Italy, providing 
much needed cheap manpower. This, in turn, contributed to the 
phenomenal economic expansion that took place in Italy at this point, a 
phenomenon usually referred to as the economic 'boom' (Cofrancesco 
1999,93). 
The period here under scrutiny did not only represent a period of 
exceptional economic change, for important developments had also 
happened at political and institutional levels. Following a referendum in 
1946 that offered the Italian people the choice between a monarchic and 
a republican system, Italy, in that same year, became a democratic 
Republic. Following the declaration of the Italian Republic, an Assemblea 
Costituente was established in June 1946 with the task of drawing up the 
Italian Constitution, which entered into force in 1948. 
The Italian Constitution brought about a formal ratification of the 
Republic's belief in the civic function of the cultural patrimony. In 
particular, article 9 declares that "the Italian Republic promotes the 
flourishing of culture as well as scientific and technical research. It also 
protects the landscape (paesaggio) and the historical and artistic 
patrimony of the Nation"137. Article 9 therefore identifies two primary roles 
for the Italian state vis ä vis culture: to promote cultural development and 
137 In the original, article 9 reads: "La Repubblica promuove lo sviluppo della cultura e la 
ricerca scientifica. Tutela it paesaggio e il patrimonio storico e artistico della Nazione". 
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scientific research and to protect the landscape and the historical and 
artistic patrimony of the nation (Carta 1999,68-69). The explicit 
reference to the need for the state to promote culture seems to open the 
way for a potential departure from the notion of the esigenza-sufcienza 
delta conservazione (the requirement-sufficiency of preservation) which 
was introduced by law 1089. However, the Constitution's introduction of 
the element of cultural promotion in the cultural policy debate has, 
according to Carta (1999,69) another important meaning. Carta 
underlines the deep social significance of the concept of cultural 
promotion, and relates it to the other important task of the Republic 
expressed by article 3 of the Constitution. According to article 3, the 
Republic "takes it upon itself to eliminate the obstacles, of an economic 
and social nature, which - insofar as they de facto limit the freedom and 
equality of citizens - prevent the full development of the individual and 
thus hinders his or her participation to the working, social and political life 
of the country"138. In Carta's (Ibid. ) interpretation, the two articles 
demonstrate that the importance of cultural participation for all is 
sanctioned at Constitutional level, and furthermore, that it falls within the 
Republic's duty to ensure the full personal development of all her 
citizens. In other words, thanks to the Constitution, the enjoyment of the 
cultural patrimony becomes a defining element of full participation in 
public life, and a necessary requisite for a social development founded 
138 Article 3 of the Italian Constitution reads: "Tutti I cittadini hanno pari dignitä sociale e 
sono uguali davanti alla legge, senza distinzione di sesso, di razza, di lingua, di 
religione, di opinioni politiche, di condizioni personali e sociali. 8 compito delta 
repubblica di rimuovere gli ostacoli di ordine economico e sociale, che, limitando di 
fatto, la liberty e I'eguaglianza del cittadini, impediscono il pieno sviluppo della persona 
umana e I'effettiva partecipazione di tutti i lavoratori all'organizzazione politica, 
economica e sociale del paese" (emphasis mine). 
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upon "the historical identity of the nation" (Carta 1999,69). This is 
confirmed by the very fact that article 9 is to be found in the section 
which deals with the principi fondamentali, that is, the fundamental 
principles on which the Republic is based (D'Angelo 1995,42). 
Two further important observations can be made at this point. Firstly, 
article 9 clearly establishes the notion of tutela as a central priority for the 
state, continuing the centrality of cultural preservation that characterises 
the Italian tradition (D'Angelo 1995,42). Secondly, the above mentioned 
articles of the Italian Constitution, by emphasizing the cultural (in an 
anthropological sense) and the civic value of the artistic patrimony, 
represent the first formal move away from the aestheticism that 
underscored the notion of cultural assets purported by the 1939 
legislation (Serravalle 1995,63). The ultimate goal of tutela, indeed, is 
not the material conservation of the bene culturale in itself, but rather the 
preservation and defence - through measures that might include 
intervening on the material dimension of the beni - of the cultural values 
that it embodies (Cicerchia 2002,59). This second phase in the evolution 
of Italian cultural policy, indeed, witnesses a slow but consistent move 
towards a notion of cultural assets that stresses their unique and crucial 
role in the moral, cultural and political formation of the individual. 
According to Carta (1999,81), the 60s and 70s in particular, represented 
the moment in Italian contemporary history when the belief in the social 
utility of the beni culturali reached its zenith. 
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The elaboration of the Constitution undoubtedly represents the fruit of the 
most important legislative activity in this period. The remaining portion of 
this phase in Italian cultural policy does not witness many other influential 
pieces of legislation see the light of day. In fact, what seems to 
characterise the cultural policy debate from the 1950s to the late 1960s is 
the flourishing of Commissioni, that is, parliamentary commissions that 
were organised in order to collect information on the current state of 
cultural policy at the time. They also had the task to make 
recommendations and advise the parliament on the best course of action 
and on the possibility of introducing new legislation to implement the 
necessary changes. The first of these commissions was instituted in 
1956 with the name Commissione mista per la tutela del paesaggio e la 
valorizzazione del patrimonio artistico e culturale. The Commissione's 
main task was to establish the technical and economic situation of the 
institutions in charge of taking care of the administration of cultural assets 
(Carta 1999,69). By far the most influential of the commissions set up in 
this period was the one commonly referred to as the Commissione 
Franceschini (named after the member of parliament who chaired it)139 
and which was established in 1964. The commission's final report, 
published in three volumes in 1967, was extremely influential. In the 
words of the 1995 National Report on Italian cultural policy, it "was for 
over a decade the point of reference in the debate on cultural heritage, 
even though it did not achieve its main purpose, which was the reform of 
the laws of 1939" (Council of Europe 1995,27). The most lasting impact 
139 Its full name was Commissione d'indagine per la tutela e la valorizzazione delle cose 
d'interesse storico, archeologico e artistico e del paesaggio. 
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of the report was the introduction of the expression beni culturali into 
discussions of cultural policy matters. The formula beni culturali had 
originated in the international context, having been first used in the 
Hague Convention of 1954 (Jalla 2003,87). As is discussed in the 
Appendix, far from being a merely linguistic issue, the adoption of the 
new expression (instead of the traditional 'objects of historical and artistic 
importance') marks a significant shift in the understanding of the very 
nature of the object of heritage policy. The report explicitly subscribes to 
an anthropological notion of bene culturale (now based on historical, 
rather than aesthetic, criteria), whereby cultural assets are important as 
expression of a civilization, and constitute, for this very reason, part of the 
cultural patrimony of humanity as a whole140 (Carta 1999,70; Volonte 
2001,35, and Council of Europe 1995,28). 
The expression beni culturali was obviously there to stay, and was 
endorsed by the following two parliamentary commissions that were 
established between the late 1960s and early 1970s. These go under the 
name of first and second Commissione Papa/do (again, named after their 
chairman). The raison d'etre of the Commissions was to attempt to 
analyse the functions of cultural preservation as promotion that the 
Constitution had identified as the main duties of the State in the cultural 
140 The original passage of the report here referred to reads: "La Commissione, all'inizio 
del suoi lavori richiamandosi a principi gia largamente e sicuramente affermati anche in 
sede internazionale, dichiara di voler riconoscere al patrimonio storico, archeologico, 
artistico e paesistico, oggetto della sua indagine, un preminente valore di civiltb 
assoluta, universale e non transeunte, tale da caratterizzarlo come patrimonlo 
dell'umanita di cui ogni possessore singolo, ogni Paese, ogni generazione debbono 
considerarsi soltanto depositari, e quindi responsabili di fronte alla societa, a tutto il 
mondo civile e alle generazioni future" (Quoted in Carta 1999,70). 
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sphere, and how such duties could be accommodated within the existing 
administrative framework (which was still the one configured by the 1939 
law). The main innovation suggested by the second Papaldo commission 
was the proposal for the institution of a Ministry for the beni cultural!. The 
new ministry was indeed established in 1975, by the government led by 
Aldo Moro and composed of a coalition of the Christian Democrats and 
the Republican Party (DC and PRI), with the name of Ministero dei Beni 
Cultural! ed Ambientali, thus ratifying at the legislative and institutional 
levels the use of the expression beni culturali that had, by then, become 
common currency in the policy debate (Carta 1999,73 and Serravalle 
1995,56) 141 . 
The new Ministero represented the institutional embodiment of the 
conviction in the moral and civic function of the cultural patrimony which, 
as we have seen, had been gaining momentum over time and that found 
now its culmination. The very establishment of the Ministry was borne out 
of the idealistic intent to make the administration of cultural assets the 
object of an autonomous policy-making body, so as to confer to the 
sphere of the beni culturali a higher position in the political hierarchy 
(Carta 1999,74). The idealistic view that underscored the institution of 
141 This is how the 1995 National Report describes the administrative structure of the 
new Ministero: "The structure of the Ministry consisted of a combination of three general 
departments, two of which were offshoots from the Ministry of Education and one from 
the Ministry of the Interior. To these was added a department for general administrative 
affairs and for staff. The four central institutions in charge of ensuring methodological 
unity in the sectors of both bibliographical and art-history cataloguing and restoration, 
both of works of art and of the bibliographical heritage, were only a reorganisation of 
pre-existing organised bodies. The most important innovation which took up another 
suggestion of the Franceschini Commission, was the division of the highest advisory 
body, the National Council for Cultural Assets, into separate sector committees on the 
basis of distinct types of assets" (Council of Europe 1995,29). 
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the 1975 Ministry is summarised by the declaration by Giuseppe Galasso 
about the widespread agreement that the Ministry should be not a 
'Ministry of Culture' but a 'Ministry for the cultural and environmental 
patrimony' (Galasso 1996,106; emphasis in the original)142. That this 
was a common feeling is indeed confirmed by the writings of the 
protagonists of this moment of institutional change. 
The principal promoter of the creation of the new Ministry was the 
member of Parliament and well respected historian Giovanni Spadolini. 
The historical and cultural patrimony of the nation was central to his very 
notion of Italy. Antonio Paolucci (who was working in the field of cultural 
administration at the time, later to become - for a short while - Minister 
for the beni culturali himself) recalls Spadolini's firm belief that Italy 
enjoys an incommensurable privilege in view of its rich cultural patrimony, 
complex history and fascinating beauty. It was Spadolini's conviction that 
- precisely by virtue of Italy's special artistic and cultural endowment - the 
issue of the administration of cultural assets ought to be central to the 
country's public and political life. Hence his campaigning for the necessity 
for an autonomous Ministry especially devoted to heritage policy and 
administration (Paolucci 1996,102). The centrality of the beni culturali to 
this understanding of the richness of Italian culture is further 
demonstrated by the fact that it did not seem opportune, at the time, to 
incorporate responsibilities for music, theatre and the other live 
142 In Galasso's own words: in Italia fin dalla istituzione del Ministero per I Beni Culturali 
ed Ambientali, nel 1975, fu chiaro the esso non doveva essere un "ministero delta 
cultura", ma un "ministero per il patrimonio culturale ed ambientale" (Galasso 1996, 
106). 
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performing arts within the remit of the new Ministry 143. The new 
institution, thus, concerned itself with the beni culturali and ambientali 
alone, which used to be under the responsibility of the Ministero delta 
Pubblica Istruzione (the Education Ministry) (Jalla 2003,90). 
It thus appears evident that the creation of the new Ministry was a crucial 
element in a much broader political plan whereby cultural policy-making 
and the beni culturali would acquire centre stage in Italian political life 
(Paolucci 1996,103). In this grand scheme of things, the Ministry was 
meant to be a technical - rather than bureaucratic - tool for the promotion 
and preservation of the cultural patrimony144. The best interests of the 
cultural heritage were the ultimate goal that this ambitious plan aimed to 
achieve. In a speech to the Italian parliament, Spadolini himself clearly 
expressed his view of a State that gets involved in cultural matters purely 
to make available resources and technical and scientific know-how in the 
143 One of the most remarkable features of the policies for the performing arts in Italy in 
this phase is that there was no devoted general legislation or regulations. The sector 
was therefore administered and funded on the basis of ad hoc dispositions that were 
communicated through circolarl ministerial!, which were issued yearly. The circolari are 
really meant to be a policy tool to be used in cases of emergency, when a situation 
requires urgent action, and it would thus be dangerous to wait for the normal long 
bureaucratic procedures. Yet the performing arts sector has been run through circolari 
ministeriali for decades! The obvious implications of this state of affairs was the 
difficulties in planning long term for cultural organizations and the obvious repercussions 
of what was clearly a lack of a coherent strategy for the sector (Trezzini 1997,7-14) 
With regards to the decision of leaving out the performing arts from the new Ministry's 
remit, the 1995 National Report comments: "It was discussed whether in the new 
ministry they should merge the responsibilities for tourism and the performing arts but 
the question, rather than solved, was shelved, seeing the hast with which they 
proceeded to establish the ministry. The Government crisis was, in fact, already taking 
place and the legislative instrument they used was the exceptional option of a decree" 
(Council of Europe 1995,28). For a discussion of the most recent legislation affecting 
the performing arts, see Trimarchi 2000 and 2002; Mbac 2004a and 2004b; Tubertinl 
2004. 
144 Paolucci (1996,103-104) explains the meaning of a 'technical Ministry': a Ministry 
predominantly staffed by tecnici of the discipline of cultural preservation. The category 
includes archivists, librarians, archaeologists, art and architecture historians, 
professional restorers and so on. 
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field of cultural preservation - without becoming itself the promoter of any 
particular type of culture. In a crucial passage of the speech, Spadolini 
maintains that a democratic state should defend its cultural patrimony 
which belongs to the whole national community, and therefore by no 
means should the state ever use that cultural patrimony instrumental IyI45 
(Carta 1999,74). 
In spite of the intense idealistic enthusiasm that accompanied it, there is 
wide agreement between commentators that the establishment of the 
new Ministry was, on the whole, a missed opportunity, and that 
Spadolini's ambitious plan to put cultural policy on the front stage of 
Italian politics resulted in a painful failure (Palma and Clemente di San 
Luca 1987,74). Since its very institution the Ministry was perceived by 
Italian politicians as being of secondary importance. Not only did it have 
very little contractual power in the complex Italian political game, but it 
soon became one of the obvious choices for the last-minute political 
transactions that characterise that peculiar phenomenon in Italian politics 
known as spartizione delle cariche (the sharing out of important public 
positions among the various parties that make up the governing coalition 
of the day) 146 (Paolucci 1996,104). Settis (2002,36) argues that, as a 
consequence of this situation, the autonomy of decision-making of the 
145 In Giovanni Spadolini's words the new Ministry "non deve essere un Ministero della 
Cultura, ne tanto meno della cultura popolare; ma in genere di nessun'altra cultura, 
perche lo Stato democratico non 6 possessore di una cultura. Lo Stato 6 difensore di un 
patrimonio culturale, the L patrimonio di tutti, ma non deve gestire esso, e cioe 
strumentalizzare la cultura. [II Ministero deve essere invece] una struttura di promozione 
della linea di tendenza e conservazione nella urgenza immediata" (Quoted in Carta 
1999,74). 
146 A more detailed discussion of this and other peculiar characteristics of the Italian 
political system can be found in Fabbrini (2000). 
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Ministry - which in theory should have ensured the optimal valorisation of 
the cultural assets - in fact resulted in cultural policy issues being 
marginalized and isolated. It has indeed been argued that it is precisely 
with the institution of the new Ministry that a period of profound crisis 
begun in the sphere of cultural administration (Settis 2002,36; Paolucci 
1996,103; Jalla 2003,90-91). Besides the mediocre leadership and the 
inadequate funding, the main problem with the new Ministry was that, 
despite the excitement its institution created, the institutional 
transformation brought about very little actual change. Palma and 
Clemente di San Luca report on the opinion expressed at the time that 
the Ministry "basically remains a ministry of restoration, museums, 
libraries, and exhibitions. It has not enabled cultural policy to take giant 
steps on the organizational plane" (Serrani quoted in Palma and 
Clemente di San Luca 1987,74). Despite superficial changes in the 
naming of offices and departments, administrative structures, as well as 
relevant legislation, were left unchanged147. As a matter of fact, this 
second phase of Italian cultural policy witnesses no significant departure 
147 One further proof of the failure of the Ministry in establishing itself into an efficient 
administrative machine is represented by the persistent problem of the residui passivi. 
This expression refers to the significant proportion of the funds that the Ministry receives 
from central government which are left unspent at the end of the fiscal year (which 
results in them being lost for good). In a country where only between 0,2% and 0%4 of 
the entire public budget goes to the cultural sector (Valentino 1999,387 and Galasso 
1996,67), the failure to plan ahead so that the best use can be made of (all) the meagre 
resources available appear not just wasteful, but also irresponsible (Galasso 1996,67). 
Galasso (Ibid. ) attributes this paradoxical situation in part to the complexity of the Italian 
legislation and bureaucracy. However, he makes it clear that this was also partly a 
consequence of the strongly bureaucratic and therefore inflexible physiognomy that the 
Ministry had progressively assumed. Interestingly, things seem not to have improved 
much since the 1970s, as proved by the declaration of the present Minister for Culture, 
Urbani, who, in 2002, wrote that at the time of taking up his appointment as Culture 
Minister, he found a huge amount of accumulated residul passvi that amounted to one 
and a half time the total funds available annually for the cultural sector (Urbani 2002, 
24). 
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from pre-existing cultural policy priorities and strategies (Jalla 2003,91). 
M. Dallari, writing in 1976, comments: 
the new ministerial apparatus seems so scantily equipped with 
personnel and resources as to restrict its activity to the mere 
conservation of the existing Italian cultural patrimony without any 
opportunity for growth (Quoted in Palma and Clemente di San Luca 
1987,74). 
Equally disappointing was the handling, on the part of the new Ministry, 
of the pressures coming from regional and local authorities to take on a 
more proactive role in local cultural planning and policy. These increasing 
requests coming from the local levels of public administration resulted in 
the initiation, in 1975, of a gradual process of decentralization of policy- 
making in the cultural sphere, which culminated in the Dpr (Presidential 
decree) n. 619 of 1977. Article 49 of the Presidential decree extended 
responsibilities for cultural and educational promotion to the Regions 
(which had themselves been established in 1970) (Carta 1999,75). The 
decree represented the final result of a long and problematic juridical 
debate around the interpretation of article 9 of the Constitution already 
discussed in Chapter 3, and on whether responsibility for decision- 
making should reside with the Central State alone. The prevailing 
position was that the tutela of the cultural assets should be a common 
task of both the Central State and the Regions. However, according to 
the 1995 National Report: 
Fruit of a difficult mediation between demand for participation by 
the local authorities and the reluctance of central government to 
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delegate any of its traditional functions, the transfer of 
responsibilities occurred in a partial way, without any real 
planning logic, and in such a way as to emphasise the conflict 
between the parties. As a consequence they did not succeed in 
coming to an agreement on the outline law, which should have 
regulated ex novo the subject of cultural assets by 1 January 
1979 (Council of Europe 1995,30). 
Although the Presidential decree did formally provide for the collaboration 
between regional and central administration, in reality, it gave no 
operational guidelines on how to achieve this, pre-emptying the 
regulation from any real possibility of genuine implementation (Jalla 
2003,90). As could be expected, the Regions challenged such 
centralistic attitudes, but as the decentralization of administrative 
functions was not accompanied by a decentralization of financial 
resources, there was very little the Regions could do148. Effectively, 
regional cultural policy entered a phase of progressive decline from the 
late 1970s onwards. In this context, the task to ensure adequate cultural 
provision at the local level fell on urban local authorities, which in 
numerous cases were able to implement very ambitious and successful 
cultural strategies (Bianchini et al 1996,295-298). As we shall see in the 
following section, the ineffectuality of the Minister continued in following 
years, due to lack of resources and political will. In the 1980s, indeed, as 
Settis (2002,36) polemically argues, "the question of the cultural 
148 Legislation clarifying the actual respective competences of the central and regional 
levels of administration has been produced as late as 2004, when a new Codice dei 
beni culturali e del paesaggio was drawn up. However, even in this most recent decree, 
commentators have found clear signs of a centralistic approach and a persisting 
reluctance of the centre to relinquish some of its competences to lower administrative 
tiers (Pastori 2004a; Pastori 2004b; Barbati 2004; Cammelli 2004; Nardella 2004). See 
also Poggi 2002 for a discussion of the impacts that revisions of the Constitution have 
had on the issue of the decentralisation of cultural administration. 
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patrimony started to be diluted in more wide-ranging governmental clever 
machinations". 
Following the analysis of the first two periods of Italian cultural policy we 
can conclude that in the first half of the 20th century we witness a clear 
shift from a phase during which public institutions did not show great 
interest for the cultural assets of the country, to another phase - broadly 
coinciding with the lifespan of the Fascist regime - characterised by a 
legislative production remarkable both in terms of quantity and quality, 
but limited to guaranteeing the protection of the existing heritage through 
regulations of practices of tutela. After the Fascist era, we register a 
certain slowing down of the legislative impetus and less remarkable 
change in the normative as well as the administrative fields, with the only 
relative exception of the establishment of a new Ministry for the Cultural 
and Environmental Assets in 1975. According to Valentino et al (1999 b), 
the explanation for such a slow development in the second phase of 
Italian cultural policy lies in the fact that the cultural sector in Italy is 
affected only marginally by market forces, which he seems to see as the 
real agent for rapid change in Italy at this time (this was indeed the era in 
which Italy witnessed the so-called 'economic-boom' a period of great 
and unprecedented economic expansion149) (Valentino 1999, XV). We 
can conclude thus, that until the period just discussed, the rationales 
behind public intervention in the public sector were, in Italy, either 
reasons of national grandeur- as was true especially under Fascism - or 
149 On the Italian 'economic boom', also referred to as the 'economic miracle', see 
Ginsborg 2001 and Cohen and Federico 2001. 
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reasons linked to cultural identity and civic education of the national 
community, as is the case for the 1948 Constitution and much of the 
following policies for the beni culturali. In the 1980s, however, a new 
policy rationale and its own very distinctive accompanying rhetoric enter 
the Italian public debate, thus rocking the centrality of tutela within Italian 
cultural policies, which had been, until then, largely uncontested. Indeed, 
the growing awareness of the economic dimension of the beni culturali 
brought about significant changes in language, legislation and 
administrative practices. These changes will be discussed in the following 
section of this chapter. 
PHASE 3: FROM THE 1980s TO THE PRESENT DAY 
Chapter 5 has discussed at length the diffuse feeling that the 1980s 
represented somewhat of a watershed in British cultural policy, marking a 
clear change of direction and an abrupt shift in policy priorities and 
rationales. Interestingly, the perception of the 1980s as a moment of 
fracture and profound change can also be found in Italy. Here too, it was 
felt that momentous transformations were taking place that altered the 
way in which the cultural patrimony was understood and administered. 
There are however, some significant differences between the events 
taking place around the '80s in the two countries. As we have seen, in 
Britain, the diffuse feeling of 'beleaguerment' originated from the 
contraction of public resources destined for the cultural sector, and the 
consequent feeling that the arts were 'under attack'. As a result of this 
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perception of its own situation and place within the public debate, the 
cultural sector believed it had to find new and more powerful ammunition 
so as to win the fierce battle for resources (now a necessary endeavour 
in order to compete successfully with other areas of public spending). 
Hence the 'attachment' of cultural policy to other areas of policy (social 
and economic) that could command greater political clout in the public 
arena. 
In Italy, however, the 1980s appear as a time of change precisely for the 
opposite reason - that is, because of the unprecedented increase in 
available funding for the heritage field. Moreover, the involvement of the 
public cultural patrimony in a number of non-specifically cultural 
governmental initiatives, not only solicited an unusual amount of public 
interest in cultural matters, but also made further resources available to 
the heritage sector. Montella (2003,98) reports that, despite the 
inevitable inconsistencies between the various available statistics, 
analysts generally agree that public spending on the cultural sector - in 
the 1980s - registered an increase of at least 80%. This is an exceptional 
growth in public spending, in comparison not just to Britain, but to any 
other European country. 
Commentators (Valentino 1999, XI; Zerboni 2001,3) agree that the 
transformations that took place in the 1980s in the Italian cultural sphere 
are referable to the crisis of the very peculiar Italian model of economic 
development that struck the country around that same time. This was the 
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model which had produced the already mentioned 'miracle' and that had 
ensured the remarkable economic and social development of post-war 
Italy. This profound crisis was further aggravated by international 
developments such as the progressive globalisation of economic 
processes and the need to adapt to EU norms and regulations. The brunt 
of the economic crisis was felt in particular by the Southern regions of the 
country, which were traditionally economically disadvantaged in 
comparison to the more industrialised North. The Mezzogiorno had been 
indeed the target of special programmes aimed at facilitating economic 
development and job creation, but the 1980s also witnessed the 
cessation of such initiatives of intervento straordinario ('extraordinary 
150 intervention'), which were felt to have been largely unsuccessful 
In the political sphere, the 1980s were also a time of significant change, 
and witnessed the consolidation of the leadership of the Socialist Party 
(PSI) and its secretary, Bettino Craxi151. His particular style of 
government, that he himself referred to as decisionismo (which meant - 
Gundle (1996,94) observes, "in essence deciding quickly and without 
consultation or compromise with the opposition"), his push for tax cuts 
and managerialism in public administration - together with the party's 
choice to affiliate itself to the growing numbers of successful Italian 
150 For more on the special public intervention in the South of Italy and its limited impact 
on the region's economic development see Giannola 2000 and Trigilia1992. 
t51 As LaPalombara (1987,232) observes about Craxi's leadership of the country: 
"During Italy's twelve decades as a nation, only a Fascist dictator had held executive 
office longer without interruption. Craxi may have generated much antipathy within the 
political class. But the general public warmed to his arrogance, his grinta, or true grit, 
and his negative charisma". Ginsborg (2001,156) observes that Craxi popularity had 
assumed - by 1987 - an international dimension: his was the only statue of a 
contemporary Italian to be found at Madame Tussaud's in London. 
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imprenditori (entrepreneurs) - Berlusconi among them - had a great 
influence over the political life of the country. In many ways, the laws and 
the initiatives regarding the beni culturali introduced in this period are 
indissolubly linked to the political fortunes of the Socialist party, and Craxi 
in particular152. 
It is in this context that we need to understand the feeling that spread 
among politicians as well as the public opinion in this period that a drastic 
rethinking of the way public resources should be used was necessary 
(Santoro 1995). As far as the cultural sector is concerned, the 1980s was 
a decade that witnessed new trends in the political and legislative 
spheres which increasingly moved towards a conception of the beni 
culturali as economic goods. It is precisely this discovery of the economic 
dimension of the heritage (and its potential for local economic 
development) that accounts for the apparently bizarre notion of a country 
that raises its funding for the cultural sector at a time when the 'economic 
boom' of the 1960s and 1970s was certainly slowing down. Since it was 
unrealistic to argue in favour of increased public spending on the arts and 
culture, the cultural sector promoted, instead, the idea that the beni 
culturali themselves are capable to produce at least part of the resources 
required for their preservation and enjoyment on the part of the public 
'52 LaPalombara's (1987,232) compellingly summarises Craxi's appeal: "Bettino Craxi's 
decisionismo, or forceful style of executive leadership, his, overuse of the executive 
decree as a substitute for ordinary legislation, and his willingness to take on 
Communists and Christian Democrats alike in head-on collisions certainly mad him the 
centre of controversy. But he demonstrated that, within the existing framework of 
institutions, the country is eminently governable. As he was fond of replying to the 
fiercest critics of his stewardship, "e la nave va", and the ship sails on. Italians ate it up. 
Several years without a cabinet crisis was more than alluring; it was downright 
addictive". 
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(Valentino 1999,387-388). Galasso (1996,58) confirms that the '80s 
were a decade that witnessed a general push towards a serious 
commitment of the state to a very pro-active cultural policy and a 
carefully planned strategy of valorizzazione ('valorisation') of the 
country's cultural patrimony. The traditional notion of the moral and civic 
quality of the cultural and artistic heritage of the nation now finds itself 
placed alongside the principle that the cultural patrimony should be seen 
as a resource that needs to be maximised in the country's best financial 
interests (especially at times of economic duress). As Settis (2002,35) 
laments, for reasons that have to do with the increasing importance of 
economic considerations in the political discourse (a phenomenon hardly 
limited to Italy alone), the traditional institutional and cultural rationales in 
favour of public financing of the cultural sector were progressively 
overshadowed by economic arguments. Paolucci (1996,120) observes 
how, in addition to the dire economic predicament of Italy, the 1980s 
were also a time that witnessed the progressive but fast dissolution of the 
radical spirit of the Sixties and Seventies based on the belief in the 
democratisation of culture, the values of mass education and the 
people's enjoyment of the country's heritage as a form of 
'reappropriation' of local civic and historical traditions and values. Whilst 
these phenomena did not exert a significant influence of cultural policy- 
making at the national level, they had important repercussions at the 
local level (see Bianchini et al. 1996). 
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In order to face the economic difficulties of the time, a decision was made 
to redirect public resources to projects and initiatives capable of 
developing new areas of the economy that were seen to provide high 
returns for low investments and that could be easily exported. In a 
country like Italy, the heritage and cultural sectors appeared as the 
perfect area for the concentration of initiatives of the nature just 
described. What is more significant, this choice was met by consensus 
across the whole Italian political spectrum, with even eminent 
representatives of the Italian Communist party speaking enthusiastically 
of the economic, profit-making and job creation potential of the 
conservation of the Italian artistic and archaeological heritage (Montella 
2003,98-100). Unsurprisingly, a particular emphasis was placed on the 
links between Italy's extraordinary cultural richness and the possibility of 
expanding the tourism industry (Valentino 1999,69; Zerboni 2001,7). 
According to the government's own definition, this was to be a sort of 
'Marshall plan for culture' (Montella 2003,99). More specifically, the 
government's 'plan' was articulated around four main initiatives which 
were expected to guarantee significant financial returns: the FIO - Fondo 
Investimenti e Occupazione (Investments and Employment Fund); the 
Giacimenti Culturali (this literally means 'cultural deposits'); law n. 64 of 
1986; and law n. 449 of 1987. 
The FIO was a special fund established in 1982 by that year's budget law 
under as so called pentapartito (five-party coalition) government led by 
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the Republican Giovanni Spadolini153. The FIO had the task to finance a 
number of infrastructural and structural projects. The ultimate goal of the 
fund was to promote the use of cultural heritage for purposes of wealth 
and job creation; the fund remained operative until 1987 (Bianchini et al 
1996,299 and Valentino 1999,70). The 1995 National Report openly 
admits that the FIO represented "for the first time an attempt to evaluate 
intervention in the cultural heritage according to criteria of profitability" 
(Council of Europe 1995,34). The giacimenti culturali were established 
in 1986 by the Ministry for Employment and Welfare154 and consisted in 
funding schemes for heritage-related inventory, training and employment 
programmes that made use of new information technologies (Bianchini et 
al 1996,299). Law n. 64 of 1986 established extraordinary funding 
measures for cultural projects in the South of the country, with the explicit 
intent to promote employment and local economic development in 
economically disadvantaged areas. Finally, law n. 449 of 1987 focussed 
on the redirection of extraordinary funding to projects of heritage 
restoration targeted at the most damaged and degraded sections of the 
cultural patrimony. However, the law made it clear that the projects that 
ought to be privileged in the selection process were those that would 
result in enhanced public access to cultural assets and that would, thus, 
encourage cultural tourism (Valentino 1999,70-71)155 
's' The five parties constituting the coalition in question were: the Christian Democrats 
(DC), the Socialist Party (PSI), the Social-democratic Party (PSDI), the Republican 
Party (PRI), and the Liberal Party (PLI). 
"' The Minister for Employment and Welfare at the time was Gianna De Michelis, and 
head of the government was Bettino Craxi, who led the pentapartito coalition composed 
of DC, PSI, PSDI, PRI and PLI (see preceding footnote) between 1986 and 1987 (IX 
Legislatura). 
155 According to the statistics cited by Jalla (2003,92), the resources redirected towards 
the cultural sector by the FIO, in the period between 1982 and 1989, amounted to 
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These initiatives were all very controversial at the time of their 
implementation, and even today - twenty years afterwards - 
commentators are very critical towards them, and sceptical over their 
actual effectiveness. Indeed, there seems to be a wide agreement that 
these schemes were all fundamentally unsuccessful both on the cultural 
and the economic planes. In particular, Valentino (1999,71-73) offers a 
detailed discussion of the limitations and problems inherent in the above- 
mentioned initiatives. His overall diagnosis is that the programmes 
established in the 1980s only managed to boost local economic 
development in limited areas of the country, so that, on the whole, from 
an economic point of view, they represented a failure (Valentino 1999, 
71)156. Montella (2003,101) - though willing to acknowledge that these 
initiatives allowed to increase the volume of restorations carried out, 
resulting in a greater proportion of the cultural heritage becoming 
available to the public - is also very critical of their economic impacts. 
Montella (Ibid. ) observes that, as a result of these programmes, no new 
market was created; furthermore, the investment was wholly public, since 
no significant private investment was raised. The use of public resources 
to fund projects that seem to advantage mainly the private sector was 
almost 1,500 billion lire; the giacimenti accounted for a public investment of 600 billion 
lire in a two-year period alone (1986-7); whilst the law n. 449 of 1987 ensured that the 
Ministero per I Beni Culturali earned an extra 1,265 billion lire for the period 1987-8. To 
gain a clearer idea of the immense proportion of this additional public spending on 
culture, it is enough to consider than when the Euro replaced the Italian lire in January 
2001, one Euro equated to just under 2,000 lire. 
156 Valentino (1999,74) also makes the interesting point that the limitations and 
problems that have been unanimously identified in the initiatives of the 1980s and that 
were, arguably, at the root of their fundamental failure, reappeared unchanged and 
unchallenged in later initiatives that strove to redirect additional funding to the cultural 
sector, such as the schemes funded through resources made available by the Lotto (the 
Italian equivalent of the National Lottery). 
-- 281 
indeed one of the most controversial aspects of these initiatives. The 
policy makers working within the Ministry for Cultural Assets had indeed 
expressed their deep reservations about the FIO. In particular, what 
worried them was their impression that the Fund envisaged the role of 
the state merely as that of a passive funder for projects that had been 
identified and set up by the private sector157 
Jalla (2003,92) further highlights the problem inherent in the 'special' 
character of these initiatives, which left unchanged the levels of ordinary 
funding for the heritage sector (unanimously reputed to be totally 
inadequate to the upkeep of a vast heritage such as the one the Italian 
state was responsible for). It is precisely the extraordinary nature of this 
additional expenditure that is responsible in Jalla's argument, for the 
exiguous cultural impact of initiatives which ultimately proved 
advantageous for a small section of the private sector dealing with 
information technologies. Finally, Cicerchia (2002,28) criticises the 
automatic, a-critical and superficial connection that was established 
around this time between the beni culturali and the tourism industry. 
157 Writing about the experiment of the giacimenti culturali, Bianchini et al. (1996,299), 
observe that: "[ ... ] it gave the private sector the responsibility of 
identifying the heritage 
assets to be developed, confining the role of the state to that of mere provider of funds 
for private enterprise. It failed to develop an effective employment strategy, with the 
result that the jobs created were only temporary. An even more serious criticism of the 
giacimenti culturali initiative is that, like the FIO, it channelled funds to a wide range of 
enterprises - from computer manufacturing and software production firms to providers 
of training and other services. These enterprises carried out projects often without clear 
prioritising, guidance, monitoring, and evaluation by the experts in the Ministero dei Beni 
Culturali. The relevance, as well as the cultural and employment benefits, of such 
projects in many cases was difficult to demonstrate". 
-- 282 
The fierce criticism that these initiatives have encountered did not focus 
merely on their alleged failure to achieve their official goals, but also on 
the change in the rhetoric accompanying cultural policy-making that they 
engendered. There is indeed no doubt that Italy witnessed, in this period, 
a change in the vocabulary and language of cultural policy discourse not 
at all dissimilar to the one that was discussed with regards to Britain (see 
chapter 5). This quote by Gianni De Michelis, the then Minister for 
Employment, and the principal figure behind the creation of the 
giacimenti law, leaves no doubts as to the new direction that Italian 
cultural policy was being steered towards: 
The financial resources needed for the conservation of the Italian 
heritage will never become available unless the emphasis is 
placed on the enhancement of the heritage's economic potential. 
The resources will never be raised purely on the basis of the 
ethical-aesthetical value of conservation; only in so far as the 
cultural assets come to be viewed as an economic advantage it 
becomes possible to conceive of a scheme whereby resources 
can be destined to their conservation (Quoted in Montella 2003, 
101 )158 
If De Michelis' words ever left any room for further doubt, the very names 
of some of the programmes discussed above are a clear marker of the 
patrimonial conception of the cultural assets that gains common currency 
around this time. Indeed, as Settis (2002,37) points out, the metaphor of 
158 This is my translation. De Michelis' original statement was: "Le risorse economiche 
necessarie alla conservazione non ci saranno mai finche non ne viene evidenziata la 
valorizzazione economica. Le risorse non si avranno infatti mal semplicemente sulla 
base del valore etico-estetico della conservazione; solo nella misura in cul il bene 
culturale viene concepito come convenienza economica, diventa possibile concepire 
una operazione le cui risorse possono essere destinate alla sua conservazione" 
(Quoted in Montella 2003,101). 
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the giacimenti culturali is very indicative of the changed climate of the 
time: 
[f]or what else is our cultural patrimony if not passive 'deposits' 
(the giacimenti), that is, resources that have not been 
adequately exploited? And here come our intrepid ministers 
ready to venture into a mission of discovery of these new oil 
wells, anxious to 'exploit' them in the most efficient manner 
possible, obviously for such laudable causes as the good of the 
country, youth employment and so on159 
The consequences of the increasing popularity of this metaphor - and the 
approach to cultural funding that underpins it - are, according to Settis 
(2002,40) that it has, in fact, turned against its very object. Settis argues 
that the notion of 'cultural deposits' encourages a conception of the 
cultural assets as a totally passive economic resource rather than as an 
important and living element in the national history and identity. In this 
new perspective, Italy's cultural heritage is to be seen precisely as an oil 
well160, which is sensible to exploit fully, so as to maximise the profit that 
can be gained from it, or as a 'deposit' where the only current value is of 
a monetary kind (rather than of a human and professional kind) and 
everything is given a price tag. Ultimately, the result of this shift is thus: 
The centuries-long stratification of civic, cultural and institutional 
values that had made the cultural patrimony into one of the 
159 In Settis' own words: "La metafora dei 'giacimenti culturali' 6 indicativa: the cos'altro 
6 il nostro patrimonio culturale se non passivi 'giacimenti', risorse non sfruttate in 
maniera adeguata? Ed ecco intrepidi ministri avventurarsi alla scoperta di questi nuovi 
pozzi di petrolio, ansiosi di 'sfruttarli' nel modo migliore, si capisce per il bene del Paese, 
I'occupazione giovanile e cost via". Eco (1988,15) makes a similar point, by explaining 
that a giacimento (a deposit) is indeed something that is presently hidden and that 
therefore needs to be brought into the light. Its discovery, thus, necessarily entails its 
exploitation. 
º60 The then Minister for the beni culturali, Giuliano Urbani, used this very analogy of 
cultural assets as Italy's 'oil' in an official publication of the Ministry (Mbac 2004c) 
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mainstays of what Italy and the Italians really are is at risk to be 
sacrificed to the god of money (although ministers and 
governments keep referring to - in their words at least - to noble 
ideals). Venal values destroy and dispel the symbolic and 
metaphoric values that had been accumulated through memory 
and history (Settis 2002,40)161. 
Although Settis is probably one of the most vocal and passionate critics 
of the developments occurring in Italian cultural policy around this time, 
he is by no means alone in denouncing the negative implications of the 
emphasis placed on the economic potential of the beni culturali. Galasso 
(1996,59), for instance, expresses a view very close to that of Settis, 
and also openly admits that criticism to the new trends from the 
professionals working within the public cultural administration were 
numerous. The once-culture minister Paolucci (1996,120-121) 
fundamentally agrees, and defines the 1980s as the punto di svolta (the 
'turning point'), when the "threatening and glittering slogan of the cultural 
assets as 'our oil"' was invented162. 
The quotes above certainly remind one of the 'discourse of 
beleaguerment' that characterised the cultural policy debate in Britain in 
approximately the same period. However, the similarities do not end 
161 Settis' original words are: "La secolare stratificazione di valori civili, culturali, 
istituzionali the aveva fatto del patrimonio culturale uno del pilastri portanti di ciö the 6 
I'Italia e the sono gli Italiani rischia cost di essere sacrificata sull'altare del denaro 
(anche se ministri e governi continuano a richiamarsi, a parole, ad alti ideali). II valore 
venale brucia e disperde il valore simbolico e metaforico accumulatosi nelia memoria e 
nella storia" (Settis 2002,40). 
162 In Paolucci's own words: "... lo slogan trucido e splendente del beni culturali 'nostro 
pertroiio... ". It is interesting here to note the particular signification of the term trucido 
with regards to the metaphor of the giacimenti culturali as oil wells. Trucido is indeed an 
adjective deriving form the verb trucidare, which the Collins-Sansoni English/Italian 
dictionary describes as meaning 'to slaughter, to slay, to massacre'. 
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here. Chapter 5 has shown how arguments around the beneficial 
economic and social impacts of the arts can be traced back to the British 
public debate of the late 18th and 19th centuries. Similarly, it can be 
argued that in Italy too instrumental notions of the role and importance of 
the arts and culture in society can be traced to much earlier historical 
moments than the 1980s. 
According to Carta (1999,49), it was in the 18th century that the public 
powers begun a coherent process of systematic legislation aimed at 
putting in place mechanisms for the protection of the cultural patrimony. 
The value of such patrimony was conceived as based on the twofold 
consideration of its economic value and its value as evidence of past and 
present artistic achievements. A significant example of this double notion 
of the value of cultural assets is represented by the edicts issued by 
Cardinal Spinola in 1704, and by Cardinal Albani in 1733. Both acts 
display a perception of the 'superior richness' that is inherent in the 
cultural value of the beni culturali and that is much higher than the simple 
market value of the individual cultural objects. Indeed, both legislative 
acts were borne out of an already clear awareness that the conservation 
of the artistic and historical patrimony of the Pontifical State would be 
important in order to attract foreign visitors to the country. This on the 
one hand, would be in itself an important source of revenue, but it would 
also contribute to enhancing the market value of the cultural assets 
themselves, in what was an obvious anticipation of the principle of the 
'multiplicative nature' of the economic processes linked to the tourism 
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industry (Carta 1999,49). Another legislative measure of great 
significance in the present discussion was also elaborated in the 
Pontifical state in the 19th century. I refer here to the Pontifical Chirografo 
(chirograph) of Pius VII, issued in 1802. The document makes 
unequivocal references to the crucial issue of the social and economic 
sustainability of the tutela of the cultural patrimony163. The numerous 
economic activities that are seen as deriving directly form the 
conservation of monuments and artistic objects are indeed listed in the 
edict. Moreover, the 'competitive advantage' that they seem to offer the 
city of Rome is openly identified as the main motivation behind the 
commitment to conservation (Carta 1999,51)164. A distinctive awareness 
and appreciation of the economic potential of the cultural heritage seems 
therefore to represent a fil rouge throughout the development of a public 
debate around the public administration of Italy's cultural assets. Settis 
quotes a ministerial official who, in 1908, speaking with regards to Italy's 
cultural richness, declared that "this is a country of billions1165"; 
furthermore, the claim that "art is the oil of Italy" was recurrently made in 
the public debate in the period in between the two world wars (Settis 
163Andrea Emiliani argues that this measure signifies an explicit acknowledgement of 
the productive and economic role of cultural assets in the city of Rome, which had 
already been consolidating its vocation to be 'a third sector city', that is, a centre 
devoted to the production of immaterial goods and knowledge (Carta 1999,50). 
164 This quote from the original text of the edict is most striking: "... Questi preziosi 
avanzi della culta Antichita forniscono alla Cittä di Roma un ornamento, the la distingue 
tra tutte le altre piü insigni Cittä dell'Europa; somministrano I Soggetti Ii pib importanti 
alle meditazioni degli Eruditi, ed I modelli, e gli esemplari I piü pregiati agli Artisti, per 
sollevare Ii loro ingegni alle idee del bello, e del sublime chiamano a questa Citta il 
concorso dei Forastieri, attratti dal piacere di osservare queste singolari Raritb; 
alimentano una grande quantitä d'individui impiegati nell'esercizio delle Belle Arti; e 
finalmente nelle nuove produzioni, the sortono dale loro man!, animano un ramo di 
commerc! o, e d'industria piü d'ogni altro utile al Pubblico, ed allo Stato, perche 
interamente attivo e di facile produzione, come quello the tutto e dovuto alla mano ed 
all'ingegno dell'Uomo" (Quoted in Carta 1999,51). 
165 In the original, "questo 6 il paese dei miliardi! " (Quoted in Settis 2002,35). 
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2002,35). In Settis' interpretation (Ibid. ), as a result of the progressive 
centrality assumed by economic preoccupations in the public realm, the 
economic argument has become paramount, inducing the 'oil well' 
metaphor and similar ones (such as the one that sees cultural assets as 
'family jewels') to gain popularity and currency within the policy-making 
discourse. In particular, Settis (2002,34-35) identifies the creation of the 
new Ministero per i Beni Culturali - and the introduction of the very 
expression beni culturali that is associated with it - as a crucial phase in 
this evolution. As he explains, labels are important, and thus the 
introduction of the label of beni culturali to refer to the country's heritage 
denotes a shift in meaning and understanding of their importance and 
their role in the life of the nation. The label of Beni culturali clearly alludes 
not just to the cultural character of the objects the 'tag' is placed onto, but 
also to their patrimonial value - here strictly seen as the possibility to 
convert those cultural assets in hard cash. As a result, Settis (2002,47) 
believes that the present Italian situation is characterised by an acute 
contradiction. On the one hand, one can find in Italy a noble and deep- 
rooted tradition of conservation and protection of the cultural heritage. On 
the other hand, one can also witness the opposite tendency to consider 
the heritage in merely economic and monetary terms; the latter trend 
goes hand in hand with recriminations against the alleged Italian 
arretratezza (backwardness) and the consequent need to follow foreign 
(mainly American) models of cultural administration, and to involve 
private investors heavily in the process (with a view of speeding it up, 
and 'catch up' with other countries whose managerial practices appear to 
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be, comparatively, more up to date and advanced). In practical terms, 
this attempt to modernise the cultural sector ("svecchiare il settore" as 
Settis polemically says) has provoked the recourse to the sudden and a- 
critical adoption of the language and philosophy that had been, until then, 
typical of the 'private firm': the language of business (Settis 2002,83). 
Indeed, what seems to characterise the developments of the 1980s in 
Italy is a similar prevalence of the logic and language of managerialism 
and economic profitability which we have also seen in operation in Britain 
in the same period (see chapter 5). Whereas the long process that saw 
the establishment of a coherent heritage policy in post-unification Italy 
had placed the values of cultural preservation, heritage conservation and 
restoration - embodied in the notion of tutela - at the very heart of the 
State's action in the cultural sphere, concerns for the economic aspects 
of the bens culturali begin to acquire centre stage position in the 1980s. 
This theory finds confirmation in the separation that begins to be 
theoretically elaborated around this time between the administration and 
management of the cultural assets (to be guided by market principles 
and business practice) and their tutela - now seen as two distinct areas 
of the State's responsibilities (Barbati et al. 2003,17). Unsurprisingly, 
Settis defines this separation between gestione (that is the cultural 
management aspect) and the tutela (the measures of heritage 
conservation and restoration) as "non affatto tranquillizzante" ('not at all 
reassuring'), but - in fact - as false and damaging. He protests that 
tutela and gestione are, as a matter of fact, two interrelating (and thus 
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inseparable) moments of a single process (Settis 2002,90)166. Settis's 
pleas ostensibly represent a minority view in the Italian cultural policy 
debate, for instrumental cultural policy seems to be alive and well in Italy 
as much as it is in Britain. Valentino (2003,3) plainly confirms this: 
In the last decades the economic impacts associated with the 
process of promotion and exploitation (valorizzazione) of cultural 
assets have become increasingly important, to the extent that 
they are nowadays included amongst the explicit objectives of the 
public policies aimed at the rationalization and development of 
the cultural sector' 67. 
Tourism is still hailed as the privileged arena where the management of 
the cultural heritage and business practice can profitably meet. Zan 
(2003,17) reports that, according to available statistics, cultural tourism 
in Italy might be responsible for up to 40% of the total influx of tourists to 
the country. Besides the obvious positive impacts on the national 
economy of such a substantial movement of tourists, Zan (Ibid., 17-18) 
also points out that cultural tourism offers the additional advantages of a 
very high multiplier effect. Thus, he argues that, for instance, for every 10 
euros that each individual visitor pays to enter the site of Pompei, he or 
she would have spent at least 5,10 or even 20 times as much for 
additional services provided locally (so that the extra spending can be 
argued to benefit directly the local economy). 
166 For a detailed and comprehensive review of the gradual process of distinction 
between processes of tutela and valorizzazione in Italian legislation, its ambiguities and 
implications, see Aicardi 2003. 
167 The original reads: "Negli ultimi decenni gli impatti economici associati al processo di 
valorizzazione dei "beni culturali" hanno assunto maggiore importanza, e vengono 
oramai considerati tra gli obiettivi espliciti delle politiche di razionalizzazione e sviluppo 
del settore culturale" (Valentino 2003,3). 
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It will thus not come as a surprise that notions and concepts - such as for 
instance, the distretti culturali168 (cultural districts) - and managerial 
principles have crossed boundaries and have been imported from 
English-speaking countries with a view of guiding policy and 
administrative practice in Italy (Silvia's Bagdadli's aptly titled book 11 
Museo come Azienda - 'The museum as a firm' - is indeed a case in 
point) (Valentino 2003; Zan 2003; Bagdadli 1997)169. As Zan (2003,23) 
observes, the fact that managerial values and practices have been 
historically extraneous to the development of the institutions in charge of 
looking after the cultural heritage has done little to hinder their 
pervasiveness and popularity170. Montella (2003,104) further complains 
that the adoption in toto of principles of 'management' and 'marketing' 
imported from abroad did not take into account - nor made the most of - 
the profound links between museums and local territory that represent 
the main feature and function of the Italian reality. Finally, the clear and 
open hostility that many cultural administrators working in the public 
sector have shown for the ever increasing role of the private and profit- 
seeking sector in the management of the beni cultural! has not resulted in 
168 It is worth mentioning, however, that the notion of 'cultural district', though imported 
from Anglophone countries has acquires a distinctive meaning in the Italian context. So 
Filas, an organisation set up by the region of Lazio to foster innovation and local 
economic development, defines a distretto culturale thus: "a local inhabited settlement in 
which plans for the management of local development is based on the exploitation of 
the cultural and environmental assets" ("un ambiente insediativo locale nel quale 
I'accordo di concertazione per il governo dello sviluppo territoriale 6 fondato sulla 
valorizzazione del patrimonio del beni culturali e paesaggistici". From: www. filas. it). 
169 It is enlightening, in this regard, the regretful admission made by the current Culture 
Minister, Giovanni Urbani, that on taking up his post, he had to face the inadequate 
competencies in the field of marketing among the staff working at the Ministry (Urbani 
2002,26). 
10 Zan (2003,23) rightly observes that, whereas managerial principles of cultural 
administration have been around for just about a decade in Italy and just over two in 
Britain, alternative, non-managerial administrative practices have been guiding the 
running of organizations such as the site of Pompei or the British Museum for the past 
250 years at least. 
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slowing down the trend towards the attempt to enforce managerial 
practices in the administration of the public cultural sector (Tumino in 
Cammelli et al. 2002,19). 
In the 1990s the trends just described became even more prominent. 
The positive contribution that the heritage sector could make to the 
national economy by boosting the tourism industry remained a very 
popular theme in the debates on the beni culturali. However, contrary to 
what had happened in the preceding decade, even instrumental 
rationales for public spending could no longer command the same 
influence and effect a redirection of funds en masse to the heritage 
sector, for the situation had dramatically changed. The economic 
recession that made itself felt across the whole Western world did not 
leave Italy untouched. Just like other countries (Britain surely among 
them), Italy had to reduce public spending to face the financial crisis in a 
desperate attempt to contain its public deficit. As a result of this situation, 
in the 1990s, public financing for culture dropped to the 0,2% of the 
national budget, the main part of which was absorbed by the running 
costs of the ministerial and cultural institutions that make up the complex 
Italian cultural bureaucracy (Montella 2003,102). As we have seen in 
chapter 5, in the post-1980s, Britain has displayed a tendency to reduced 
central government spending on the arts and culture. A similar trend is 
visibly active in Italy too: according to the then Culture Minister Urbani, in 
2002, only 0,17 of the country's GDP was earmarked for the Ministero 
perl Beni e le Attivitä Culturali (Urbani 2002,5). 
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Politically too, this was an interesting time. Following the 1991 
referendum on the abolition of the multiple preference vote, a process of 
electoral reform begun (with a view of bringing about the demise of the 
proportional system, which many felt to be at the root of Italy's political 
corruption) which culminated in the electoral reform promoted by the 
Christian Democrat Mattarella and approved in August 1993 (Parker 
1996). Even more influent, however, was the 'judicial revolution' that 
altered the face of the country in the early 1990s. As Ginsborg (1996,19) 
argues, "the years from 1992 to 1994 were amongst the most dramatic in 
the history of the Italian Republic". Ginsborg refers here to the 
phenomenon of Tangentopoli (Kickback City). In a period of two years, 
following April 1992, all the major parties of government in Italy were 
effectively swept away by the force of the judicial investigations which 
brought to light illegal organised systems for the financing of political 
parties and numerous instances of illegal and corrupt agreement 
between politicians and businessmen (Nelken 1996,191)171. 
This context of economic duress and consequent reduced public 
spending represents the appropriate backdrop for law n. 4 of 1993 - 
171 The Socialist Party, and Bettino Craxi himself, soon became directly involved in the 
judges' investigation over corruption charges, so that the progress of the mani pulite 
(clean hands) campaign, marked the beginning of Craxi's political decline. When the 
President of the Republic Scalfaro was called to offer the post of Prime Minister to a 
representative of the PSI, following the 1992 general elections, Craxi was overlooked in 
favour of another Socialist, the law professor Giovanni Amato. In view of the very 
delicate (and increasingly difficult) position of the Socialist Party vis ä vis suspicion of 
corruption, Amato decided to form a government that was constituted mainly by 
technical experts rather than controversial (and now largely discredited) former 
ministers (Gundle and Parker 1996,3). This allowed a number of intellectual and 
experts that were not necessarily 'career politicians' to be involved in the government of 
the country, and this proved to be, in many respects, an interesting experiment. The 
nomination of the well-known and respected journalist Alberto Ronchey to the post of 
Minister for cultural assets, represents a case in point. 
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also known as Ronchey Act, from the name of the main political 
personality behind it. The Ronchey Act "started form the principle that 
Italian museums should become as self-sufficient as possible, with a 
more effective use of their premises, personnel and collections" 
(Bianchini et al. 1996,300). In particular, there are two aspects that 
make this act of legislation particularly interesting for the present 
discussion. Firstly, the Ronchey Act introduces the possibility for the 
Ministry to 'rent out' (the Italian legal expression is concedere in uso) 
cultural assets under its responsibility to other public institutions or 
private individuals and companies (Jalla 2003,94). Secondly, the law of 
1993 also ratified the possibility for the establishment of the so-called 
servizi aggiuntivi (additional services) within publicly-owned museums, 
libraries and archives. These servizi aggiuntivi are represented by 
bookshops, coffee shops and wardrobe services that the state-owned 
museums could now contract out to private firms in order to improve the 
'cultural experience' of their public. As chapter 5 discussed, the 
contracting out of services, is one of the principal tenets of NPM, and 
indeed the Ronchey Act seems rather sympathetic to the values of 
economy and efficiency of public administration that are at the core of the 
NPM cult12. Montella (2003,102-103) indeed maintains that the 
Ronchey Act attests to the fact that, by the early 1990s, the Italian 
political class and the policy-makers had fully accepted the notion that 
172 In this regard, it is also important to mention the Merlon! Act of 1994, which 
established that the State is under the obligation of contracting out public works to the 
firm that can carry them out for the lowest price (Urbani 2002,19). These dispositions 
also affect large-scale projects of heritage restoration and conservation, providing 
additional evidence of the spread, in Italy, of the core values at the heart of the NPM 
discourse. 
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the conservation of the cultural patrimony could not represent in itself the 
end of cultural policy. Rather, the efficient and effective management of 
cultural organisations was the new target, in so far as it would promote a 
better cultural experience for the public, and also place them on the 
sunny road towards self-sufficiency. Jalla (2003,95) attributes the 
enthusiasm for the innovation introduced with the servizi aggiuntivi (and 
the belief that they would allow museums and other organisations to 
become, in the long term, fully self-financing) that accompanied the 
introduction of the Ronchey Act primarily as the result of the distortions 
of the media. However, the law clearly represents the acceptance, on the 
part of the government, of an instrumental notion of the beni culturali and 
of cultural expenditure. This interpretation is further validated by the fact 
that the actual implementation of the Ronchey Act (despite the obvious 
enthusiasm of politicians) was ridiculously slow, due to the 'passive 
resistance' of a large number of soprintendenti (administrators of beni 
culturali at the local level) who were either uninterested or fiercely 
opposed to the introduction of entrepreneurial values and practices in the 
administration of cultural assets (Jalta 2003,95). Jalta (Ibid. ) indeed 
maintains that the Ronchey Act was a largely unsuccessful piece of 
legislation, whose main merit was to have shown how unfounded the 
enthusiasm for the potential of fund-raising - with a view to achieving 
self-sufficiency - through the servizi aggiuntivi actually was. He argues 
that it is nowadays an agreed point that the additional services can only 
have a marginal role in covering the huge costs involved in the running of 
a museum. The principal rationale for the establishment of a bookshop or 
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a cafeteria should thus not be economic calculations but rather the 
attempt to make museums, libraries and archives a more welcoming and 
pleasant environment for their visitors. The Ronchey Act, however, 
unquestionably represented a defining moment in contemporary cultural 
policy in Italy, since it introduces a revolutionary way of conceiving the 
relationship between public and private sector with regards to the cultural 
sphere. If, in the past, the involvement of the enterprise sector in the 
cultural sphere had been uniquely limited to sponsorships and donations, 
now the possibility was introduced for an unprecedented involvement of 
private organisations in cultural administration (Dell'Orso 2002,128). 
Another important legislative measure introduced in the 1990s is 
represented by law n. 59 of 1997, more commonly known as the 
Bassanini Act173. This has been defined as the most innovative and 
incisive reform of the Italian system of cultural administration (Jalla 2003, 
183). The present thesis does not allow for an in-depth discussion of the 
details of the changes introduced by the 1997 law, and will therefore limit 
itself to those aspects that are more relevant to the discussion here on 
hand. In very general terms, the Bassanini Act had three main strategic 
objectives: to simplify and slim down the famously cumbersome Italian 
administrative structure; to decentralise administration wherever 
possible; and to reorganise public administration on the organizational 
and functional planes both at the central and local level (Jalla 2003,183). 
'73 Law n. 59 of 1997 was passed during the Xlll Legislatura, when the centre-left party 
Ulivo was in power, Romano Prodi was Prime Minister and Walter Veltroni Minister for 
the Beni Culturali. 
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The law openly expresses a commitment to efficiency and economy in 
public administration, in pure NPM style (Ibid., 185). However, even 
more interesting is the fact that the Bassanini Act also introduces a 
legally ambiguous norm that would appear to abrogate the already 
mentioned articles of the civil code that sanctions the inalienabilitä of the 
cultural assets, that is the impossibility for their legal property to belong 
to anybody but the Italian State (Cofrancesco 1999,98-99). Cofrancesco 
(Ibid. ) sardonically observes that this particular norm introduced by law n. 
59 of 1997 would seem to create the legal premises for a paradoxical 
scenario in which the State could simply sell off the Colosseum -a 
situation occurring in a very popular Italian comedy film starring Totd, the 
most loved Italian comic actor of all times. The last section of this chapter 
will show that this possibility - which Cofrancesco, in 1999, clearly 
believed to be the stuff of comedy - is today a very real legal and political 
possibility (and lacking the legal ambiguities that weakened the 
Bassanini Act in this respect) as a result of the huge transformations 
introduced by the law decree n. 63 of 2002. 
The 1990s represented, in Italy, a consistent effort, on the part of the 
State, to entice the private, profit-making sector into getting involved in 
the cultural sector. The motivation behind this attempt was the hope that 
the involvement of private enterprise in cultural matters would result in 
the injection of much-needed additional resources in the sector. This is 
indeed the phenomenon that Settis (2002, chapter 12), in his philippic 
against what he sees as the degenerative tendencies of current Italian 
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cultural policy, refers to as the svendita (literally the 'clearance sale') of 
the nation's cultural patrimony. Settis (Ibid., 104) identifies a further 
crucial stage in the 'escalation of the private' in the legislative decree n. 
41 of 1995174, issued by the government led by Lamberto Dini15. The 
decree largely expanded the category of the servizi that a museum could 
outsource. As we have seen, the Ronchey Act had introduced the 
possibility of contracting out catering and other services that were not 
directly related to the museum's core activities. However, with the 
introduction of the 1995 decree, the range of such services was much 
broadened so as to include (to Settis' horror) also guided tours, 
educational activities, the preparation (not just the sale) of catalogues, 
archives, and IT support, the setting up of exhibition and special events 
(Barbati et al. 2003,176). These are however, all activities that - it might 
be argued - should be, in fact, part of any museum's essential functions. 
They are indeed very closely related to the function of preservation and 
to the transmission of knowledge that lies at the heart of the role of the 
museum institution. This is why - Settis points out - in many other 
countries these are tasks that are carried out by the museum's own staff 
(rather than being contracted out to external organizations, as is now 
possible in Italy). 
174 At the time this decree was issued, the already mentioned Paolucci was the Minister 
in charge of the beni culturali. 
"' The government led by Lamberto Dini is a case of what Ginsborg (2001,299) calls a 
'Presidential Government, which was seen, by President Scalfaro, as the best option 
following the collapse of the first Berlusconi government (which had come to power 
following the 1994 general elections). Rejecting the call for new elections coming from 
Berlusconi and Fini (leader of Berlusconi's allied post-fascist party Alleanza Nazionale), 
Scalfaro nominated Din! (former Minister of the Treasury in the short-lived Berlusconi 
government) as President of the Council of Ministers. Dini was in power for a year, 
during which he was at head of another executive dominated by technical experts rather 
than consumed politicians. 
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A subsequent legislative act, the ministerial decree n. 139 of 1997, 
introduced a clarification of the conditions for the outsourcing of services, 
by confirming that this was to be limited to the services and activities that 
could not be successfully provided internally by the organisations' own 
financial or human resources (Settis 2002,104). Nevertheless, as Settis 
(Ibid. ) agues, the decree of 1997 did little to dissipate the ambiguity 
deriving from the lack of a precise demarcation between what should be 
considered as the specific task and duty of the public administration 
(and, for Settis, the preparation of catalogues, educational programmes, 
the setting up of exhibitions and so on should all belong to this category), 
and what can legitimately be outsourced. Settis concludes: 
In view of the lack of a clear definition of the unavoidable duties 
of the public administration and of the tools required to carry 
them out, even measures such as this one [the decree of 1997], 
besides the good intentions they are borne out of, can appear - 
retrospectively - as a first destabilizing step, as the timid 
beginning of the subsequent gradual process of emptying out of 
the public administration's institutional duties (Settis 2002, 
104) 176 
Settis (Ibid. ) further laments that, following the legislative acts of 1995 
and 1997, the encouragement of the access of private players to the 
administration of the Italian public cultural sector - within an ambiguous 
176 Settis' original words are: "... in mancanza di una chiara definizione dei compiti 
imprescindibili dell'amministrazione e dei mezzi per svolgerli, anche misure come 
queste, al di lä di ogni buona intenzione, possono apparire retrospettivamente come un 
primo passo destabilizzante, come il timido inizio del successivo svuotamento graduate 
dei compiti istituzionali dell'amministrazione pubblica" (Settis 2002,104). 
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legal framework - became the norm. Some of the prescriptions contained 
in the document that established, in 1998, the first unified ministry for 
culture since Fascism, would seem, indeed, to confirm his grievances. 
The new Ministero per i Beni e le Attivitd Cultural! (Ministry for Cultural 
Assets and Activities) was established by the legislative decree n. 368 
of 1998. The most obvious innovation introduced by the new institution 
was that, in addition to the beni culturali, its remit also included 
responsibilities for the live performing arts and sport. The spectrum of the 
ministerial responsibilities in Italy has therefore been, since 1998, very 
broad. As Barbati et al. (2003,125) put it "there is no sector that can be 
linked to the sphere of the cultural assets or activities for which the 
Ministry has not been found to have legitimate competencies"177. In 
relation to the present discussion, it is important to note that article 10 of 
the legislative decree that reformed the Ministry with responsibilities for 
the cultural assets, makes a step forward on the path highlighted by the 
1997 Ronchey Act. Article 10, indeed, represented the most explicit 
attempt yet, to extend mechanisms of outsourcing (in Italian referred to 
as esternalizzazione) - which were already operational in other ambits of 
public administration - to the cultural sector. The significance of article 10 
is thus twofold. Firstly, it certainly gave a clear sign to those working 
within the public cultural administration who, as was explained earlier, 
had shown a stubborn hostility against the permeation of entrepreneurial 
177 "Non vi e nessun settore, riconducibile ai beni o alle attivita culturali, su cui il 
ministero non sia riconosciuto titolare di competenze". For a very detailed description of 
the Ministry's competencies see Jalla 2003,222-223. 
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values and practices into the public cultural sector (on the grounds that 
they felt the public sector to be driven by a much different, and 
incompatible ethos). Secondly, article 10 also opened up the possibility 
of a further extension of the services to be outsourced. Activities of 
inventory, cataloguing and restorations could already be contracted out 
by museums to private firms. However, article 10 extended this 
possibility also to the Ministry itself, for the spheres of valorizzazione and 
gestione (that is, 'valorisation' and 'exploitation', and `management'). One 
more important feature of the legislative decree n. 368 of 1998 is that, in 
defining the role and tasks of the restructured Ministry, it confirms and 
ratifies the distinction between activities of tutela on the one hand and 
and gestione and valorizzazione on the other, that - as we have seen - 
had been progressively taking shape and raising concerns. This trend 
has been further accentuated by the Constitutional reform of 2001 
(particularly the changes to the Titolo V delta Costituzione), following 
which the functions of the public administration with regards to the 
cultural assets appear sharply polarized between tutela and 
valorizzazione (Barbati at al. 2003,58). This polarization reflects the 
changes in the repartition of responsibilities between the central State 
and the Regions following the 2001 constitutional reform (Barbati et al. 
2003,106). The aim of the changes had been the attempt to reform 
Italian public administration with a view to enhance 'institutional 
pluralism'. With this reform, all tiers of government are formally confirmed 
to be constitutive elements of the Repubblica of equal dignity. In the 
sphere of cultural policy, this means that responsibilities are now shared 
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out. The central state thus retains all functions linked to the task of tutela, 
while the Regions and other local authorities are now formally granted 
the right to get fully involved in cultural administration in the spheres of 
the valorizzazione dei beni culturali e ambientali (the valorisation of 
cultural and environmental assets) and the promozione e organizzazione 
delle attivita culturali (the promotion and organization of cultural 
activities) (Jalla 2003,200-201). Settis (2002,111) expresses concerns 
for the weakening of the function of tutela that he sees as an unavoidable 
consequence of this separation of roles: a mechanism of tutela disjointed 
by managerial functions would lose any strategic edge, any sense of the 
'bigger picture' of the cultural assets situation, and therefore the 
possibility to monitor and control effectively the quality of the service 
provided. 
Finally, the decree that established the new ministry, also instituted the 
possibility for the ministry itself - in order to fulfil its tasks in the most 
effective manner - to take part, together with the private sector, in 
foundations, associations or companies. The law also allows the Ministry 
to grant access and exploitation of the cultural assets under its 
responsibility to private partners - with a view, obviously, to obtain a 
financial gain from such dealings with the private sector (Settis 2002, 
105). This possibility was later confirmed and clarified by law n. 448 of 
2002, which was the budget law for 2003. In Settis's critical view, this 
was yet another stage of the progressive 'escalation of the private sector 
within public cultural administration (Settis 2002,109). The reasons for 
his interpretation are self-evident: the law confirms a further enlargement 
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of the ever-expanding category of services that is possible for the public 
administration to outsource18. In fact, this law of 2002 subscribes to a 
notion of 'global service' whereby the only sphere whose responsibility is 
reserved to the State alone is that of tutela (Jalla 2003,237). Needless to 
say, the private firm that is contracted to provide these various services 
is supposed to pay the State a fee, so that the innovation induced many 
to speak up and express their concern for what seemed as a 'trick' to 
privatise de facto much of the national cultural patrimony and its 
administrative bodies (Jalta 2003,238; Settis 2002,109). 
One of the crucial points in Settis' criticism of what he sees as a 
damaging process of limitation of the State's responsibilities and role in 
the administration of the cultural assets (to the full advantage of the 
private and profit-driven sector), is that - ostensibly - this was a 
phenomenon that developed gradually, but consistently and coherently 
over time. The other crucial legislative act besides the one that reformed 
the Ministry, that is, the Testo Unico of 1999, is also an important stage 
in this evolution. The significance of the Testo lies first and foremost in 
the fact that it aimed at bringing together in a single act the ensemble of 
norms and regulations for the cultural assets that had been accumulating 
over time, with the inevitable complication represented by various 
overlapping laws, inconsistencies and even open contradictions between 
178 It is interesting to point out that, despite the main objective of outsourcing is, as we 
have seen, to make museums and cultural organisations more efficient and cost 
effective, in many cases it is simply not possible to verify whether the changes 
introduced have been at all successful. As Cappelli (2002,100-1) observes, the 
accounts of the Soprintendenze that are In charge of administering and preserving 
cultural assets at the local level are not available. As a result, there are presently no 
indicators that can help in measuring the economic aspects of the activities of Italian 
museums, so that comparisons over time (and thus the understanding of whether 
organisations are run more or less efficiently than before) are impossible. 
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different pieces of legislation. This means that although the Testo Unico 
had the power to abrogate extant legislation (and it indeed invalidated the 
dispositions introduced by law n. 1089 and n. 1047 of 1939), introducing 
normative innovations was beyond its remit (Cammelli 2000a; Zerboni 
2001,115). With regards to the present discussion's concern with the 
growing popularity of principles of outsourcing, public-private 
partnerships and the question of the alleged svendita of cultural assets, it 
is important to mention that the Testo Unico too explicitly ratifies both the 
possibility for the State to form partnerships or conventions with the 
private and voluntary sectors and the commitment to an expansion of the 
category of servizi aggiuntivi subject to externalizzazione179. These are 
here referred to with a new label: servizi di assistenza culturale e 
ospitalitd per il pubblico (services of cultural assistance and hospitality) 
(Jalla 2003,245). This is clearly a much broader category than the 
bookshops and cafeterias originally prefigured by the Ronchey Act. 
According to article n. 113 of the Testo, if the services cannot be 
adequately provided internally and it appears to be financially convenient 
to do so, then they can be contracted out to private companies (Ibid. )180 
179 There are, of course, a number of other aspects of the Testo Unico that this chapter 
cannot discuss in much detail. The common feeling that the Testo represented 
somewhat of a missed opportunity has already been mentioned in the Appendix with 
regards to its adoption of a 'normative' and 'conservative' notion of beni cultural! that 
focused on their material nature (the bene as cosa, 'thing', that Is a physical object) 
(Cammelli 2000a, Zerboni 2001,120; Pitruzzella 2000). The Testo Unico also identifies 
four main objectives of public Intervention with respect to the beni cultural!. For a 
detailed discussion of each article of the Testo Unico see Cammelli 2000b. 
180 Guido Corso (2000,359) makes an important clarification with regards to this 
particular article of the Testo Unico. He explains that whenever the two conditions cited 
above occur (the impossibility of providing a service internally, and the financial 
convenience in contracting it out), then the soprintendente or the decision-making officer 
is legally required (in other words, he must) involve a third party in the provision of that 
service. However, Corso is also very careful in pointing out that this is a case of 
'outsourcing Italian style', by which he means that the forms of outsourcing configured 
by article 113 do not correspond to what Corso (Ibid. ) refers to 'outsourcing (or 
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This is the interpretation of the events taking place in the Italian cultural 
sphere in this phase as put forward by Settis (2002,108): 
In the last few years, therefore, the State has begun to willingly 
lose ground contemporaneously on two different planes: on the 
one hand, by putting in place the requirements for a reluctant 
and only partial devolution to the Regions and local authorities, 
and on the other hand, by opening itself to the private sector 
both with the expansion of the services that can be contracted 
out, and through the introduction of the new institution of the 
Foundations1e'. 
The phenomenon of the introduction and growth of the so-called 
Fondazioni, represents one of the most remarkable aspects of the trend 
towards desetatisatlon that - as we have seen - has characterised Italian 
cultural policy since the mid-1990s. The legal model for the Fondazioni 
put forward by the Italian legislation constitutes an adaptation of the 
American community foundation - that is, an area-based organisation that 
is run by a number of diverse bodies and is financed through numerous 
sources of funding (Cappelli 2002,36). Carla Bodo (2002,25) 
characterises this development as "the transformation of some of the 
main public cultural institutions into private organisations, generally under 
contracting out) English style'. Indeed, in the understanding and practice of outsourcing 
as it has been developed in the Anglo-Saxon world, if the cost of providing a service 
internally is higher than the cost of buying that same service from a third party, then the 
public administrative apparatus previously In place is dismantled, and jobs (within the 
public administration) are consequently lost. In other terms, in this conception of 
outsourcing, financial convenience is at the same time the primary goal and the primary 
criterion for decision-making. In the Italian version - and as prescribed by article 113 - 
inadequate staff levels within the public administration are a pre-requisite for the 
contracting out of services to a third party, but do not necessarily lead to the 
restructuring of the public administration nor to job losses. 
181 Settis' actual words are "Negli ultimi anni, dunque, lo Stato ha cominciato a cedere 
terreno, quasi contemporaneamente, su due fronti. Da un lato, predisponendo 
devoluzioni riluttanti e parziali alle regions e agli enti locali, e dall'altro aprendo le braccia 
ai privati sia allungando la lista des 'servizi' concedibili, sia con il nuovo strumento delle 
fondazioni" (Settis 2002,108). 
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foundation status. [... ] The logic behind these measures was twofold: a) 
to pursue a more efficient management of such institutions, traditionally 
paralysed by red tape; b) to ease the burden they represent for the public 
purse by facilitating fundraising from the private sector"182. Interestingly, 
Bodo (Ibid. ) also adds that the latter aim "has only been partially 
achieved" since, as a matter of fact, the considerable running costs of the 
newly created fondazioni are still covered mostly by the state Budget. 
Moreover, the establishment of fondazioni for the management of opera 
houses has been especially difficult in the less prosperous areas of 
Southern Italy, which are, for obvious reasons, less appealing to private 
investors. As a result, a number of opera houses in the Mezzogiorno are 
presently in dire financial trouble and might face the possibility of having 
to close down (Bodo 2002,26). Regrettably, a detailed discussion of the 
development of the foundation and its implications is beyond the scope of 
the present analysis. However, Luca Zan (2003b) - who has devoted 
much time to the study of the increasing pervasiveness of a managerial 
style in Italian cultural administration - maintains that the Fondazioni 
represent the privileged form that the process of 'managerialization' 
(aziendalizzazione) of cultural institutions has assumed in Italy (see also 
Sicca and Zan 2004). 
182 The first national cultural organisations to be transformed in foundations were: the 
thirteen Ent! Autonom! Lirici (autonomous opera houses) which became Fondazioni 
liriche; the world-renown Venice Biennale was transformed in the Societfi di Cultura 
Biennale di Venezia; the Centro Sperimentale di Cinema -a national centre for 
professional training in the art of film-making - became the Scuola Nazionale di Cinema 
(Bodo 2002,25). For a discussion of the legal aspects entailed in this recent reforms 
see Cortese 2004 and Foa 2005. 
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It is with the new millennium, however, that the involvement of the private 
enterprise in cultural administration reaches its apex, and when evidence 
abounds of the subscription of the Italian government to an instrumental 
and patrimonial notion of the cultural assets as a way to raise the funds 
required to finance public infrastructural works - providing additional 
targets to Settis' polemic's against the 'suicidal tendencies' of the Italian 
'83 state. 
ITALIAN CULTURAL POLICY IN THE NEW MILLENNIUM: SELLING OFF THE 
COLOSSEUM? 
The final part of this chapter will focus on the highly controversial 
changes introduced by the decreto legislativo (legislative decree) n. 63 
of 2002, later converted into law n. 112 of 2002'84 by the government led 
by Silvio Berlusconi following his victory at the 2001 general elections185 
183 Chapter 13 of Settis's 2002 book is indeed entitled "The suicidal state" (Lo stato 
suicida). 
184 A decreto legge is the ordinance that can be issued, in cases of urgency or 
emergency, by the executive power (that is, the government). A decreto legge is a 
'formal law', which means that it has the power to modify or abrogate already existing 
laws. However, the decree, once issued, needs to be converted in law (and thus has to 
go through Parliament in the usual law-making process). If the Parliament fails to do so 
within 60 days, the decreto legge is annulled. 
"s Ginsborg (2001,320) ascribes Berlusconi's victory in part to the internal divisions that 
blighted the centre-left coalition, and its consequent incapacity to put in front of the 
electorate a clear and convincing political alternative. However, Ginsborg (Idem, 321-2) 
also points out that the strong points of Berlusconi's campaign proved determinant in 
deciding the result of the elections. A particular strength of his campaign was the clear 
language in which Berlusconi formulated his solemn 'promise to the Italians', which he 
signed during a television broadcasting, and to which - he claimed - Italians could held 
him accountable should he win the election. At the top of the list of promises made by 
Berlusconi was administrative reform, followed immediately by the promise to undertake 
a very ambitious programme of public works, including building a bridge connecting 
Sicily to mainland Italy. As Ginsborg observes: "The promise of major public works for 
the South appealed enormously in regions where the level of youth unemployment was 
high, and Berlusconi successfully portrayed himself as the experienced entrepreneur 
who could kick-start the economy of the South into action". Other important ingredients 
in Berlusconi's programme were the promise to lower taxes (and the obvious tension 
between this commitment to tax reductions and major public works, as we will see, will 
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Both Settis (2002) and Dell'Orso (2002) describe in great detail the 
antecedent legislation which paved the way for the 2002 decree. This, 
indeed, for Settis represents the culmination of that gradual but 
irrepressible process of svendita in which the Italian public institutions 
seem to be engaged. Such process, indeed, seemed to accelerate 
following the return to power of Berlusconi in 2001, whose programme 
Ginsborg (2001,291) summarises as "a basically neo-liberal economic 
programme, with strong Thatcherist overtones: fewer taxes, greater 
choices for citizens, competition and efficiency in public life, and a 
residual welfare state". 
In this context, Settis writes (2002,120) that what the decree announced 
was "the radicalisation of the measures aimed at the dismissal of the 
state's patrimony and the befalling, upon our country, of an 
unprecedented deregulation"186. Silvia Dell'Orso (2002,136) describes 
the scenario opened up by the new legislation as "hazy and very 
disturbing at the same time". At the centre of their concern was the 
Patrimonlo dello Stato S. p. A. which the decree instituted. This is a 
company set up on the basis of a capital represented by shares and is 
completely state owned187. The decree also establishes the possibility to 
have important consequences for the heritage sector), the reform of the justice system 
and more choice with regards to health-care and education. 
186 In Settis' own words: "Quello the il decreto di aprile annunciava senza mezzi termini 
era una radicalizzazione delle misure di dismissione del patrimonio statale, I'abbattersi 
sul nostro Paese di una deregulation senza precedenti" (Settis 2002,120). 
187 As Benedikter (2004,370) explains: All estates belonging to the state were included, 
including all monuments, museums and cultural objects. The company is administered 
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs, and a professional financial manager is the chief 
executive. This de facto assigning of all cultural heritage to the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs was a measure taken in order to improve the general management of state 
property and to allow the use of the infrastructural budget for the purpose of 
preservation". 
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transfer to this company all property rights with regards to all the real 
estate assets that belong to the State's patrimony, including those that 
are part of the Demanio Pubblico (State Property), on the uses of which, 
traditionally, a number of strict limitations were in place - including the 
already mentioned inalienabilitd. The components of the state patrimony 
that are susceptible to be handed over to the Patrimonio S. p. A. thus 
include all national parks and coastlines, all the buildings that belong to 
the public sector, all public monuments, museums, archives and libraries, 
for a total value estimated in the region of 2,000 billion euros (Settis 
2002,121). The handing over of such valuable assets is justified as a 
way to guarantee their more effective and efficient management, as well 
as to increase their profitability (Dell'Orso 2002,136). The contentious 
point here is that the decree (as well as the subsequent law) also 
introduces the possibility to repossess (alienare) the state's assets 
mentioned above, so that even legal experts agree that, once the 
legislation introducing the Patrimonio S. p. A. is analysed in all its details 
and implications, it appears to represent mainly a way to contribute to 
enhance public resources though the alienation of its assets (including, of 
course, the cultural assets) (Barbati et al. 2003,187). 
But if, as was noted earlier, so much of the Italian cultural heritage is part 
of the Demanio (and therefore cannot be alienated), how can it be sold 
so that the state can raise cash? The answer lies in another S. p. A. - 
called Infrastrutture S. p. A. - that is meant to work closely with the 
Patrimonlo S. p. A. and whose shares are open to private investment. The 
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legal status of the Infrastrutture S. p. A. is that of a financial trust based on 
share ownership - indirectly controlled by the Italian Minister for the 
Economy and under the supervision of the Banca d'Italia - whose object 
is to foster the realization of infrastructures, public works and investments 
to sustain economic development. The Infrastrutture S. p. A. is supposed 
to work towards this objective through the concession of loans and 
financial guarantees (Barbati et al. 2003,187). The Minister of the 
Economy, by simply issuing a ministerial degree, has the power to 
transfer the assets belonging to the Patrimonio S. p. A. to the Infrastrutture 
S. p. A. The latter, therefore, works like a huge real estate trust, whereby 
the state raises resources for its public works selling off its assets to 
private investors (Settis 2002,125). The fact that the Infrastrutture S. p. A. 
is open to private investors also means that the assets belonging to the 
Patrimonio S. p. A. can ultimately pass into private hands. Benedikter 
(2004,370-1) maintains the conditions that investors need to meet are 
"comparatively light". Unsurprisingly, "the law has often been criticised for 
being 'flexible', lacking clear statements about which objects may and 
may not be privatised. There seem to be no additional criteria except the 
one requiring the sale of groups of objects and not of individual objects 
so as not to leave single objects of minor interest behind" (Ibid. )188. 
168 As was mentioned earlier, the political and economic contexts for resorting to such a 
dramatic means of generating income was the tension between Berlusconi's 
commitment not to raise income tax (and, in fact, to reduce taxation where possible) and 
to carry out major public works (a very expensive exercise). At the same time, Italy's 
economy came under strict supervision by the European Central Bank following her 
tumultuous entry into the Eurozone in 1998 (because of the country's difficulty in 
keeping her public deficit within the mark of 3% of GDP - see Ginsborg 2001,308-9). In 
addition, competition from China put further pressure on the Italian manufacturing 
sector. 
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In this complicated scenario, what happens to the portion of the real 
estate that belongs to the artistic and cultural patrimony of the country? 
The answer is very simple, they too are susceptible to go through the 
process described above, with the only difference that, in order for the 
property rights of assets of 'particular artistic importance'189 to be 
transferred from one S. p. A. to the other, the Minister of the Economy has 
to act in agreement with the Minister for the Cultural Assets and 
Activities. As Settis (2002,121) bitterly clarifies, in order to sell off the 
Colosseum, the signature of two ministers would be required on the 
ministerial decree, rather than that of the Minister of the Economy alone. 
This provides very little reassurance, especially in view of the very 
exiguous political weight that the cultural Ministry has always had in the 
Italian political tradition190. For, although probably no government, 
present or future, will want to really sell the Colosseum to a Japanese 
firm (or at least, so one would hope), in the present legislative framework, 
the legal possibility has been put in place for this to be actually 
possible191. The symbolic meaning of this state of affairs is self-evident. 
'89 The ambiguity of the expression "asset of particular artistic importance" will no doubt 
cause innumerable complications and arguments in the implementation phase of the 
law. 
190 The concern that the new law provoked amongst the general public as well as the 
cultural administrators was such that the President of the Republic felt compelled to 
intervene in order to highlight the need for clearer regulations with a view to ensure 
adequate protection of the cultural assets in question (Cappelli 2002,21). 
19' Settis (2002,129-130) also expresses an additional concern: that this new complex 
legal mechanism - which is effectively under the almost exclusive control of the Minister 
for the Economy - will ultimately result in the redirection of public resources form the 
state Budget to the two newly created S. p. A. and, ultimately, to private banks and 
investors. For the cultural sector in particular, this might entail an emphasis on the 
monetary evaluation of the work of museums and galleries. 
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The new Codice Urban! of 2004 tried to respond to the criticism that 
these dispositions gave rose to by attempting a clearer identification of 
those assets that are part of the demanio, and that are therefore not- 
sellable and whose circulation is subject to strict limitations. These 
categories include: museums, art galleries, painting collections, libraries 
and archives, national monuments and archaeological sites. The 2004 
code also introduces a condition for the sale of all other assets that are 
recognised as sellable: the sale must not in any way pose a danger to the 
correct preservation of the cultural assets up for sale, nor should public 
access to the ben! be restricted as a result of their sale (Mbac 2004c, 13). 
Legal experts, however, have pointed out that the 2004 codice is not 
without inconsistencies and contradictions, so that it does not 
successfully quell the criticism discussed above (Ferretti 2004). 
As Benedikter (2004,369) reports, "already, 36 objects from the medieval 
period to the 20th century have been sold to international investment firms 
and private investors for amounts that many Italian experts consider well 
below the median market price"192. The situation is complicated by the 
fact that, although the number of state-owned objects that are susceptible 
of being sold in the future has been estimated to be as high as 400,000, 
no complete official list actually exists yet (Ibid., 371)193. As was 
192 Some of the most artistically significant monuments sold are: the Villa Manzoni in 
Rome (19`" century); the Manifattura Tabacchi in Florence (a large manufacturing 
complex built in the 20`h century); the Archivio di Stato in Bari (19`h century); the 
Palazzo Correr in Venice (16th century); the Palazzo Via del Cambiatori (1901) and the 
Palazzo Piazza del Monte in Reggio Emilia (1671); the Palazzo Via Balbi in Genoa 
1677) (Benedikter 2004,371). 
93 As a result of this situation, "listings of public property for sale are, therefore, being 
compiled and supplemented on the basis of suggestions made by the Ministry of the 
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mentioned above, the law prescribes that assets need to be sold in large 
lots, so as to avoid that those located in less popular or provincial areas 
are left unsold. Obviously, group sales necessarily require larger 
investments. As a result, the selling process seems to favour larger 
international investors. Indeed, so far, none of the assets sold have been 
purchased by cultural institutions, but rather by international real estate 
and economic investors. The 36 properties already sold and referred to 
above, were bought by the American Carlyle Investment Group (a global 
private equity firm) in what was described as possibly "one of the most 
significant sales to take place in the European real estate market in 2003" 
(quoted in Benedikter 2004,375). Furthermore, the method chosen to 
sell off the properties (auction) has also given rise to problems of 
transparency and to speculations about the involvement of private 
interests in the proceeding: 
The Economy Ministry and its holding companies 'Patrimonio dello 
Stato SpA' and 'Infrastrutture SpA' have formed some additional 
sub-companies for each individual portfolio sale. Their task is to 
carry out an auction and to attract international bids. These 
companies seem to be linked to associations of international real 
estate agents (Benedikter 2004,374). 
Following the sale, the former under-secretary of State for culture (and 
TV celebrity) Vittorio Sgarbi - who famously left his post in protest 
against precisely these measures - declared with regards to some of the 
properties sold and located in Rome: "no real-estate agency in Rome 
Economy, the regions and local authorities" (Benedikter 2004,371). Often, however, it 
would seem that, in fact, assets are sold due to urgent need for resources or because 
they are not in use (Ibid., 373). 
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would have hesitated to offer three or four times the allotment price"194 
(quoted in Benedikter 2004,376). Furthermore, as the heritage expert 
Lorenzo Pagnini observes, "the investment company who bought it [the 
portfolio of assets] does certainly not intend to restructure the historic 
monuments for their intrinsic value, but is acting as a real-estate investor. 
It has an interest in high-value buildings located in areas of historical 
flavour" (quoted in Benedikter 2004,376). Preoccupations with tutela are 
certainly not paramount here! 
The possibility to sell off cultural assets in order to raise the financial 
resources needed to carry out planned public works represents the 
apotheosis of an instrumental notion of the arts, whereby the beni 
culturali are seen as mere tools towards the achievement of non-cultural 
aims (as the building of roads and motorways certainly is). What can be 
witnessed in Italy is the glorification and, at the same time, the 
degeneration of the notion that the cultural sector could and should have 
a positive economic impact and a role of wealth creation within the 
national economy. The present situation also represents the most fitting 
embodiment of the popular metaphor according to which Italy's enormous 
cultural and artistic richness is, for the Italian state and its people, like a 
collection of 'family jewels'. For, what else would a once-wealthy family 
do in times of financial difficulty if not start to sell off, one by one, all its 
194 The Carlyle Group acquired the portfolio of 36 properties for E230 million (Benedikter 
2004,375). 
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most precious possessions in the hope to make it through the hard 
times? As Settis (202,124-125) lucidly argues: 
The Italian tradition has been founded for centuries on two 
main guiding principles: that the cultural patrimony is of public 
property and needs to be promoted by the state through 
research and measures of preservation; and that this patrimony 
needs to be seen as an indissoluble whole spread throughout 
the national territory. The very root of these principles has been 
weakened by the new law which risks, if implemented literally, 
to cause a change of epochal proportions, by stripping the 
citizens of rights they have been enjoying for centuries195 
Another rather disturbing fact is the somewhat limited response that such 
developments have given rise to among Italian commentators. As a 
result, the most common remark made by foreign observations was the 
astonishment in front of what appeared to them as a relative absence of 
reaction (Settis 2002,43) 196, as if what was happening was just the 
logical consequence of a shift in values and priorities in the public sphere 
that had been so complete and pervasive, as to appear beyond any 
195 "La tradizione Italiana si basa da secoli su due principT ispiratori: the il patrimonio 
culturale 6 di proprietä pubblica e va promosso dallo Stato mediante la ricerca e la 
tutela; e the esso va inteso come un insieme inscindibile distribuito net territorio 
nazionale. Questi principt sono stati incrinati alla base dalla nuova legge the rischia, se 
applicata alla lettera, di provocare una svolta epocale, espropriando I cittadini di secolari 
diritti" (Settis 2002,124-125). 
196 The international museology community, however, decided to speak up. Hence, in 
2001, the International Council of Museums (ICOM) launched an appeal against what 
appeared to be an attempt to enslave public interests and access to the laws of profit. 
Shortly afterwards, 37 directors of the most renowned museums in the world signed a 
petition against the privatisations of Italian museums, archaeological and artistic 
heritage (Cappelli 2002,24). How Benedikter (2004,384) explains, "they feared the 
'denaturing ' of Italian museums, which would no longer fulfil UNESCO's primary criteria 
for a museum, I. e. to be a non-profit organisation and to serve for public benefit. Further, 
they petitioned for a far-reaching national and international debate on Italian 
privatisation plans, because Italian heritage constitutes, as they stated, a primordial 
value for World Heritage and thus belongs not to individuals but to the whole world". For 
some snippets of the Italian press debate, see De Luca 2001a and 2001b, De Seta 
2001, Giuliani 2001 and Calvesi 2002. 
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possible criticism (besides isolated examples of civic and cultural 
indignation of which Settis is a prime example). As it has been 
mentioned numerous times - though - Settis is openly critical of recent 
developments in Italian cultural policy, and relying too heavily on his 
reconstruction and interpretation of events might appear too one-sided an 
attitude, However, if we turn to the book published, in 2002, by the 
previous Culture Minister, Giuliano Urbani197, we cannot but conclude 
that here too the instrumental rhetoric abounds. 
Urbani's principal defence of the duo of newly created S. p. As. is that the 
involvement of the private sector will guarantee tutela and accessibility to 
the public for a number of building and monuments that are presently in a 
state of decay, and which the State simply cannot afford to look after 
adequately (Urbani 2002,42-43). Urbani touches here on a real issue in 
the Italian context. As earlier sections of this chapter have shown, Italian 
cultural policy was dominated, in the first half of the 20th century by the 
absolute priority of tutela over and above any other concern. This 
centrality of the state's duty of cultural preservation was behind the 
introduction, in law n. 1089 of 1939, of a norm according to which every 
building and cultural asset of public property that is more than fifty years 
old is automatically considered a bene culturale to be protected and 
never sold (again, on the basis of the principle of inalienabilitä), on the 
grounds of its historical, and possibly even artistic importance, unless the 
197 In April 2005, the controversial Rocco Buttiglione succeeded Urbani in his ministerial 
post. 
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contrary is proven and evidence collected to this aim. This has been a 
regulation endorsed by all subsequent legislation in the field up until 
2002. This has resulted in a huge number of buildings and other assets 
being included in the legal category of bene culturale and, thus, placed 
under the responsibility of the State for upkeep and preservation. 
Obviously, not all of these properties and assets are of any genuine 
historical or artistic value. In fact, a great percentage of them represent a 
'dead weight' for the state (Settis 2002,116). A high percentage of these 
assets is therefore languishing underused and in decay, and - as 
Urbani's argument goes - there would be nothing wrong with the 
involvement of private investors to bring these disused and decaying 
buildings back into life. Urbani (2002,44) declares that he intends to sell 
everything which is a rischio (at risk) because selling assets - provided 
that selling criteria and conditions are in place - is, according to the 
Minister, the best way to ensure their valorizzazione. Urbani's most 
interesting statement though, comes later in his book, where he admits 
that the economic and financial reason behind the introduction of these 
changes is 'vital', although accompanied by considerations that have to 
do with the effective tutela of the ben!. In private hands they will be finally 
well looked after. What about the evidence that this will indeed be the 
case? In Urbani's view, this is self-evident: the private investors that will 
buy cultural assets from the State will love them (this seems to be in 
Urbani's view a logic necessity, since they are happy to pay so much 
money to buy them), and who can be trusted to care for them well, if not 
somebody that really, really loves them? (Urbani 2002,47). In Urbani's 
-- 317 
cogent reasoning, the Patrimonio S. p. A. and the Infrastrutture S. p. A. do 
not represent a danger for the beni culturali, but, rather, an opportunity 
(Ibid., 46). To those who fear that he might be tempted to sell off a bit 
more than empty and crumbling old buildings, he replies firmly: 
[... ] no, we do not want to sell the Colosseum, we do not want 
to sell the Trevi Fountain, we do not want to sell Milan's Duomo 
[... ] We will not sell any of those assets that have a great 
potential for exploitation - noble exploitation, as I explained 
earlier - for the simple reason that it will be in our best interest 
to keep them. If you still have it, you can exploit it; if you no 
longer have it, because you have sold it, then, that's it, end of 
story (Urbani 2002,41)198 
These words ostensibly will not have brought much reassurance to Settis 
and the many others who have looked at recent developments in Italian 
cultural policy with growing unease. The 'noble exploitation' here referred 
to relates to the view that private ownership of the assets will increase 
public accessibility to the assets in question. However, the real reasons 
behind the 2002 decree and law transpire as Urbani's argument unfolds: 
referring to the Patrimonio S. p. A. and the Infrastrutture S. p. A he 
maintains that in the context of the disastrous Italian financial situation, 
they had to be created (Urbani 2002,46). Here is why: 
We have the highest public debt in the West, on which we pay 
an extremely high interest, that is money that cannot be 
destined to the cultural assets nor to anything else. We also 
have the largest artistic patrimony in the West (nobody knows 
, ea « no, non vogliamo vendere il Colosseo, non vogliamo vendere la Fontana di Trevi, 
non vogliamo vendere il Duomo di Milano. (... J ... tutto cid the ha un grosso valore di 
potenziale sfruttamento - di sfruttamento nobile, come dicevo prima - non lo 
venderemo, per la semplice ragione the ci farä comodo averlo. Se ce I'hai lo sfrutti; se 
non ce I'hai piü perche I'hai venduto, chiuso il discorso" (Urbani 2002,41). 
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what the exact percentage is, but it is certainly remarkable) 
Well: we have on the one hand, a huge debt on which we pay 
interest, and on the other hand, a fabulous public patrimony, 
artistic and belonging to the state, from which we make no 
profit. Shouldn't we try to achieve some balance? Otherwise, 
we will never have enough money to do what we need to do 
(schools, hospitals, and so on)199. 
Despite the vague grammar, Urbani's position is very clear, and it 
represents instrumental cultural policy in its purest form. It is also very 
interesting to note how Urbani does not justify the sale of part of the 
artistic heritage as a way to finance other initiatives belonging to the 
cultural sphere. His argument is that it is unacceptable for a country that 
has a huge public debt yet still has to build schools and hospitals (no 
mention about building museums here! ) not to maximise the financial 
potential of its artistic patrimony. This is a defence of the act of selling off 
of the family jewels to face the hardship caused by the difficult economic 
circumstances200 
199 In Urbani's own words: "Conclusione: le due societä non sono un pericolo per I beni 
culturali, possono e devono essere un'opportunita. Inoltre, net panorama delle finanze 
Italiane non si potevano non creare. II nostro 6 il piü grande debito pubblico 
dell'Occidente, su di esso paghiamo fror di interessi, quindi soldi the non possiamo dare 
n6 ai Beni culturali n6 ad altri. Abbiamo pure il piü grande patrimonio artistico 
dell'Occidente (nessuno sa quale sia la vera percentuale, comunque 6 notevole). Bene: 
un mare di debiti sul quale paghiamo interessi e un favoloso patrimonio pubblico, 
artistico e statale, da cui non guadagnamo niente. Vogliamo trovare un equilibrio? 
Altrimenti, non avremo mai i soldi per fare ciö the dovremo fare (scuole, ospedali e 
%uant'altro" (Urbani 2002,46; emphasis in the original). 
20 Another interesting sign of the Berlusconi government's interest for the 
encouragement of the involvement of private investors in the administration of publicly 
owned beni culturali Is the recent legislation aimed at the creation, for the first time, of a 
coherent and clear legal framework for private sponsorship of cultural assets and their 
restoration (Piperata 2005). 
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However, Urbani's view only reflects the position of the Berlusconi 
government with regards to the administration of the (still) public cultural 
patrimony. If further evidence were needed, the current Dpef (Documento 
di Programmazione Economico-Finanziaria, that is the country's official 
economic strategy) covering the period 2003-2006 has chosen to 
redefine public expenditure on the beni culturali as 'investment' (spesa 
d'investimento) - instead of the traditional 'ordinary expenditure' (spesa 
corrente), in a development that mirrors that of Britain (Settis 2002,138). 
The Dpef, indeed, considers the cultural patrimony to be "of strategic 
importance for the development of relevant economic and financial 
sectors, ranging from tourism to the promotion of products 'made in Italy'" 
(Quoted in Settis 2002,138). Settis (Ibid. ), sharp as usual, points to 
something missing in this enunciation of reasons for the strategic 
importance of the Italian cultural patrimony. Indeed, what is missing is 
any reference to any function of an institutional, historical or civic nature. 
This seems to provide further ammunition for Settis' accusations that the 
problem afflicting the politicians in whose hand the destiny of the cultural 
assets rests, is their progressive distancing from that typically Italian and 
centuries-long institutional culture that considered the cultural patrimony 
of the country as one of the pillars of Italian civil society (Settis 2002, 
113). This distancing has expressed itself in the language of 
managerialism and through the rhetoric of profitability. 
A final example of this trend that this thesis will consider (but there are so 
many more that one could describe) is represented by a number of 
-- 320 
policies that have been developed with a view to promote economic 
development in the South of Italy, an area that includes zones of severe 
economic disadvantage. Theoretical debates on the so called "questione 
meridionale" (Southern question) as well as specific action to resolve the 
economic and social backwardness of the Southern regions date back to 
the years following the Unification of Italy. A number of special funds and 
strategies aiming at fostering the growth of the secondary sector in the 
mainly peasant South were set up. In particular, the most important 
initiative was the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno. This was a fund set up in 
1950 with the aim of improving the economy of the South and reducing 
income inequalities between North and South of the country by helping to 
create almost ex nihilo a secondary sector in the Mezzogiorno. The 
initiative was considered to be fundamentally a failure, leading to the 
closure of the Fund in 1984. A number of measures targeted at the less 
developed Southern regions have followed, but with not much more 
successful outcomes. In fact, the fundamental failure of such initiatives is 
today generally acknowledged by economists, sociologists and politicians 
alike (Trigilia 1992). 
In these circumstances, it is evident that new strategies for a sustainable 
economic development of the Southern regions needed to be 
established, and, most recently, the attention has focused on the 
potential of culture towards sustainable development and job creation 
(Santoro 1995, I-II). This potential could be particularly remarkable in 
view of the fact that a high proportion of the Italian artistic and 
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archaeological heritage is to be found in Central and Southern areas of 
the country. In the South of Italy, the consistent use of culture with 
regenerative aims is still at an early stage of development, and it was 
partly the result of institutional pressures to make the most of EU 
Structural Funds to finance cultural projects. Despite the fact that this is a 
relatively recent development, the rhetoric of management and 
profitability that we have seen seeping through the main pieces of 
legislation discussed above, has already affected current policies for 
economic development set up for the Southern regions. In particular, the 
Programma di Sviluppo del Mezzogiorno (PSM, that translates as 
Programme for the Development of Southern Italy) -a policy document 
that outlines the way European funds will be invested in the South 
between the year 2000 and 2006 - attributes a central role to the 
valorisation of the South's cultural patrimony in order to bring about 
economic development and create new job opportunities (Marchesi 2000, 
21). The PSM is a seven-year strategy that will redirect a third of all 
national public spending to the Southern regions, allowing for 
investments in the region of about 2,544 million euros (Barca 2000,195; 
Dell'Orso 2002,117). A number of regions, including Calabria, Puglia and 
Sicily, have a number of projects already well under way (Dell'Orso 2002, 
117). Culture-based urban regeneration and local economic development 
are hardly an invention of the Southern regions of Italy, but what is of 
interest here is the rapidity with which the language of public policy - and 
cultural policy in particular - has changed, absorbing the rhetoric - as well 
as the values - of the instrumental discourse. Marchesi (2000,22) quotes 
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from the PSM document the part that concerns the broad objectives of 
the initiative, which are: 
To establish conditions favourable to the development of new 
entrepreneurial possibilities in the sector of culture and cultural 
activities; to enhance the quality of life of citizens, their trust and 
their social wellbeing; to valorise, protect and enhance public 
access to the cultural resources of the Southern regions. 
Despite the survival of references to principles of valorizzazione and 
tutela, we are in front of a new type of language that - in Italy too - 
emphasises the importance of the subsidised cultural sector as a 
promoter of economic development and employment. 
It seems fit to conclude this necessarily selective historical overview of 
developments in the cultural policy field in Italy with the thoughts of the 
ex-culture Minister Paolucci, who notes how, in a not too far away past, 
cultural organisations were considered as places that are expensive to 
run, but have a value for those who want to go there; they might have 
some beneficial impacts on tourism, but their importance did not lie in 
economic profitability (Quoted in Dell'Orso 2002,10). Museums are a 
perfect example - or used to be - in so far as their entrance ticket used 
to have a symbolic value rather than any kind of financial profitability. 
However, in the last twenty years, things have changed. An entrance 
ticket to the Galleria dell'Accademia in Florence, for instance has gone 
up in less than twenty years, from 150 lire to 6,60 euros - the equivalent 
of about 12,500 lire (Dell'Orso 2002,10-11). No other public service has 
registered a rise in prices of this proportion. For Paolucci, "this explains 
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the entity of the shift that has occurred in our understanding of the 
concept of cultural asset, which has now loosened its anchorage to its 
traditional historical and idealistic moorings, in order to berth at the land 
of economic utility"201 (Paolucci quoted in Dell'Orso 2002,11). 
201 "Questo spiega I'entitb dello slittamento subito dal concetto di bene culturale the si 6 
disancorato dai suoi tradizionali ormeggi storicistici e idealistici per approdare agli 
scenari dell'utilitä economica" (Paolucci quoted in DeII'Orso 2002,11) 
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Chapter 7 
`Instrumentalism' across borders: Towards an explanatory 
framework 
As the preceding discussion of the most recent trends in cultural policy in 
the two countries has shown, the differences that once characterized the 
Italian and British national policy models seem now to be becoming 
progressively less significant. Despite the fact that the impact of 
neoliberalism takes different forms in the two countries at the centre of 
the present research - because of the different characteristics of 
capitalism assumes in the two countries, different political systems and 
parties -a common ethos of instrumentalism and a similar rhetoric 
emphasising the alleged positive economic or social repercussions of 
cultural expenditure seem indeed to be seeping through the cultural 
policy debate in both Italy and the UK. This is certainly a significant 
departure from very well established cultural and political traditions in 
both countries, and for this reason alone, worthy of a closer scrutiny. This 
final chapter, therefore, aims to provide a plausible explanation for the 
trends and attitudes that are currently at work in both countries, 
reshaping the contours of cultural policy as it has been traditionally 
understood and interpreted. An attempt will be made to provide a 
possible paradigm of explanation for the dramatic rupture in the 
traditional understanding of culture as an object of public policy, and the 
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role of the state in its promotion and administration. In order to achieve 
this, this chapter will look at issues and developments in cultural policy in 
the light of the global phenomena that have dramatically changed the 
world as we used to know it, giving rise to what could be defined as a 
'new world order'. In particular, I will look at the phenomena of 
globalisation and the seemingly unstoppable rise of neoliberalism. The 
present discussion of the impacts of neo-liberal globalisation over cultural 
policy will complement the examination of the implications of the diffusion 
of NPM principles and practices presented in chapter 5, giving as 
complete a picture of how global transformations have affected cultural 
policy-making as the limitations of scope and time imposed by this thesis 
allow. Finally, the theory of policy transfer will be examined in detail, in 
order to suggest a possible specific explanation for the apparently similar 
cultural policy trends that have been observed in two countries so 
profoundly different (in all the respects discussed in this thesis, and 
more) as Britain and Italy. 
UNDERSTANDING THE'DISCOURSE OF BELEAGUREMENT' 
As was observed earlier, in both the countries that are at the centre of the 
present enquiry, a widespread agreement can be found that the 1980s 
represented a time of radical change, when transformations occurred in 
the public sphere so profound as to require, for their understanding, a 
whole new set of theoretical and analytical tools. Another puzzling aspect 
of the post-1980s era, according to McGuigan (2004,137), is also that an 
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extremely significant change of direction took place in the academic 
study of culture. In the decades preceding the rise of the New Right in the 
1980s, the disciplines of cultural and media studies had been 
characterised by a firm commitment to ideological critique (in the form of 
a critical attitude to the current political and cultural order). However, 
such commitment appeared to be wavering precisely at a time when it 
would have been most justified by the shape that global politics was 
assuming. One of the aims of this section is, therefore, to try and answer 
the question "what really happened in the 1980s? " in order to justify the 
"discourse of beleaguerment" (Bennett 1995,200) that seems to have 
entered the cultural debate then, resulting in a "sense of the public sector 
being occupied by alien power" (McGuigan 2004,46). 
The premise of this chapter is that the answer to our question is to be 
found in the ensemble of transformations that are usually characterised 
as the defining traits of the new global society, and principally in the 
spread of neo-liberal globalisation. As Andrew Gamble (2001,127) 
explains: 
One of the significant trends of the last thirty years has been the 
revival of economic liberalism both as a form of political economy 
and as a political ideology. By the end of the century many had 
come to regard it as the new hegemonic ideology, following the 
collapse of Communism in the USSR, the fading of alternative 
paths of development in the Third World and the new trajectory of 
social democracy. 
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It was precisely during the 1980s that the debate over the various and 
controversial phenomena that are usually grouped under the umbrella- 
term of 'globalisation' started gaining momentum - in academia and 
beyond. This has resulted in the development of a very substantial and 
varied body of literature, both academic and journalistic in nature (in fact, 
often of a character that blurs the boundaries within the two), 
representing equally diverse and varied positions and interpretations of 
'the' topic of the times. As Moore (2003,15) maintains: 
Globalisation has joined imperialism, colonialism, capitalism 
and communism in becoming an all-purpose tag, which can be 
wielded like a club in almost any ideological direction. It is the 
defining political, economic and social phenomenon of the new 
millennium. 
For obvious reasons, the present examination of matters relating to 
globalizing processes currently at work in the world will have to be 
necessarily selective. The analysis will thus be limited to those aspects 
that are more immediately relevant to the understanding of the cultural 
policy-making process as it is currently unfolding in Britain and Italy. 
Nevertheless, I will try to refer to the available literature, and to account 
for the most important themes and debates that mark the (very lively) 
present debate over globalisation in general, and neo-liberal globalisation 
in particular. 
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NEO-LIBERAL GLOBALIZATION AND THE TRIUMPH OF ECONOMIC REASON 
"We live in an age dominated by economic reason". This is the opening 
line of Jim McGuigan's latest work entitled Rethinking Cultural Policy 
(2004,1). The book attempts to suggest a possible answer to the 
question "What does it mean for cultural life when economic reason 
predominates? " (Ibid. ). The prevalence of economic values and principles 
exemplified by today's 'market fundamentalism' has, according to 
McGuigan, clear repercussions in the cultural policy field: 
In the past, cultural policy has been rationalised in various 
ways, including the amelioration of 'market failure' for practices 
deemed to have a cultural value that is not reducible to 
economic value. While this rationalization persists residually, it 
has very largely been superseded by an exclusively economic 
rationale. In this sense, cultural practices are deemed worthy of 
support because they are of economic value. Cultural policy 
has been rethought in such a way that it no longer requires a 
specifically cultural rationale. This is a manifestation of the 
pervasive dominance of economic reason today: to put it 
bluntly, naked capitalism (McGuigan 2004,1; emphasis in the 
original). 
The analysis of the British and Italian case studies, presented in the 
preceding sections of this thesis, certainly reinforces and substantiates 
McGuigan's argument. However, in order to better understand such 
developments in the cultural policy arena, it is necessary to pose some 
further crucial questions, such as: where does this all-pervading 
economic reason come from? What have been the circumstances that 
have allowed it to be endorsed so enthusiastically by governments and 
-- 329 
institutions operating within such different cultural, political and 
administrative frameworks? Is economic reasoning - and the instrumental 
rationality that seem to accompany it -a global phenomenon? These are 
the questions that the following and final part of this thesis will tackle and 
strive to answer. 
It has been noted (Peck and Ticknell 2002,392) that "neoliberalism does 
indeed seem to be everywhere. And its apparent omnipresence is at the 
same time a manifestation of and a source of political-economic power". 
And yet, a precise and clear definition of what neoliberalism actually is 
appears rather hard to come by202. A number of scholars have 
commented on the difficulty of pinning down a definition of the 
phenomenon of neoliberalism that can be broad enough to encompass 
the varied aspects of such a complex phenomenon whilst at the same 
time avoiding gross generalizations that do not take into account the fact 
that neoliberalism, albeit a global trend, when implanted in different 
economic, political and cultural contexts, gives rise to very different local 
manifestations. As Peck and Ticknell (2002,381-2) explain, "[t]his means 
walking a line of sorts between producing, on the one hand, 
overgeneralized accounts of a monolithic and omnipresent neoliberalism, 
which tend to be insufficiently sensitive to its local variability and complex 
internal constitution, and on the other hand, excessively concrete and 
contingent analyses of (local) neoliberal strategies, which are 
202 The variations across countries in the interpretation of the label 'neoliberalism', and 
the differing interpretation of its relationship to the preceding 'liberalism' contribute to 
making neoliberalism "a recent concept open to several often conflicting interpretations' 
(Cerny 2004,1). 
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inadequately attentive to the substantial connections and necessary 
characteristics of neoliberalism as an extralocal project"203 (see also 
Overbeek and Van Der PijI 1993,15). Brenner and Theodore (2002,353) 
go as far as arguing that "a purely definitional approach to the political 
economy of neoliberal restructuring contains significant analytical 
limitations"204. They seem to express a point of widespread agreement 
among commentators when they conclude: "the somewhat elusive 
phenomenon that needs definition must be construed as a historically 
specific, ongoing, and internally contradictory process of market-driven 
sociospatial transformation, rather than as a fully actualised policy 
regime, ideological form, or regulatory framework". Colin Hay (2004,507- 
8), thus, argues that rather than striving for a fixed definition, the most 
fruitful approach is, rather, to identify a set of core tenets and principles 
that can be said to 'capture the identity of neoliberalism', and at the same 
time leave room for variations in specific policies across time and space. 
These are, according to Hay (Ibid. ) the main tenets of neoliberalism: 
1. A confidence in the market as an efficient mechanism for the 
allocation of scarce resources. 
2. A belief in the desirability of a global regime of free trade and 
free capital mobility. 
203 Larner (2004,5), for instance, has pointed out that often, current definitions of 
neoliberalism tend to conflate the concept with that of neo-conservatism, an occurrence 
which does not account for the fact that "the articulation between neoliberalism and 
neoconservatism is contingent rather then inherent". She thus concludes (Ibid. ) that 
"[w]e need to be more sensitive to the fact that there are different configurations of neo- 
liberalism. Close inspection of particular neo-liberal political projects is more likely to 
reveal a complex and hybrid imaginary, rather than the straightforward implementation 
of a unified and coherent political philosophy". 
204 Colin Hay (2004,507) expresses a similar position when he says "[d]efinitions are 
static; paradigms evolve. Tempting though it is to fashion a generic and trans-historical 
definition of neoliberalism as a set of policy preferences, this will not do'. 
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3. A belief in the desirability, all things being equal, of a limited 
and non interventionist role for the state and of the state as a 
facilitator and custodian rather than a substitute for market 
mechanisms 
4. A rejection of Keynesian demand-management techniques in 
favour of monetarism, neo-monetarism, and supply-side 
economics. 
5. A commitment to the removal of those welfare benefits which 
might be seen to act as disincentives to market participation (in 
short, a subordination of the principles of social justice to those 
of perceived economic imperative). 
6. A defence of labour-market flexibility and the promotion and 
nurturing of cost competitiveness. 
7. A confidence in the use of private finance in public projects 
and, more generally, in the allocative efficiency of market and 
quasi-market mechanisms in the provision of public goods205 
A corollary of these principles is the view that conceives states and 
markets as diametrically opposed principles of social organization, in a 
dualistic view that seems to ignore the fact that, in fact, they both are 
politically construed notions. In addition, neoliberalism offers the world a 
'one size fits all' model of public policy that assumes that similar market- 
driven reforms will bring about similar changes independently of the 
institutional and political contexts (Brenner and Theodore 2002,353). 
Having established the fundamental characteristics of neoliberalism (a 
number of which will be further investigated later), it remains to be 
ascertained what brought about the 'neoliberal regime shift' that 
commentators agree took place in Britain and the US in the late 1970s 
tos The literature discussing the main principles of neoliberalism is vast. The sources 
consulted for this section of the chapter were: also Cerny 2004; Peck and Ticknell 2002; 
Larner 2004; Solomon 1994, ch. 1,2 and 3; Bremmer and Theodore 2002; Overbeek 
1993; Jessop 2002. 
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(Jessop 2002,457). A shared agreement indeed exists that the 
intellectual roots of the neoliberalism creed are to be found in the work of 
a group of jurists and economists that came to be known, collectively, 
with the label of Ordoliberalen, on the grounds of their involvement in the 
journal Ordo (Gordon 1991,41)206. A crucial tenet of the Ordoliberalen 
was that market needs to be understood as "an artificial game of 
competitive liberty" (Kendall 2003,7). They advocated a form of 
interventionism targeted not at the market itself, but rather at those 
conditions that can allow the market to flourish: the rule of law, the 
cultural climate, the institutional framework, etc. Ideally, intervention in 
these areas would result in instilling in society at large a useful and 
fruitful competitive spirit (Ibid., 7-8). Another important element in the 
intellectual line of descent of current neoliberal ideology is represented 
by the Chicago School theorists, whose principal representative was 
Gary C. Becker, who wrote his most influential books between the 1960s 
and '70s. The hallmark of the school was a much more radical view of 
the relationship between the market ad the social sphere, and their 
suggestion that the social be seen as a form of the economic (Ibid., 9). 
The Chicago School theorists' faith in the market was such that they felt 
that its logic could be usefully extended to the social (family life, human 
relationships, crime, work life, etc. ). At the basis of this line of reasoning 
is the assumption that the essence of all rational behaviour ultimately 
boils down to making decisions about which resources are best 
206 The Ordoliberalen were mostly jurists and economists that had been working in 
Germany since the 1920s though were exiled during Nazism. Many of them returned to 
Germany after the end of the war, and contributed to reconstructing post-war West 
Germany (Kendall 2003,7). 
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channelled towards which ends. As, Kendall (Ibid. ) explains, "[o]nce all 
rational human behaviour has been understood as economic behaviour, 
then, government becomes nothing more or less than economic 
government". The final key figure in the theoretical elaborations that 
neoliberalism feeds upon, is Hayek, and the highly influential critique of 
state intervention that he put forward in his 1944 book The Road to 
Serfdom. At the heart of Hayek's work is the notion of freedom, "that 
ideal of freedom which inspired modern Western civilization" (Hayek 
quoted in Viskovatoff 2002,2). This he sees as an artefact of civilization, 
and an act of individual submission to discipline (Kendall 2003,12). 
However, as Klees (1999,5) notes, "Frederich Hayek begins by 
assuming a very narrow view of the meaning of freedom and liberty and 
ends up supporting an extremist version of laissez-faire"207. Indeed, 
Hayek sees the market not as the end product of governmental policy, 
but rather as "a 'spontaneous social order' [... ] arrived at through the 
rules of conduct established in cultural evolution" (Kendall 2003,13). 
Defining the market as something 'cultural' leads Hayek to the conclusion 
that it cannot possibly be sensibly and effectively regulated by the 
government, and it is therefore best left to its own devices and logic 
(ibid. )208. 
207 Klees (1999,5) also reports that Keynes, commenting on Hayek's work reached the 
following conclusion: "it is an extraordinary example of how starting from a mistake a 
remorseless logician can end up in bedlam". 
208 Furthermore, as the democratic liberal Herman Finer wrote in his angry response to 
Hayek, The Road to Reaction (1945), though Hayek seems to nominally be in favour of 
democracy, he seems not to think much of what the people really want, for he attributes 
"more rationality and honor to millions struggling with each other economically than to 
millions democratically composing their own laws and controlling their responsible 
administrations (Finer quoted in Gottfried 1999,11). In conclusion, according to a 
scathing Finer (Ibid. ) "in our time the only form of government which will give Hayek 
what he wants - namely the protection of economic individualism in the extreme form 
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Even from such a necessarily terse review, it is evident how these 
theoretical elaborations aim to undermine the values and beliefs at the 
root of the post-war welfare model and propose a much different 
alternative. The extent to which these theories underpin a new and 
radical alternative approach to market and society has been spelled out 
by Colin Gordon (1991,43): 
Economics thus becomes an 'approach' capable in principle of 
addressing the totality of human behaviour, and, consequently, of 
envisaging a coherent, purely economic method of programming 
the totality of governmental action. The neo-liberal homo 
economicus is both a reactivation and a radical inversion of the 
economic agent as conceived by the liberalism of Smith, Hume or 
Ferguson. The reactivation consists in positing a fundamental 
human faculty of choice, a principle which empowers economic 
calculation effectively to sweep aside the anthropological 
categories and frameworks of the human and social sciences. 
In the mid-1930s, Keynes has famously argued that "the ideas of 
economists and political philosophers, both when they are right and 
when they are wrong, are more powerful than is commonly understood" 
(quoted in Milberg 2004,352). His claim seems to have stood the test of 
time, for - according to Peck and Tickell's (2002,388-9) reconstruction - 
the late Seventies were precisely the time when the abstract 
intellectualist theoretical elaborations of the thinkers discussed above 
coalesced into an actual neoliberal political project of 'state-authored 
restructuring' carried out mainly by the Thatcherite and Reaganite 
that he wants it - is dictatorship, which coerces whole peoples, and sneers at rule by 
persuasion". 
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governments209. As the following sections of this chapter will highlight, a 
second important shift took place in the early 1990s. This was indeed a 
time when it was no longer possible to deny the institutional and political 
limits, and the negative economic and social consequences of the 
neoliberal reforms. However, the final outcome of the realization of the 
negative aspects of neoliberal strategies was not an implosion of the 
system, but rather its reconsitution into more 'socially interventionist and 
ameliorative forms", epitomised by the Third-Way politics of the Clinton 
and Blair governments (Peck and Tickell 2002,388). 
NEOLIBERALISM: A SCENARIO WITH NO ALTERNATIVES? 
Jessop (2002,467) maintains that one of the key features of 
neoliberalism is that its success "depends on promoting new ways of 
representing the world, new discourses, new subjectivities that establish 
the legitimacy of the market economy, the disciplinary state, and 
enterprise culture". Consistently with this claim, a first observation that 
can be made from the analysis of the extensive corpus of literature that 
examines the seemingly inexorable diffusion, globally, of neo-liberalism, 
209 The trait d'union between theory and political practice was In many cases 
represented by think tanks, policy elites and public intellectuals (Peck and Tickell 2002, 
401; Osborne 2004). As the anti-neoliberal political activist Susan George (2001,9) has 
pointed out: "They [the neoliberals] have understood, as progressives have not, that 
ideas have consequences. Starting from a tiny embryo at the University of Chicago with 
the philosopher-economist Friedrich von Hayek and his students - Milton Friedman 
among them - at its nucleus, the neoliberals and their funders have created a huge 
international network of foundations, institutes, research centres, publications, scholars, 
writers and public relations hacks to develop, package and push their ideas and 
doctrine relentlessly". 
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is the widespread agreement that the faith in its tenets has gained today 
such a degree of acceptance as to have become, in many ways, a truly 
universal religion, summoning an inexorable "logic of no alternative" (Hay 
and Watson 2003,147; see also Peters 2001, chapter 6 and Smart 2003, 
chapter 2). In his already mentioned discussion of the revival of the 
doctrines of the free market, Gamble (2001,127) notes how - in the late 
1980s - "[c]apital appeared once more triumphant, and the nostrums of 
economic liberalism about the organisation of the economy were once 
more being expressed as simple common sense and encountering 
relatively little challenge, either politically or intellectually". Following the 
historical collapse of communism and the seeming weakening popularity 
of Marxism, liberalism has progressively yet steadily assuming the role of 
the official ideology that legitimises advanced multinational capitalism 
(Peters 2001,119). 
Anderson (2000,17), in the editorial of the opening first issue of the New 
Left Reviews (NLR) second series, brings the argument a step further: I 
For the first time since Reformation, there are no longer any 
significant oppositions - that is, systematic rival outlooks - 
within the thought-world of the West; and scarcely any on a 
world scale either, if we discount religious doctrines as largely 
inoperative archaisms, as the experiences of Poland or Iran 
indicate we may. Whatever limitations persist to its practice, 
neo-liberalism as a set of principles rules undivided across the 
globe: the most successful ideology in world history (emphasis 
mine). 
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It was from the very pages of the NLR that, two years previously, Pierre 
Bourdieu (1998,125) had proffered his own perceptive interpretation of 
the present "period of neo-conservative reconstruction", which is worth 
quoting in full: 
It is a new type of conservative revolution that claims 
connection with progress, reason and science - economics 
actually - to justify its own re-establishment, and by the same 
token tries to relegate progressive thought and action to 
archaic status. It erects into defining standards for all practices, 
and thus into ideal rules, the regularities of the economic world 
abandoned to its own logic: the law of the market, the law of 
the strongest. It ratifies and glorifies the rule of what we call the 
financial markets, a return to a sort of radical capitalism 
answering to no law except that of maximum profit; an 
undisguised, unrestrained capitalism, but one that has been 
rationalized, tuned to the limit of its economic efficiency through 
the introduction of modern forms of domination ('management') 
and manipulative techniques like market research, marketing 
and commercial advertising. 
According to Bourdieu, neo-liberalism's "uncrossable horizon of thought" 
equates to an all-pervading form of economic fatalism, which is 
"becoming a sort of universal belief, a new ecumenical gospel" (Ibid., 
126; see also Bourdieu 1998b, pp. 29-44 and 1998c). Neo-liberalism, 
thus, is "a powerful economic theory whose strictly symbolic strength, 
combined with the effect of theory, redoubles the force of the economic 
realities it is supposed to express" (Ibid., emphasis in the original). 
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Across the Atlantic, Bourdieu's and Gamble's words are echoed by 
Thomas Frank's (2000, XV) declaration that ideas revolving around the 
notion of what he calls 'market populism', in the nineties, "became 
canonical, solidified into a new orthodoxy that anathematised all 
alternative ways of understanding democracy, history, and the rest of the 
world". His concept of 'market populism' is indeed very interesting. In a 
book significantly entitled One Market under God (2000), Frank presents 
an incisive and scathing analysis of the neo-liberal orthodoxy in the 
cultural and political public spheres in Britain and the States. He makes a 
significant point when he notes how one of its main theoretical principles 
is the identification between democracy and the workings of the market, 
which is at the root of so much of today's public policy and political 
theory. In the neo-liberal set of beliefs, the free market and democracy 
are seen as identical entities210. Indeed, Frank (2000,29) writes: 
By its very nature the market was democratic, perfectly 
expressing the popular will through the machinery of supply 
and demand poll and focus group, superstore and Internet. In 
fact, the market was more democratic than any of the formal 
institutions of democracy - elections, legislatures, government. 
The market was a community. The market was Infinitely 
diverse, permitting without prejudice the articulation of any and 
all tastes and preferences. Most importantly of all, the market 
was militant about its democracy. It had no place for snobs, for 
hierarchies, for elitism, for pretence, and it would fight these 
things by its very nature. 
210 Frank (2000,15) also points out that, in fact, such an identification is not something 
new in itself, for claims in favour of such identification have always been a recurrent 
theme in the American political debate. What is 'new', however, according to Frank, is - 
once again - 'this idea's triumphs over all its rivals: the determination of American 
leaders to extend it to all the world; the general belief among opinion-makers that there 
is something natural, something divine, something inherently democratic about 
markets'. 
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The problem here is that there is actually an obvious conflict between the 
logic of maximum profit and capital accumulation on the basis of which 
the global economy operates on the one hand, and - on the other hand - 
the 'logic of legitimisation' which guides politics in all liberal states that 
are administered on the basis of democratic elections. Whereas the 
former only recognises the requirements of capital as its priority, the 
latter aims at achieving economic stability - and possibly growth - on 
condition that certain social needs of the population are met21 (Leys 
2003,26). 
This identification of the market with a democratising force within society 
entails all sorts of significant implications for the publicly subsidised 
cultural sector. The case of Britain is, in this respect, very significant. 
Accusations of snobbery and elitism indeed have been addressed 
against the Arts Council's arts policy and funding allocations since the 
1960s. Some commentators even suggested that it would be desirable 
that public subsidy for the arts should be stripped off completely, and the 
livelihood of the cultural sector left to the will of the public as it expresses 
itself through the marketplace (Sawers, 1993). 
2" As Leys (2003,26) further observes, in the past (that is in the epoch of national 
economies) the conflict between these two logics was limited, to a certain extent, by the 
relative immobility of capital. The situation is today radically different: "[g]lobalization has 
for the first time separated the fields of operation of the two logics" (Ibid. ). As a result, 
the national states that are committed to the attempt of limiting the impact of the market 
forces on the life of their citizens find that they have very little room for manoeuvre left. 
Realistically, in order to survive in the global economy, national governments have no 
other feasible option but to pursue whatever economic policies can allow them to boost 
national competitiveness in the global marketplace, and at the same time encourage 
economic growth and employment (Ibid., 28). 
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An influential promoter of the positive cultural role of the market in 
cultural life is certainly Tyler Cowen, whose work - in particular the book 
In Praise of Commercial Culture (1998) - has been at the centre of great 
interest in Europe, and in Britain especially (see also Cowen 2002). In 
the attempt to counteract the diffuse pessimism vis ä vis the negative 
impacts of the market on culture - and the defence of public subsidy for 
the cultural sector that relies on it - Cowen (1998,37) famously stated: 
"The state does its best in promoting the arts when it acts simply as 
another customer, patron or employer, rather than as a bureaucracy with 
a public mandate. Direct government funding works best when it serves 
n212 as private funding in disguise... 
On the one hand, it is beyond question that in many instances the market 
has contributed to making culture, in all its high-, mid- and low-brow 
manifestations, more accessible to a larger number of people. On the 
other hand, though, it has also been observed that a tendency is 
currently spreading among western cultural commentators of looking at 
the tension between culture and the economy in ways that are largely 
uncritical of the relations of economic power that are involved in the 
212 Similar arguments, however, had been in circulation within the cultural debate for 
quite some time, as proven by a Council of Europe document of cultural democracy, 
published as early as 1976, which - in its historical discussion of the progressive move 
towards a focus on cultural democracy (over the traditional cultural policy goal of the 
democratisation of 'high' culture), openly refers to the contribution of the market to 
cultural democratisation: "Commercial interests, always astute in the diagnosis of 
potential profitability, had begun to intervene in ways that contributed to the diffusion of 
culture. (... j There can be no doubt of the contribution made by the cultural industries to 
the democratisation of culture" (Simpson 1976,16 and 17). 
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production, circulation and consumption of culture. As a result, many 
cultural critics as well as cultural policy-makers seem to have opted for 
the adoption of the jargon and values of the market, and appear 
completely oblivious to the very possibility of any alternative set of values 
or cultural policy rationales (McGuigan 2004,121-122). This conclusion is 
clearly confirmed by the recent trends in both British and Italian cultural 
policies, where increasing 'managerialization' (through the 
implementation of NMP principles) of the cultural sector and the 
instrumental rationality of the economic and social impact of the arts has 
been met by very little resistance, and by the failure (or even the 
renunciation to attempting) to formulate an alternative theoretical defence 
of the rightfulness and importance of the involvement of the state in the 
funding and nurturing of the public cultural sphere. For this is indeed the 
"age of corporate colonization" (Boggs 2000,6), characterised by the 
decline of the public sphere (Marquand 2004; Sennett 2003 [1977]213; 
see also Duggan 2003). According to Marquand (2004,6): 
The single most important element of the New Right project of 
the 1980s and 1990s was a relentless kulturkampf designed to 
root out the culture of service and citizenship which had 
become part of the social fabric. De-regulation, privatisation, 
2" As early as 1977, the sociologist Richard Sennett, in his major work entitled (quite 
significantly) The Fall of Public Man had already identified the decline of the public 
sphere as a distinguishing feature of contemporary western society. His main argument 
is that as a consequence of the development of capitalism and the secularisation of 
society, the boundary between the public and the private domains have been 
progressively eroded. Moreover, Sennett argues that such breakdown has been so 
dramatic, as to have left 'public man' deprived of any clear ideas of his role in society. In 
the first chapter of the book Sennett writes: "Today public life has also become a matter 
of formal obligation. Most citizens approach their dealings with the state in a spirit of 
resigned acquiescence, but this public enervation is in its scope much broader than 
political affairs. Manners and ritual interchanges with strangers are looked on as at best 
formal and dry, at worst as phoney... As in Roman times, participation in the res publica 
today is most often a matter of going along, and the forums for this public life, like the 
city, are in a state of decay" (Sennett 2003 [1977] 3-4). 
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so-called public-private partnerships, proxy markets, 
performance indicators mimicking those of the private 
corporate sector, and a systematic assault on professional 
autonomy narrowed the public domain and blurred the 
distinction between it and the market domain. 
Chapter 5 and 6 have discussed, respectively, the new orthodoxy of 
managerialism and New Labour's cultural policies, characterised by their 
consistent promotion of a connection between 'culture' and 'industry '214 
(Littler 2000,204) - to the point of having arguably transformed Britain in 
the "UK Plc"215 (Cohen 1999,172 ff. ) - and the clear determination shown 
by the Italian government to find the resources needed for the planned 
public works by ruthlessly selling off the treasures of the Italian cultural 
heritage to private companies. Furthermore, it has been suggested 
(Bardouille 2000) that the spread of the NPM paradigm (also discussed 
in chapter 5) has been enthusiastically embraced by OECD countries not 
only as 'the' panacea for all their governmental inefficiencies, but 
principally as a way to make their governance practices consistent with 
the fundamental values and ideological constructs of neo-liberal 
globalisation. On the grounds of the analysis there proposed, thus, we 
can agree with McGuigan's (2004,59) conclusion that "[t]he crucial 
2 14 The encroachment of economic concerns in the cultural sphere that has been 
discussed in chapter 5 and 6 with regards to Britain and Italy respectively, is a 
phenomenon that has undergone, as a matter of fact, much broader circulation. Jeremy 
Ahearne (2002,22) for instance, discussing French cultural policy, concluded that - in 
the 1980s - in France too the minister for Culture Jack Lang and the President 
Mitterand had collaboratively established a "new cultural policy matrix" whose 
distinguishing feature was the juxtaposition of culture and economy. 
"I The claim that the UK has become a fully market-driven state (Leys 2003) is hardly 
pertinent to the British experience alone, as shown, at the global level, by the concept of 
'McWorld' put forward by Barber (2003 [1995]) and George Ritzer's (2004) theory of the 
'McDonaldization of society'. 
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development in the recent period has been the ideological de- 
legitimisation of state intervention and public-sector arts and media. They 
persist, but with an uncertain and poorly defended rationale. Even when 
they persist, however, their operations are reconfigured increasingly by 
market reasoning so that publicly funded organizations must behave like 
private businesses, thereby further undercutting their own legitimacy". 
But is neo-liberalism really the only possible option? How did this "logic 
of no alternative" find so strong a rooting in Western culture? This is 
indeed a very intriguing question, especially in view of the fact that until 
not long ago, the significance of the revival of market fundamentalism 
was not universally grasped, so that the unchallenged consolidation and 
diffusion of neo-liberalism was not always successfully predicted - not 
even by widely respected and usually very perspective commentators 
(Anderson 2000,10; Gamble 2001,127). None other than Eric 
Hobsbawm, by all means one of the most remarkable living historians, as 
late as 1998, seemed to fail to foresee its future global spread216. I refer 
218 Although, as the preceding quotes demonstrate, the perception of neo-liberalism as 
the current orthodox ideology in the political and economic fields is the prevalent 
interpretation of the world's development in the last three decades, assessments of the 
global influence of neoliberalism differ (Peters 2001,120 ff). For there are isolated 
voices that argue that the impacts and the spread - and of course, the inevitability - of 
neo-liberal globalization have been overestimated. For instance, writing in 2002, Walden 
Bello maintains that "[i]ncreasing resort to unilateralism and the brazen manipulation of 
multilateral mechanisms to achieve hegemony by the United States was an important 
source of the crisis of legitimacy that began to grip the global order in the late 1990s. 
But equally important as the erosion of multilateralism as a source of de-legitimation 
was the spreading realization that the global neoliberal regime resting on free trade and 
free markets could no longer deliver on its promise... When the Asian economies 
collapsed in the long summer of 1997 [... ] the follies of neoliberal economics came to 
the fore" (Bello 2002,4-5). Furthermore, it is interesting to register here the opinion 
expressed by Kiser and Laing (2001,51 ff) that the theoretical consensus engendered 
among financial and economics experts that the rise of neoliberal ideas and policies 
across much of the world would result in the progressive decline of taxation on 
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here to Hobsbawm's contribution to a special issue of Marxism Today 
with an article whose title, in hindsight, sounds very naive: "The death of 
neo-liberalism"21. 
How was it, then, that neoliberalism has become the "new hegemonic 
creed" (Gamble 2001,133), despite the diffuse criticism of its ethos and 
its well-documented adverse social impacts (Bennett 2001,156-165, and 
Sennett 1999)? For an answer we have to look, once again, at the 
political and economic developments that followed the global economic 
crisis of the early 1970s, and in particular at the political and economic 
strategies of the Thatcher and Reagan government in Britain and the US, 
and their repercussions on the rest of the world. Gamble (2001) 
acknowledges that, by the 1970s, it had become evident that the 
Keynesian policy regime was struggling because of the rise of inflation 
and consequent fiscal crisis. This, in turn, precipitated the already 
existing economic recession and exacerbated the unemployment 
problem, a situation that was further compounded by the oil crisis of 
1973. However, he also argues that, at that time, the prevalent opinion 
amongst economics experts was that the only possible alternative to 
Keynesianism (albeit in a reformed version) was a socialist alternative. In 
businesses has established itself despite the lack of systematic evidence. In fact, where 
evidence has been collected and analysed, it has shown that "the predicted effects of 
neoliberalism and globalization on business taxation are nowhere to be found. Total 
taxes on capital in OECD countries have not only not decreased over the past two 
decades, but they have increased slightly" (Ibid., 51). For a more detailed discussion of 
the pessimistic narratives originated by the spread of neoliberal globalization - including 
the feeling among some commentators that this latest manifestation of capitalism could 
not be, ultimately, sustainable or viable in the long term - see Bennett 2001, chapter 4. 217 In the article, Hobsbawm argued that the economic crisis which begun in South-East 
and East Asia - threatening to turn into a global capitalist crisis - heralded "the end of 
free-market fundamentalism" (Hobsbawm 1998,4). 
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other words, in the 1970s, Keynesianism was still largely thought of as 
the most effective economic and political strategy available for the 
success of capitalism. Things, though, were to change abruptly: 
By the end of the 1980s neo-liberalism had successfully 
redrawn the terms of the debate, sidelining both Keynesianism 
and socialist alternatives. In Britain and the United States the 
political interventions represented by Thatcherism and 
Reaganism established neo-liberalism as the new dominant 
common sense, the paradigm shaping all policies (Gamble 
2001,129). 
As Bennett (2001,150) notes, what had begun as an economic necessity 
and the required austerity to face the hardship and difficulties brought 
about by the early 1970s crisis, by the 1980s had transformed itself - in 
Britain and the States - into a fully-fledged political mission218. Neo- 
liberal ideals effectively began their ascendant journey in English- 
speaking countries, where the new political and economic ethos seemed 
to find much more fertile ground than in continental Europe or Asia. 
Gamble (2001,129-30) establishes a link between the spread of the neo- 
liberal creed in countries such as the US, Britain, Australia and New 
Zealand and the adoption, on the part of these countries, of a defensive 
strategy to protect their own model of capitalism from others that 
seemed, at that time, more successful (in particular those of Germany 
218 Yergin and Stanislaw (1998,108) quote Margaret Thatcher herself to have said: "We 
should not expect the state to appear in the guise of an extravagant good fairy at every 
christening, a loquacious companion at every stage of life's journey, and the unknown 
mourner at every funeral". As they explain (Ibid. ), instead, "(s]he wanted to replace what 
she called the 'Nanny State' and its cradle-to-grave 'coddling' with the much more 
bracing risks and rewards of the 'enterprise culture'". 
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and Sweden in Europe, and Japan in Asia). The feeling of being under 
increasing pressure, if not even under direct threat, from international 
competitors was particularly strong in Britain and the US, where - in the 
1980s - debates over current decline dominated the political and 
economic discourse219. In this context, the most commonly suggested 
explanation for Britain's perceived economic decline was what 
Rubinstein (1993,1-2) calls the 'cultural critique', according to which the 
main culprit for Britain's decline is the traditionally anti-capitalist character 
of British culture. In this rhetoric of decline (which, by the way, was 
equally popular among leftists and conservative commentators), many 
British cultural institutions appeared intrinsically suspicious and at times 
2'9 There is an extensive body of literature that deals with the many aspects of the 
perception (more or less unfounded) of Britain's economic, political and cultural decline. 
Gamble's Britain in Decline (1994), for instance, tackles mainly economic issues relating 
to Britain's economic problems. Political decline is at the centre of Jim Tomlinson's The 
Politics of Decline (2001). Cultural as well as political aspects of decline are commented 
upon in George Bernstein's Myth of Decline (2004) and W. D. Rubinstein's Capitalism, 
Culture & Decline in Britain (1993). A separate mention is deserved by a distinctive type 
of publication, usually produced by conservative cultural commentators and focusing on 
a nostalgic exaltation of traditional British (or even specifically English) cultural and 
moral values which are seen as irredeemably threatened in the current climate of 
decline. The most eminent examples of this literature are Peter Hitchens' The Abolition 
of Britain (2000; focussing in particular on British decline in the Blairite era) and the 
more interesting England; An Elegy by Roger Scruton (2001). The latter, in particular, is 
a glorious example of the genre, displaying high points of whingeing that make for an 
often unwittingly amusing reading. Yet Scruton is undoubtedly the interpreter of much 
diffused feelings among the English - and, more generally, British - people. This 
passage from the book's last chapter is thus worth quoting at length to get a picture of 
just what intense peaks the sense of decline has reached in the UK: "England consisted 
in the physiognomy, the habits, the institutions, the religion and the culture that I have 
described in these pages. Almost all have died. [... ] It is right that the heirs to English 
civilisation should commemorate its virtues, its achievements and its meaning. For dead 
civilisations can speak to living people, and the more conscious they are while they are 
dying, the more fertile is their influence thereafter. [... ] I find myself confirmed in the 
desire to praise the English for the virtues which they once displayed, and which they 
were taught even in my youth to emulate. This does not alter the fact that these virtues 
are rapidly disappearing. Having been famous for their stoicism, their decorum, their 
honesty, their gentleness and their sexual puritanism, the English now subsist in a 
society in which those qualities are no longer honoured -a society of people who 
regard long-term loyalties with cynicism, and whose response to misfortune is to look 
round for someone to sue. England is no longer a gentle country, and the old courtesies 
and decencies are disappearing" (Scruton 2001,244-245). Interestingly, Scruton's 
concluding tirade goes on for further 12 pages! 
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overtly hostile to capitalist values, and therefore had an adverse effect on 
Britain's entrepreneurship220. Under attack as mechanisms for the 
transmissions of non-business-friendly values from one generation to the 
next were the educational system, the anti-urban feelings so common 
among the population, and the altogether anti-capitalist inspiration of so 
much of British culture, as argued by Wiener (1985) in his essay English 
Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit. Thus, according to the 
advocates of the 'cultural critique', "[u]nlike America or contemporary 
Japan, British culture was, generally speaking, anti-capitalist, regarding 
free market economics as unfair, its chief beneficiaries the despicable 
factory-owners and plutocrats of the age of laissez faire, its chief victims 
the working class" (Rubinstein 1993,2). Rubenstein (Ibid., 3) - before 
proceeding to argue against all the main contentions of the cultural 
explanation for Britain's economic decline in an analysis spanning the 
period 1750 to 1990 - concludes that, according to the cultural critique, 
"[t]he end product of this is a society rooted in the past, pre-modern and 
anti-modern in most respects, and ill-equipped to deal with the modern 
world". 
For all the perceptions of enduring decline that seem to have persistently 
affected the British people, the reality of the matter is that, by the end of 
220 The perception that Britain's economic performance was in some way defective had 
begun unfolding in the 1960s giving rise to a sense of 'national angst' that got 
progressively worse over the following two decades. As a result, the specific issue of 
economic performance gradually became identified with a broader sense of Britain's 
decline. As George Bernstein (2004,157) puts it "[t]he very concept of 'national decline' 
as it evolved in this context implied a failure of character, and so the British began to 
ask what was wrong with themselves". The fact that evidence of decline was, in fact, 
partial and inconclusive did not seem to change perceptions much (Ibid. ). 
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the 1990s, the picture appeared somewhat altered. The renewed 
buoyancy of American - and, though to a lesser extent, British - 
capitalism, combined with the growing difficulties faced by other capitalist 
models (such as Japan's and Germany's) ultimately meant the 
assumption of neo-liberalism as "the dominant ideology of the new world 
order proclaimed by the Americans and also of the discourse of 
globalisation" (Gamble 2001,130). The political message of neo- 
liberalism was that the adoption of a Keynesian political economy had 
resulted in an unsustainable situation, whereby the state's sphere of 
intervention in the economy was getting larger (so that capital was often 
prevented from flowing freely across the markets), whilst the inflation was 
accelerating. Neo-liberalism therefore calls for the freedom of capital 
from the various commitments required by the Keynesian system (such 
as welfare), and an emphasis on capital as money, instead of capital as 
production. This, in turn, requires a devotion to monetarism as the 
cornerstone of economic policy (ahead of other concerns, such as an 
adequate welfare provision and the goal of unemployment reduction, 
which are at the forefront of Keynesian economics) that was indeed 
enthusiastically espoused by the Thatcher governments during the 1980s 
(Gamble 2001). The main casualties of this turn in British politics were 
the Welfare state as it had come to be structured in the post-war period 
of consensus, and the Trade Unions. 
When New Labour entered into office, therefore, they inherited a 'social 
landscape' that had been deeply transformed by the Thatcherite 
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revolution. However, from the very beginning of their leadership of the 
country, New Labour made it clear that they would rather work within the 
paradigm established by the previous conservative governments rather 
than put forward any radically different or alternative model (Watkins 
2004,10). According to Susan Watkins (2004,26), indeed, "it is obvious 
enough that neo-labourism is a variant of neoliberalism". In 2000, Perry 
Anderson had already affirmed that, from an ideological point of view, the 
rising neo-liberal consensus had found an important point of stabilisation 
in the 'Third Way' of the Clinton-Blair regimes. The 'Third Way' was in 
fact - in his words - "the best ideological shell of neo-liberalism today" 
(Anderson 2000,11). 
What distinguishes, then, New Labour's 'Third-Way Politics' from the 
Thatcherite project? A possible answer lies in the influence exerted on 
New Labour thinking by communitarian thought, which Tony Blair himself 
became interested in during his days at Oxford University, when he 
discovered the work of the Scottish philosopher John MacMurray (Gould 
1998,233). Subsequently, the influence of American communitarian 
thinking as articulated by Amitai Etzioni (1995 [1993] and 2000), together 
with the development of thinking around the concept of community by 
personalities such as Giddens (1998), also contributed to progressively 
shape some of the values central to New Labour's political project221. 
221 Philip Gould (1998,233) - one of Blair's senior advisers - comments: "The idea that 
individuals are defined by their relationships to the community, not in isolation from the 
community, is Blair's grounding idea, his core political insight". However, Stephen Driver 
and Luke Martell (1998 and 2002) have questioned the extent to which the Blairite 
notion of what 'Britishness' and the British community is (as exemplified in the slogan 
'Cool Britannia'), is actually based on a realistic picture of the country. The authors 
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The central tenets of communitarianism is the belief that individuals can 
only flourish and realise their full potential within a strong and supportive 
community (hence the centrality of issues of social inclusion and 
cohesion in New Labour's rhetoric). Another crucial principle of 
communitarianism is the belief that there can be no rights without 
responsibilities attached to them, and furthermore, that, in a healthy 
society, there are also responsibilities and duties that citizens are 
expected to fulfil even though no rights or benefits are immediately 
attached to them222. However, doubts have been raised about the extent 
to which the adoption of communitarianism as one of the philosophical 
references for 'Third-way politics' really sets New Labour's project apart 
from Thatcher's version of neo-liberalism. For instance, the politics 
scholar Alex Callinicos (2001,64) poses a crucial question: "How can a 
political current so strongly identified with the forces of capitalism and 
modernity somehow attach itself to communitarian theories that define 
themselves in opposition to these forces? Certainly what has become 
suggest (2002,151) that "Labour's vision of a creative, young country within a post- 
industrial economy is unlikely to apply evenly across the United Kingdom. It reflects a 
rather narrow view of British society and being British. It is hardly representative of the 
British economy, British society - or even British demographics". 
222 As Etzioni (1995,10) explains, 'Although it is difficult to imagine rights without 
corollary responsibilities, we must recognise that we have some duties that lay moral 
claims on us from which we derive no immediate benefit or even long-term payoff". In a 
later publication for the think-tank Demos, Etzioni (2000,12) further clarifies this, and 
links it to another central theme in New Labour's body of values, social inclusion: 
"Equally pivotal is the recognition that only in a society where no one is excluded, and 
all are treated with equal respect, are all people accorded the status of being ends in 
themselves and allowed to reach their full human potential. Furthermore, the core 
communitarian idea - that we have inalienable individual rights and social 
responsibilities for each other - is based on the same basic principle: we are both 
entitled to be treated as ends in ourselves and are required to treat others and our 
communities in this way". 
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Blair's cliche of 'Traditional Values in a Modern Setting' offers no easy 
solution to this problem'"223 Callinicos (Ibid., 67) thus concludes: 
Blair is as solid a champion as Thatcher of Family, Church, Monarchy 
and Nation, albeit interpreting them in somewhat more contemporary 
terms; meanwhile, as we have seen, his government is guided by the 
same version of neo-liberal economics that she embraced. 
Presently, the new axis Blair-Bush would indeed appear to have moved 
the canonization of neo-liberalism one stage further. As Watkins (2004, 
30) maintains the so-called special relationship between the Bush and 
Blair governments have much less to do with a past tradition of British 
loyalty to Washington, but rather more with the similar internal position 
occupied by the two countries within the neo-liberal spectrum. The UK 
experience therefore confirms the observation made by many 
commentators (Watkins 2004 and McGuigan 2004 among them) that, 
nowadays, the political colour of the leading government party hardly has 
a significant impact on the country's position in the global political 
system. It was remarked, in chapter 6, how, in his fierce indictment of the 
present situation of the Italian heritage, Settis (2002) insisted that the 
dramatic developments under Berlusconi's centre-right government had 
223 Callinicos (2001,66) points out that a number of Third way theorists have also 
acknowledged the contradiction inherent in the embrace of capitalism and the 
affirmation of communitarian values. He mentions, for instance, the reservations 
expressed by Charles Leadbeater (a writer otherwise close to the values of 'Third-way 
Politics') for the notion of community, which he sees as a reactionary force in society, 
and incompatible with the requirements of a knowledge society. In Living on Thin Air, 
indeed, Leadbeater (2000,15) maintains that The communitarian critique of market 
capitalism is superficially appealing but eventually disappointing. Strong communities 
can be pockets of intolerance and prejudice. Settled, stable communities are the 
enemies of innovation, talent, creativity, diversity and experimentation. They are often 
hostile to outsiders, dissenters, young upstarts and immigrants. Community can too 
quickly become a rallying cry for nostalgia; that kind of community is the enemy of 
knowledge creation, which is the well-spring of economic growth'. 
-- 352 
been allowed and prepared by similarly spirited (though, admittedly, 
more timid) legislative and administrative changes implemented by the 
preceding centre-left governments. In both Britain and Italy, then, it would 
appear possible that managerialism and marketisation of the public 
sector are phenomena hardly ascribable to the political leadership of the 
day alone (though the latter obviously has an impact)224. This situation is 
powerfully grasped by Chin-tao Wu (2002) in her perceptive and incisive 
analysis of the continuous spread of the practices and values of the 
'enterprise culture' in the cultural sector that has been taking place, since 
the 1980s, in Britain and the US. Wu writes (Ibid., 276): 
On this side of the Atlantic, New Labour's record on public 
funding of the arts is a mixed one. In many areas of public 
spending, the Blair government has simply continued the policies 
that it inherited from the Conservatives. For those who waited 18 
years for the Tory Party to be defeated, Tony Blair might seem a 
born-again Thatcherite, and the celebrated 'Third way' he so 
fervently champions nothing more than the decanting of the old 
wine of market principles into attractive new bottles, with the 
added ingredients of moral uplift and big smiles225. 
224 It is obviously impossible to say with any degree of certainty that things would have 
developed exactly as they did if elections had been won by different parties, for such a 
conclusion would belong to the sphere of speculation. However, it is significant to 
register that a certain progressive convergence over a call for a wider involvement of the 
private sector in the administration of the cultural sector can be found in both Italy and 
the UK among both centre-left and centre-right political parties. In many cases, this 
represented an important departure from traditionally held positions (see for instance 
David Forgacs' (1990b, 170) on the change that can be detected in the Italian 
Communist Party's official positions over cultural assets in the mid-1980s). 
225 In view of Wu's argument, it is interesting to point to the growing popularity of the 
'public value' debate, that has been seen as a sign that New Labour's might be in fact 
looking at developing tools for public administration alternative to the strict adherence to 
NPM and neoliberal principles that was called for by the preceding political regime. An 
important ingredient in the growing debate over the notion 'public value' and how its 
adoption as guiding principle of public policy-making might help in going beyond the 
limitations of performance measurement, was a paper commissioned by the Cabinet 
Office and put together by Gavin Kelly, Geoff Mulgan, and Stephen Muers (2002), 
entitled 'Creating Public Value: An analytical framework for public service reforms°. The 
authors claim that: "Public value provides a broader measure than is conventionally 
used within the new public management literature, covering outcomes, the means used 
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The repercussions of this commonality of intent and goals between 
successive Tory and New Labour governments in the more practical field 
of public-policy making, has been extensively discussed in chapter 5. 
Chapter 6, on the other hand, has shown how similar developments are 
also taking place in Italy, the country that at-one time could boast the 
most powerful communist party in liberal Europe (the same that - having 
changed its name to Partito Democratico della Sinistra [PDS, that is, 
Democratic Party of the Left] created the legislative and political basis for 
the successive process of privatisation of the Italian cultural heritage). 
Ilaria Favretto (2000,103) in her comparative discussion of New Labour 
and the Italian Left has indeed observed that Tony Blair's party and the 
Italian PDS (later renamed Democratici di Sinistra, DS, in 1998) "are two 
parties whose histories could not be more different, but which, after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall and the process of homogenisation and 
convergence which has characterised European socialism over the last 
few years (between both east and west, north and south), now find 
themselves surprisingly close". In other words, socialist parties might 
have been successful in gaining power from the 1990s onwards, but this 
was achieved by pushing forward very few traditionally left-wing policies 
- that is, by accepting and subscribing to the hegemony of neo-liberal 
ideology (Ibid., 102). 
to deliver them as well as trust and legitimacy. It addresses issues such as equity, ethos 
and accountability. Current public management practice sometimes fails to consider, 
understand or manage this full range of factors" (p. 3). John Holden (2004) has recently 
attempted to adapt the notion of 'public value' to cultural policy; however, it is probably 
still too early to say whether this most recent development represents a authentic 
departure from preceding styles of public management and whether they reflect values 
genuinely different from those expressed by Thatcher's neo-liberal project. 
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The similar general orientation of recent cultural policy in the two 
countries, as well as the common prevalence of instrumental rationality 
over traditional rationales, and the rhetorical emphasis on the cultural 
sector's positive contribution to the economy are all features of 21st 
century British and Italian cultural policies that are broadly consistent 
and, in fact, dependent on the global transformations just discussed. 
However, the almost identical recurrence of similar justifications for public 
spending on the arts that are alien to traditional rationales; the equal 
popularity gained by the buzz words of marketing and managerialism, 
and the similar trends in funding allocations in the two country require a 
more compelling and specific explanation than the general thesis of the 
impacts of neo-liberal globalisation allows. To this end, the theory of 
policy transfer, recently elaborated within the discipline of public policy 
studies is most useful, and - as the concluding section of this chapter will 
argue - can provide a useful framework for the understanding and the 
interpretation of the developments that we have seen at work in both 
Britain and Italy. 
THE THEORY OF'POLICY TRANSFER' 
In the past fifteen years, a body of literature has been developing within 
the field of political science and international studies, that investigates 
various aspects of the phenomena that are usually referred to as 'lesson- 
drawing', 'policy convergence' 'policy diffusion' and 'policy transfer' 
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(Dolowitz 2000b, 3; Dolowitz and Marsh 2000; Stone 1999). Despite the 
various labels attached to these sub-groups within the literature, it was 
obvious that their authors were dealing with very similar and inter-relating 
objects"'. It is in the last decade, however, thanks to the work of 
Dolowitz and Marsh (1996 and 2000; see also Dolowitz, Greenwold and 
Marsh 1999; Dolowitz 2003) that the initially fragmented literature has 
been collectively analysed and systematically organised into a relatively 
coherent whole under the epithet of policy transfer (Evans 2004,21)227. 
Dolowitz (2000b, 3) defines policy transfer as "the occurrence of, and 
processes involved in, the development of programmes, policies, 
institutions, etc. within one political and/or social system which are based 
upon the ideas, institutions, programmes and policies emanating from 
other political and/or social systems". 
226 Dolowitz and Marsh (1996,344) explain that some use the terms 'lesson-drawing' 
and 'policy transfer' interchangeably. However, they argue that the latter expression is 
preferable in so far as the former implies that political actors and policy makers 
voluntarily choose to look at other countries' experiences for lessons and ideas. 
However, especially in developing countries (but by no means them alone),, policy- 
makers are often not free to make their own policy decisions, as they can be subjected 
to pressures of various intensity coming from other governments or transnational 
organizations (such as, for instance, the EU, the IMF and the World Bank). The 
expression 'policy transfer', thus, can refer to both 'voluntary' and 'coercive' policy 
transfer. More precisely still, Dolowitz and Marsh (2000) further differentiate between 
'lesson drawing', 'obligated transfer' and 'coercive transfer'. Stone (2001a, 6) explains 
that "[t]he emphasis of the policy transfer literature is on understanding the process by 
which policies and practices move from exporter to importer jurisdictions, especially the 
agents of policy transfer and the processes of decision making in the importer 
jurisdictions". 
27 All the commentators cited in this section of the chapter agree that policy transfer can 
happen across time (when a country looks at its own or other's past to draw lessons) as 
well as space. Moreover, transfer can also happen internally, between different levels of 
government within a single country (or between states in the case of federal countries). 
The present discussion, however, will limit itself to the case of policy transfer between 
different countries, which is more relevant to the comparative study of British and Italian 
cultural policy that is the focus of this research. 
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Despite their relatively recent theorization, the actual practices of lesson- 
drawing and policy transfer are much older. Evans (2004,1) notes how - 
as far back as 315BC - none other than Aristotle, in his Nicomachean 
Ethics, recommended to look at others' administrative experiences, both 
positive and negative, in order to gain precious knowledge and inspiration 
to guide decision-making. If the practice of policy transfer, thus, is as old 
as Western civilization itself, the recent interest for its ratification at the 
more theoretical level can be ascribed to the transformations in 
communications, governance, and politics that have been discussed in 
the previous section of this chapter. The fast growth in communications 
technology; globalisation; the worldwide spread of the Internet; the 
expanding body of international organisations and think tanks since the 
mid-20th century have all accelerated the process, by stimulating interest 
in what other nations are doing, and by making the finding out much 
easier than in the past (Dolowitz 2000b, Evans 2004, Rose 1991 and 
1993). Furthermore, the structural changes that have accompanied 
globalisation processes (such as growing internationalisation of politics 
and economics) have directly or indirectly created new political and 
institutional structures (think, for instance, of the IMF or the OECD; the 
UN or the EU) that facilitate - if not even actively promote - policy 
transfer (Evans 2004). Indeed, as globalisations proceeds its ascending 
march and international integration becomes even more institutionalised, 
policy makers worldwide will be further encouraged to look to other 
countries and other political systems for inspiration, ideas or - more 
specifically - for policies and programmes that can help them tackle the 
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problems they are faced with (Dolowitz 2000b, 3). The growing reliance 
on evidence-based policy-making resulting from the spread of NPM 
practices (discussed in chapter 5) has also encouraged policy-makers to 
look at other countries' implementation of policies to tackle common 
problems. This, as Rose (2001) argues, offers an evidence-based 
alternative to the development of a specifically designed new 
programme. Instead of one's own government's experience, though, the 
decision-making process is based on the evidence provided by the 
experience of other countries. Much of the current literature on policy 
transfer, then, focuses its analysis on the voluntary policy transfer 
between developed countries seen as a tool of policy development. In 
this context, researchers have attempted to identify and describe "a 
process in which policies implemented elsewhere are examined by 
rational political actors for their potential utilization within another political 
system" (Evans 2004). As it can be expected, thus, the study of policy 
transfer is characterised by a strongly interdisciplinary, as well as 
multidisciplinary, nature (Evans and Davies 1999). Although this is 
certainly a testimony to the richness and complexity of this research area, 
it also means that policy transfer analysts do not enjoy a unified, 
consistent and universally agreed upon theoretical or methodological 
approach (Evans 2004). Dolowitz (2000c, 9) comments that, so far, 
"there have been few attempts to organize the elements of this 
phenomenon [policy transfer] into a coherent model capable of being 
generalised across policy areas and academic disciplines"228. 
228 A most significant exception is represented by the volume edited by Mark Evans in 
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THE CRUCIAL QUESTION: WHO TRANSFERS WHAT? 
The fundamental question that the policy transfer approach to 
transnational research should address, is 'who transfers? ' and 'what is 
transferred? ' Dolowitz (2000c, 16 ff. ) suggests that there are nine main 
categories of actors that can be actively involved in processes of policy 
transfer. These actors are: elected officials; bureaucrats and civil 
servants; policy entrepreneurs and experts229; consultants; pressure 
groups; think tanks; corporations; and, finally, governmental as well as 
non-governmental international organizations and institutions. In addition 
to these individual actors, Dolowitz (Ibid. ) also acknowledges the 
important role, in policy transfer, of networks - that institutionalise the 
relationship that develops between governmental officials and wider 
societal interests within a certain policy area230 - and of the so-called 
"epistemic communities". These are constituted of groups and individuals 
that are involved, in different ways, in the development and promotion of 
policies within a certain sphere of public policy. What differentiates the 
epistemic community from a network is the fact that the latter is formed 
around a "system of shared knowledge". This body of knowledge is built 
on the basis of information and quantitative data provided by professional 
2004, entitled Policy Transfer in Global Perspective, which considers not just policy 
transfer between developed countries, but also the role of policy transfer mechanisms in 
policy-making in developing countries. 29 Dolowitz (2000c, 18) identifies an interesting sub-group within the category of policy 
entrepreneurs and experts, that of 'the academic entrepreneurs', whose roles he defines 
thus: "Not only are academics advising local and national governments, but they are 
heavily involved in the work of international organizations and think tanks, often moving 
between these institutions throughout their careers. In each of these areas academic 
entrepreneurs take with them policy proposals, which are often accepted as legitimate 
due to their status as academics". 
2'o On the increasing significance of network in the globalised society, see the 
interesting work by Anne-Marie Slaughter (2004). For more on the crucial role of 
networks in the policy transfer process, see also Evans 2004. 
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organizations or individuals working in the field of policy analysis. 
Dolowitz (Ibid., 22) explains that "[t]his knowledge is then moulded into 
'consensual knowledge', or commonly accepted cause and effect 
propositions, which defines the nature of policy problems and shape the 
responses available to government [... ]. Thus, policy making is about the 
use of knowledge to define political interests and to refine the ideological 
basis of policy proposals". If we look at the field of cultural policy, which 
is the concern of this thesis, then we can argue that there definitely exist 
an 'epistemic community' active in this field. It comprises academic 
researchers conducting cultural policy (or cultural policy related) research 
from within a number of disciplinary areas, researchers working in 
cultural consultancies and think tanks, civil servants, cultural 
administrators, and individual members of the public (often highly 
regarded and influential ones) who are simply enthusiastic about the arts 
and culture and therefore take an interest in cultural policy matters 
(sometimes with a clear intent to affect policy decisions). Arguably, it is 
precisely as a result of its acceptance (until recently largely uncontested) 
within the cultural policy epistemic community's 'consensual knowledge' 
that Richard Florida's The Rise of the Creative Class (2002) could 
become so influential as to inspire the re-design of so many urban 
cultural policies worldwide231. 
231 See for instance the very critical discussion of the adoption of principles and ideas 
derived from Florida's work in the city of Wellington, New Zealand, in Volkerling (2004), 
or the analysis of the aptly named 'Creative City Strategy' developed by Brecknock 
Consulting for the city of Brisbane, in Australia (Brecknock 2004). Also very pertinent 
here is Deborah Stevenson's (2004) intelligent discussion of the rhetoric of the 'creative 
city' and the 'creative class' in the context of 'Third Way' cultural policies in Australia. 
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The role of consultancies and think tanks, in particular, is becoming 
increasingly significant. Suffice to mention here, the deep impact of the 
work carried out by Matarasso (1997) for Comedia on the social impacts 
of the arts on cultural policy making in the last ten years (Belfiore 2002; 
Merli 2002). Equally exemplary is the work of the think tank close to New 
Labour's heart, Demos, and its role in the promotion of the idea of the 
centrality of 'cultural entrepreneurs" in today's knowledge economy 
(Leadbeater 2000,2001 and 1999 with Kate Oakley)232. 
This brings us to the second important question, "what exactly gets 
transferred" in the process of lesson drawing from other countries? 
Again, Dolowitz (2000c, 23) proposes six different categories of policy 
elements that can be transferred from one country to another: policy 
goals, content and instruments; programmes; institutions; ideologies; 
ideas and attitudes; and negative lessons. It is worth elaborating on the 
difference between 'policy' and 'programme' for which the differentiation 
might not appear immediately obvious. In Dolowitz's (Ibid. ) definition, 
"policies are generally seen as broad statements of intention which 
represent the direction in which policy makers wish to go"; programmes, 
on the other hand, "are the specific means or course of action used to 
232 With regards to think tanks, whose leverage over British cultural policy-making is 
undeniable, it is interesting to mention here the research carried out by Diane Stone 
(2001 b, 338) on the role of think tanks in influencing global social policy: "One facet of 
think tank impact on the global order is the propensity for lesson drawing that aids 
cross-national policy transfers of ideas, practices and policy programmes. The 
international spread of ideas can contribute to an 'atmospheric' form of influence on the 
climate of policy thinking whereas policy transfer usually involves more concrete form of 
agenda-setting and political decision-making". The notion of 'atmospheric influence' is 
indeed a useful tool to make sense of the role of think tanks such as the Policy Studies 
Institute (that published, in the 1980s, Myerscough's influential report on the economic 
impact of the arts) and Demos. 
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implement policies233. Because of different administrative structures in 
place in different countries (a situation that the British and Italian cases 
clearly illustrate), it is often impossible for a specific programme or 
institution to be successfully transferred across countries. In this case, 
policy actors might decide to transfer, instead, ideologies and attitudes on 
which those programmes or institutions are based. Indeed, as Dolowitz 
(2000c, 23) comments with regard to this type of 'ideology transfer', 
"during the past twenty years governments around the world, including 
the current Blair government (to a certain extent) have been actively 
borrowing the ideological rhetoric emerging from the American New Right 
in relation to welfare reform". The political reasons behind this have been 
looked at earlier in this chapter. At this stage it is more interesting to note, 
how, although in the theory of policy transfer all policy actors (and 
therefore all countries) are equally liable to import or export policies (at 
least whenever countries engage in a process of 'voluntary' transfer - 
see note 11), in the reality of it, certain countries tend to be importers, 
rather than exporters, or vice versa. More precisely (and unsurprisingly), 
the United States' involvement in mechanisms of policy transfer is more 
often than not in the role of lender, rather then borrower. In most areas of 
public policy, Britain - on the other hand - appears to be a consistent 
borrower, with the exception of education policy, since the British model 
233 In other terms, the desire to emphasise the economic value of the Italian cultural 
heritage - so that the State can gain some financial gain from its protection and 
management of cultural assets, is the Italian government's current cultural policy. The 
sale of a significant portion of the county's artistic and architectonic patrimony is the 
specific programme through which that more general aim is hoped to be achieved. 
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has been widely exported globally (Dolowitz 2000b, 5). Interestingly, 
Britain seems to display a tendency to borrow prevalently from the US234. 
If we consider again the sphere of cultural policy, we can see that in the 
age of neo-liberal globalisation, for the reasons already discussed, the 
US have been an important player in the transfer of ideas and ideology 
and - albeit more rarely - programmes. This was indeed the case with the 
promotion of business sponsorship of the arts as an alternative form of 
support to public subsidy, which was Mrs Thatcher's most explicit attempt 
to push Britain in the direction of "the American model of private cultural 
provision" (Bradley 1998,139; see also Wu 2002,6). Policy transfer from 
the States received a boost under the Thatcher governments in all areas 
of public policy, and the cultural one was no exception (McGuigan 1996, 
59 ff. ). The emphasis on the values of the 'enterprise culture', and their 
translation in a radically new direction and language for cultural policy 
have already been discussed in chapter 5. The reasons behind this 
consistent borrowing from the US can be inferred from the previous 
discussion of the global spread of neo-liberalism. In summary, they are 
the common values and the shared ideology of both Thatcher and 
Reagan, which are at the root of the so-called 'Washington consensus' 
(Evans 2004,32). The integration of ideas and ideology borrowed from 
American cultural policies in Italy, though, is an altogether more 
complicated issue. 
234 See for instance the collection of essays contained in Dolowitz 2000a on the process 
of UK borrowing from the States in various areas of public and social policy; Hulme 
2004 on the impact of American ideas on British social policy, and Ferguson (2002) on 
how New Labour's policies to tackle social exclusion amongst young people are 
indebted to US workfare policies. 
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In his ferocious attack on the current direction of Italian cultural policy, 
Settis (2002,49) laments that the theme of the 'backwardness of the 
Italian public administration' -a recurrent one in Italian political debates 
since the Unification - has been exploited, in recent times, for the de- 
legitimisation of the traditional forms of public cultural administration, with 
a view to create a climate favourable to the private sector. The key 
element in what could be called the 'rhetoric of backwardness', as it has 
been deployed in the Italian cultural policy discourse, is the exaltation of 
the American model, by both the Left and the Right, as the solution to the 
problems of the cultural heritage (Ibid. ). Settis (Ibid., 50 ff. ) argues that the 
transformation of the American model into a veritable myth reveals a 
fundamental ignorance - on the part of Italy's politicians - of the actual 
American situation. More importantly, however, the mythologizing of the 
US model - and the promotion of its application to the Italian system - is a 
convenient way to divert attention from the real reasons behind the 
recent policies of privatisation and the push towards managerialism in 
cultural administration. Once again, changes that are the end product of 
locally made political decisions (affected by specifically Italian interests 
and political games) are justified as being part and parcel of the 
ineluctable processes of modernization that Italy must undergo if it wants 
to remain a key political player in the global society. Consequently, the 
allegedly politically neutral concept of modernisation, becomes a mask 
for the actual expansion of the (politically charged) logic of the market to 
the previously sheltered sphere of cultural heritage. Settis (Ibid. ) then 
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focuses his analysis on the museum sector, on which pressures to 
incorporate teachings from the US have been especially strong. As we 
have seen in chapter 6, Settis is convinced that what distinguishes the 
Italian situation is that the country's culture, and its artistic manifestations 
are very deeply rooted in the local community. Indeed, many 
archaeological areas and artistic monuments are to be found, in Italy, in 
squares, in churches, behind residential buildings, that is, in the very 
heart of the community. Even the smallest village in Italy is in charge of 
protecting and maintaining all sorts of cultural, archaeological, 
architectural and artistic treasures. In Settis' view, herein lies the richness 
of Italy. Hence the alien nature of the American museum model that is 
now been pushed by Italian policy-makers. This is based on a network of 
high-profile museums, supported mainly by powerful and rich donors. 
Sponsorship is not a challenge for these museums, since their 
international prestige is such that firms will always be glad to pay to have 
their name linked to their projects. But this is clearly not the case for so 
many Italian museums and galleries. With the exception of the Uffizi 
Gallery, Villa Borghese and a few other flagship organisations, who will 
donate to the numerous small provincial museums scattered all over the 
country? And why should a wealthy multinational company decide to 
sponsor an exhibition in a small museum whose identity is so closely 
related to the immediate local community (as opposed to the global 
community that a museum like MoMa in New York appeals to)? It simply 
would not make economic sense. Similarly, in his discussion of the recent 
trend towards the infiltration of managerial rhetoric and practices in the 
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cultural sector, Zan (2003, chapter 2) discusses at lengths the 
managerial innovations carried out by the British Museum. He paints a 
very critical picture of the 'managerial excesses' that determined the 
crisis that the museum was faced with at the dawn of the new Millennium. 
Yet, for all the perplexities voiced by academics, journalists and 
commentators, the managerial and marketing rhetoric still dominates 
Italian cultural policy debates. It is therefore evident that the careful work 
of adaptation of the policy or ideas transferred from one political system 
and cultural context into that of another country has not taken place in 
Italy. This, according to policy transfer experts is the prerequisite 
condition for successful policy transfer. "Handling the problem of context" 
is indeed one of the 'ten steps' guide to policy transfer proposed by Rose 
(2001,16). He states that "[t]o recommend that one country emulate or 
catch up with another's success simply by copying or transferring a 
programme wholesale is naive, because it ignores the way in which 
national context influences how a programme can operate, and whether it 
may be effective ". Furthermore, Evans (2004,4) maintains that "policy 
transfer can be a rational and progressive learning activity but only if the 
policy that is transferred is compatible with the value system of the 
recipient organization, culturally assimilated through comprehensive 
evaluation, and, builds on existing organizational strengths". 
How can we explain the seemingly paradoxical obsession displayed by 
Italian policy-makers for a model that is not just incompatible with the 
national tradition that sees the cultural patrimony as a repository of civic 
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values (that are thus better served by the State), but which is just simply 
not feasible nor economically viable in the Italian context? 
A possible explanation comes again from the policy transfer literature. 
Colin J. Bennett (1991) has concentrated his analysis on the interests of 
the policy receiver or importer (though he acknowledges that the exporter 
too might have vested interest in exporting information about its policies 
and programmes). Bennett (1991,33) concludes that political elites that 
decide to emulate the policy experiences of other states may in fact have 
five different political motives for doing so. They might want: 1) to put a 
specific issue on the policy agenda; 2) to mollify political pressure to 
intervene in a certain political area of public policy; 3) to emulate the 
actions of an 'exemplar' (such as a particularly influential country) in an 
area that has been identified as needing action; 4) to make the search for 
the best policy more effective; 5) finally - and more pertinently to our 
discussion - to legitimate conclusions already reached and decisions 
already made. Obviously, the prevalence of any of these motivations will 
determine the exact timing of the introduction of evidence, the nature of 
the evidence presented, and the breadth of the geographical scope of the 
search for inspiration. With regards to this final point, Bennett (Ibid., 38) 
makes a crucial argument: 
Evidence is used in the policy process in highly selective ways to 
reinforce positions and to legitimate decisions already taken. 
Thus, information about the effects of a program elsewhere 
enters a debate in an incomplete and anecdotal way to justify 
prior positions [... ]. The sources cited will be chosen selectively, 
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with little attempt to garner evidence from a variety of nations. 
Evidence from selective sources will be used selectively, with 
little regard to accepted canons of methodological reliability and 
validity. Such argument also tends to be oblivious to the 
problems of transferability: 'It works there, it can work here'. It 
may also, of course, be used to justify non-action 'it has not 
worked there, so it can't work here'. 
Arguably, then, the real reason behind the current push of the American 
model in the field of Italian heritage policy, might be the simple fact that 
what the implementation of that model requires, coincides conveniently 
with the government's already manifest intention to 'roll back' (as Mrs 
Thatcher would have it) and reduce their support of the cultural sector. 
This would allow the Italian state to reduce its financial outlay by getting 
the private sector involved in the administration of the cultural patrimony: 
hence the extensive privatisation plans, and the sale of architectural 
assets to firms that would then be responsible for their maintenance and 
upkeep. 
It seems fair to conclude, therefore, that the policy transfer approach can 
offer interesting insights into some of the mechanisms that are at work in 
cultural policy making in the age of globalisation. However, whilst 'policy 
transfer' might provide a useful framework to investigate the movements 
of policy concepts and ideas from one country to another, it is at this 
stage still impossible to provide 'hard evidence' to corroborate the 
identification of preferential routes that certain ideas follow in the 
international sphere (e. g. a route that brings ideas from the US and the 
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UK to other countries, such as Italy). In the sphere of cultural policy, 
evidence of actual transfer is still difficult to come by, though the aim of 
this chapter has been to highlight that work done so far in the 'policy 
transfer' arena might prove useful, if further explored and perfected. 
Policy transfer is, after all, a very young field of enquiry yet, and - as 
such - one that still has to refine its methods and tools of intellectual 
enquiry. Yet, it seems certainly to provide an approach that can prove 
fruitful and rich in potential for the cultural policy researcher. It is thus my 
hope that the present study might act as a stimulus to further enquiry into 
the possible applications of the policy transfer theory to the 
understanding of cultural policy-making in the new Millennium, 
particularly in studies of a cross-national nature. 
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Conclusions 
This thesis has begun with an attempt to propose and put in practice a 
rigorous methodology for cross-national cultural policy analysis based on 
the principle of contextualization. The illustration of the different 
institutional, legal, political and intellectual traditions of the two countries 
therefore provided the background for a discussion more specifically 
focused on the two countries' cultural policies. In particular, the present 
study of British and Italian cultural policy has attempted to show how, 
under the pressures of the intensifying globalisation process, the shape 
and nature of public policy making in the two countries has been 
progressively changing. As a result, the two countries under examination 
here, show clear signs of having moved towards a new logic of cultural 
policy making, dominated by economic reason and instrumental 
rationales. British and Italian cultural policy, as the first two parts of this 
thesis have demonstrated, are rooted in very different intellectual and 
administrative traditions. These, in their turn, are deeply rooted in each 
country's cultural context and political history. Yet, the rhetoric of cultural 
policy has become, today, quite similar in the two countries. One of the 
common elements, is - as we have seen - the deployment of instrumental 
justifications for public funding of the cultural sector in the face of a 
continuously shrinking public budget. It was also observed how the 
growth of instrumentalism seems to have paralleled a tendency, on the 
part of the central government, to adopt a 'hands-on' approach to public 
policy-making that commentators feels equate - in fact - to a process of 
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effective centralization (Gordon 2005) - despite the move towards 
devolution in the UK and a fuller involvement of the Regions in Italian 
cultural policy-making. 
This thesis has also claimed that the alleged positive economic and 
social benefits of the public cultural sector have been hailed as the 
solution to the 'legitimacy crisis' that has invested traditional cultural 
institutions and values at the hand of postmodern theory. Furthermore, 
chapter 5 has put forward the argument that the growing popularity of 
practices of auditing and performance evaluation in the cultural sector 
since the 1970s, can be seen as a 'compensative' phenomenon for the 
cultural relativism that has eroded the very foundations of the traditional, 
post-war consensus on public financing of the arts as part of the welfare 
state. 
But this escamotage is not without costs. With regards to the emphasis 
on the impacts of the arts as advocacy strategy for the British cultural 
sector, chapter 5 argued that what started out as 'policies of survival' are 
not sustainable long term, so that they might eventually reveal 
themselves to be, in fact, 'policies of extinction'. Moreover, besides the 
ostensible impossibility for instrumental cultural policy rationales to 
survive in the long term within the public policy arena (see Bennett 1995 
and Belfiore 2002), the all pervading logic and ethos of the marketplace 
also have very problematic ethical implications. 
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I refer here to the theory put forward by Michael A. Peters (2001, chapter 
6) according to which the neoliberalism creed, with its characteristic 
teleological slant discussed in the preceding chapter, has surged to the 
role of a new and powerful metanarrative -ä la Lyotard - that legitimises 
and justifies the current social and economic status quo. It was precisely 
the French theorist Jean-Francois Lyotard who, in an essay originally 
published in 1979 (and translated into English in 1984) entitled The 
Postmodern Condition, defined postmodernity as "incredulity towards 
narratives" (p. xxiv). Modernism and modernity, according to Lyotard, 
were, on the other hand, characterised by the co-existence of science 
alongside a number of universalising and legitimating metanarratives. 
Their origin - despite the diversity between them - could ultimately be 
traced back to the Enlightenment, its values and telos, and especially its 
belief in reason and human progress (Milner and Browitt 2002,176). As 
Peter Barry (1995,86) explains: 
For Lyotard the Enlightenment whose project Habermas wishes 
to continue is simply one of the would-be authoritative 
'overarching', 'totalising' explanation of things - like Christianity, 
Marxism, or the myth of scientific progress. These 
'meta narratives' ['super-narratives'], which purport to explain and 
reassure are really illusions, fostered in order to smother 
difference, opposition and plurality. 
The illusory nature of all grand narratives lies in their being rooted in a 
sense of unity, harmony and wholeness that are nothing but a myth. For, 
in Lyotard's view, there is no real unity, and no genuine collective or 
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universal subject that fights for freedom and emancipation. Quite the 
opposite, in fact; as Swingewood (1998,160) puts it, "the concept of the 
whole is totalitarian and 'terroristic' in that it seeks to exclude others from 
participating in its idealised communities". Metanarratives, thus - despite 
being presented as having universal attributes and value - are, in fact, 
expression of the interests of specific groups and communities 
characterised by internal homogeneity and a common purpose (Ibid. ). 
Once all grand theories claiming to offer true accounts of the world are all 
equally discredited to the point of becoming untenable, one can only refer 
to a series of equally weighing 'mininarratives'. These are, thus, 
necessarily contingent, temporary, and relative: each of them can only 
provide a basis for the activities of very specific groups in particular and 
local circumstances (Barry 1995,87). In other words, postmodernity 
effectively deconstructs the basic aim and project of the Enlightenment, 
the Enlightenment narrative being one in which, according to Lyotard, 
"the hero of knowledge works towards a good ethico-political end - 
universal peace" (Lyotard 1984, xxiii). 
Lyotard's identification of the incredulity towards grand narratives as the 
distinguishing feature of postmodernity has been extremely influential: 
the impact of the legitimation crisis that invested the Enlightenment- 
derived metanarratives, and the consequent decline of the Western 
cultural institutions that had traditionally expressed their values, was 
already referred to in chapter 5. Hence the importance and originality of 
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Peters' argument. He maintains that there is evidence that in advanced 
liberal states at the present time, official discourses are being constructed 
around theories of post-industrialism, of the information society and the 
knowledge economy. Peters' (Ibid., 129) claim is that these various 
discourses in fact represent "the neoliberal attempt to develop a new 
metanarrative, a unifying and totalising story, as a basis to reimagine the 
future... It also functions as a myth to mask the interest that it serves". In 
the context of this overarching and all-embracing narrative, 
modernization is conceived as based upon "an economic instrumental 
rationality that has universalist value", especially after the failure of 
alternative projects of modernization (of a communist, nationalist or anti- 
imperial inspiration) (Ibid. ). The neoliberal project of postmodernity, then, 
is for Peters nothing but "an extreme form of economic rationalism that 
restructures science, technology, and education as the future leading 
economic sectors and basis for national competitive advantage in the 
global economy" (Peters 2001,129). The process by which this new 
metanarrative has taken shape has been - according to Peters (Ibid., 
115) - the revival and revitalization, throughout the Western world, of the 
master narrative of classic liberalism under the new label of 
neoliberalism. If, in the cultural arena, the most influential narratives in 
the Western tradition have been the theories of liberal humanism and 
Marxism (Jordan and Weedon 1995,19), in the economic sphere, the 
predominant theory was, indeed, classical liberalism235 
235 As Peters (2001,116) explains, "[c]lassical liberalism has been the dominant 
metanarrative, which in one form at least, has appealed to reason in the guise of an 
individualism that privileges the rational, knowing subject as the fount of all knowledge, 
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On this basis, Peters argues that at the root of the recently elaborated 
theories around the restructuring of the public sector and the welfare 
state discussed before, is a 'philosophy of individualism' that originates 
precisely from the principal tenets of classical economic liberalism. 
Peters (Ibid., 118) thus concludes that: 
The form of political reason that has come to dominate the policy 
agendas of successive governments in these countries is 
Eurocentric in origin and both rationalistic and totalising in its 
effects. In the simplest terms, we might say that this form of 
reason is motivated by an extreme economic rationalism that 
views the market not only as a superior allocative mechanism for 
the distribution of scarce public resources but also as a morally 
superior form of political economy. 
In this perspective, it becomes easier to understand the development 
(described in chapter 7) that saw - following the collapse of many 
communist regimes in the West and, therefore, the ostensible popular 
decline of Marxism - the rise of liberalism as today's predominant 
narrative. Furthermore, it is today indubitable that liberalism, in its most 
recent neoliberal guise, has progressively become the official ideology 
that serves to legitimate advanced multinational capitalism (Peters 2001, 
119). As Peters (Ibid. ) further explains, the legitimising role and 
teleological impetus of the neoliberal metanarrative, is undeniable: 
signification, moral authority, and action. The particular variant of this metanarrative that 
informs the economic rationalism of neoliberalism is construed in classical terms of the 
assumption of homo oeconomicus, the assumption that in all of our behaviour we act as 
self-interested individuals (Peters 2001,116). 
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[... ] neoliberals have advanced and reworked their variant of 
classical economic liberalism as a totalising vision of the future in 
the form of a project that substantively draws on theories of 
postindustrialism and the information society. [... ] Neoliberals 
have harnessed a project of postmodernity as the master 
narrative to legitimate an extreme form of economic rationalism. 
Needless to say, as it is to be expected of any self-respecting 
metanarrative, one of the principal functions of the neoliberal framework 
is to operate a sharp closure, so as to deny validity to any alternative or 
competing vision of the future 236. Indeed, it has been noted how 
"neoliberalism is qualitatively different from 'competing' regulatory 
projects and experiments: it shapes the environments, contexts, and 
frameworks within which political-economic and socio-institutional 
restructuring takes place" (Peck and Tickell 2002,400). 
Peters' theory offers a compelling background against which to 
understand the recent developments in Italian and British cultural policy 
that have been described so far. As the Latin quote in the title of this 
thesis hints to, in the neoliberal metanarrative economic reason is key, 
and thus supplants any other pre-existing value or priority. Ubi major, 
236 As Peck and Tickell (2002,382) observe, "[l]ike the globalization rhetorics with which 
they are elided, discourses of neoliberalism have proved to be so compelling because, 
in representing the world of market rules as a state of nature, their prescriptions have a 
self-actualizing quality. Even as they misdescribe the social world, discourses of 
globalization and neoliberalism seek to remake it in their own image [... 1. Discourses of 
neoliberalism are 'strong discourses' in part by virtue of this self-actualizing nature and 
in part because of their self-evident alignment with the primary contours of 
contemporary political-economic power". 
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minor cessat: whenever a more powerful issue arises (here economic 
reason and the neoliberal ethos), the smaller one (traditional cultural 
policy priorities) has to give way. 
Another significant ethical implication of the developments here 
discussed is highlighted by McGuigan (2004,96) when he points out that 
"[a]s cultural policy immaterialises into economic policy in rich countries, 
curiously, it becomes a way of thinking about development for poorer 
countries, which arguably obscures the realities of economic inequality 
and political domination". It is hardly surprising, in this perspective, that 
development economics as it has been articulated and written about in 
America, has consistently placed great emphasis on the social and 
cultural aspects of economic development. A clear example of this 
attitude is the work of the two Harward academics, Lawrence H. Harrison 
and Samuel P. Huntington. Together, they edited a book published in 
2000 and entitled Culture Matters: How values shape human progress. In 
the foreword to the volume, Huntington explains that "the book explores 
how culture in this subjective sense237 affects the extent to which and the 
ways in which societies achieve or fail to achieve progress in economic 
development and political democratisation" (Harrison and Huntington 
2000, xv). Furthermore, in a book significantly titled Underdevelopment 
is a State of Mind: The Latin American case, Harrison (2000 [1985]) 
declares: 
2" Huntington defines the term 'culture' as used in the book In purely subjective terms 
as the values, attitudes beliefs, orientations, and underlying assumptions prevalent 
among people in a society" (Harrison and Huntington 2000, xv). 
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I believe that the creative capacity of human beings is at the 
heart of the development process. What makes development 
happen is our ability to imagine, theorize, conceptualize, 
experiment, invent, articulate, organize, manage, solve problems, 
and do a hundred other things with our minds and hands that 
contribute to the progress of the individual and of humankind. 
Natural resources, climate, geography, history, market size, 
governmental policies, and many other factors influence the 
direction and pace of progress. But the engine is human creative 
capacity. 
This passage engenders a series of important reflections. I take 
Harrison's quote, and in fact, the whole cultural approach to economic 
development (in the Third World as well as in economically backward 
areas within otherwise wealthy countries) as the most obvious symptom 
of the recent trends towards the re-elaboration in cultural terms of what 
used to be seen as social problems. So, the economic backwardness of 
the developing world, rather than being seen as the end-product of 
centuries of Imperialism, exploitation, or of climatic and natural causes is 
reinterpreted as a cultural problem. It is their culture that makes the Third 
World underdeveloped and poor. Needless to say, this is an 
interpretation of things that allows to easily gloss over the responsibilities 
of the Western world in the suffering of so much of humankind today. It is 
very convenient, indeed, to shift from the political and economic planes to 
the cultural one. 
In what way does all of this concern the cultural policy researcher? 
Undoubtedly, the debates over the role of the cultural sector in 
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contributing to fighting social exclusion and promoting local economic 
development that have become paramount within the British cultural 
policy discourse (and that are quickly gaining ground in Italy too) fall 
within this very same phenomenon. Nowadays, discussions over issues 
of poverty and the need of a serious project of wealth redistribution to 
fight it are totally absent from the British political debate, having been 
overturned by their 'softer' versions of social exclusion and inclusion 
policies. As a result, the political, social and economic status quo is 
effectively preserved, while the government can appear to be actively 
tackling social and economic disadvantage. The arts and the public 
cultural sector have been harnessed as tools in what is essentially a 
conservative political strategy which has very little to do with culture, 
access to the arts or arts policy 'proper'. Regrettably, despite a few 
sporadic manifestations of resistance, the sector seems not to have been 
able or willing to resist this tendency. This situation poses clear moral 
issues, a number of which have been highlighted throughout this 
thesis238. However, besides ethical consideration, one more observation 
can be made with regards to the implications of instrumental cultural 
policy. As McGuigan (2004,114) points out: 
Any discussion of public cultural policy - whether in the 
narrowest sense of arts patronage or in the broadest sense of 
reforming the social - must, at some point, address questions of 
value [... ]. Such questions stretch from the rigorous application of 
the most stringent criteria of aesthetic judgement to, at the other 
extreme, measuring indicators of social justice and wealth 
creation associated with specific cultural policies. The 
238 For a specific discussion of the ethical problems inherent in current policies that 
tackle social exclusion through the arts, see Merli 2002. 
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instrumental approach conveniently avoids difficult questions of 
aesthetic value at the cost of evacuating the space of genuinely 
cultural debate. 
This thesis has attempted to explore precisely this issue, by showing how 
- on the one hand - aesthetic criteria (or, more generally, culturally 
specific ones) have been progressively losing ground in the cultural 
policy arena in favour of instrumental considerations and policy 
rationales. On the other hand, the research has also shown that the 
endorsement of economic reason, which becomes paramount within a 
neoliberal framework, results in the enforcement of the principle of 'value 
for money' on the subsidised cultural sphere. Significantly, though, the 
publicly funded cultural sector has not been able to provide convincing 
evidence of its capacity to 'deliver' against the targets set by those 
instrumental policies. By describing and explaining the rise of the 
instrumental character of so much of today's cultural policy in Britain and 
Italy, this thesis aspires to contribute to the creation of the ground for the 
establishment of a new discourse of cultural policy and a renewed 
discussion of the rationales for public subsidy of the arts that does not 
shy away from aesthetic issues, whilst also being firmly aware of the 
highly politicised character of public policy in general, and cultural policy 
in particular. Far from dealing with haughty and detached artistic matters, 
cultural policy clearly appears to be, in today's knowledge economy, right 
at the intersection between the political, economic, social and cultural 
sphere. Cultural policy research should strive to reflect such complexity. 
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Therefore, issues for further research might be the investigation of the 
role of the subsidised arts in contemporary society, in a manner that 
shies away from the stifling dichotomy between an 'art for art's sake' or 
excessively instrumental view of the principles that ought to guide 
contemporary cultural policy. Furthermore, some of the methodological 
tools and frameworks utilised in the present work, such as 
contextualization in cross-national policy research and policy transfer, 
might be further investigated, with a view of refining them and providing 
further examples of their adaptation to the study of cultural policy in other 
countries. In particular, the capacity of theories of 'policy transfer' and 
their applications to generate solid evidence for the movement of policy 
concepts and ideas from one country to another ought to be further 
tested. 
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Appendix 
BENI CULTURAL!: THE DEFINITION OF THE CONCEPT OF'CULTURAL ASSETS' IN 
THE ITALIAN LEGISLATION 
The category of beni culturali is constituted by works or art and 
archaeological finds, scientific objects, historical documents and 
monuments. As Giovanni Pinna (2001,62) explains, the beni culturali are 
"a complex set of assets, symbols and traditions which are referred to in 
French and in English by the respective terms patrimoine and 
heritage"239. Pinna (ibid. ) also notes how the Italian beni culturali 
differentiate themselves from the French and English counterparts in that 
they are not considered as a single entity, but are rather referred to by 
their component parts: 
In the official documents of the government, ministries and public 
administration, the cultural and historical inheritance of the Italian people 
is not referred to as patrimonio culturale (cultural heritage), which would 
be a perfectly correct term in the Italian language, but invariably as beni 
culturali, meaning 'cultural goods or assets'. Words are never used 
haphazardly in a given language; and beni culturali is the precise 
reflection of a particular interpretation of heritage and its social role. This 
interpretation is rooted in the policy that has been followed by the Italian 
state since the early days of national unity. 
239 According to Italian legislation, the expressions patrimonio culturale (cultural 
patrimony) and patrimonio storico e artistico (patrimony of a historic and artistic nature) 
convey concepts that tend to coincide with the ensemble of all the beni culturali that can 
be found within the geographical area or the context under consideration (Sciullo 2003, 
29). 
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According to Pinna's (2001,62) argument, the usage of the label of 
'cultural assets' to designate cultural heritage reveals a number of 
essential features of Italian cultural policy: 
first [... ] objects are not considered as an overall entity implied by 
the terms patrimoine and heritage, but are taken individually; 
second, the material aspects of the objects is given prominence 
and their symbolic significance is hidden; and third, the potential 
symbolic value is greatly diminished because cultural assets are 
not regarded as forming an overall entity, as is the case when the 
concepts of patrimoine and heritage are chosen. 
As the quotes above lead to infer, the definition of what precisely belongs 
to the category of "cultural assets" as defined within the Italian legal 
system is far more controversial than the corresponding notion of 
"heritage sector" is in the British context240. In fact, the interpretation of 
the definition of bene culturale in the evolution of the relevant legal norms 
has been keeping legal experts very busy for decades. The lack of 
agreement about what characteristics are fundamental to the beni 
culturali is such that even successive legislators have opted for differing 
interpretations in different pieces of legislation. As a result, there seems 
to be a certain degree of inconsistency among different laws passed at 
different times by different governments. It is important to observe that 
the notion of cultural assets as they have been understood in Italian 
jurisprudence was introduced in the Italian cultural policy debate towards 
the end of the 1950s, as a reaction to the already mentioned law n. 1089 
of 1939 (Sciullo 2003,25). This law had fundamentally opted for an 
240 For a very thorough discussion of the heritage sector and its relation to the broader 
cultural and political circumstances of Britain, see Hewison 1987. 
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idealistic and strongly aesthetics-based view of the Italian cultural 
heritage, by limiting the object of Italy's cultural policy to objects of arts of 
agreed and established artistic importance. The limitations of law n. 1089 
had progressively become apparent, in view of the strong aestheticism it 
professed in its characterization of the cultural assets (Chiti 1998). 
The expression ben! cultural! represented the aspiration to a more flexible 
notion of what type of cultural expressions should come under the 
responsibility of the state. The formula showed a remarkable vitality, and 
continued to be commonly used in the cultural policy debate - though it 
was officially ratified only in 1974, with the institution of the Ministero per i 
Beni Cultural! e per ! 'Ambiente (Montella 2003; Chiti 1998). As Massimo 
Montella (2003,29 ff. ) explains, the term cultural assets is in no way a 
synonym of 'monuments', nor in fact can beni culturali be identified solely 
with the so-called "objects of artistic or historical interest"241 as claimed 
by the 1939 law. The concept of ben! cultural! instead implies the 
adoption of a much broader notion of culture: whilst including monuments 
and objects of artistic importance, the bene cannot be conceptually nor 
materially limited to them242. The importance of this clarification lies in the 
fact that the concept of beni culturali - as it was gradually shaped by the 
legal doctrine and debate that followed (and reacted to) the enforcement 
of the 1939 law - is underpinned by a new understanding of cultural 
241 "Cose di interesse artistico o storico". 242 Interestingly though, Giuseppe Galasso, denounces that notwithstanding changes in 
legislation, the progress towards a notion of ben! cultural! that goes beyond their 
identification with objects of artistic excellence alone has been, in Italy, frustratingly slow 
(Galasso 1996,218). 
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values243. As Montella (2003,29 ff. ) and Pitruzzella (2002) argue, at the 
root of the accepted understanding of the term beni culturali is a rejection 
of a selective tradition that used to limit its application to a restricted 
group of examples of aesthetic excellence. This rejection on the part of 
the legal experts has led to the progressive extension of the boundaries 
of the category of bene culturale to those artefacts and those cultural 
objects that are deemed to represent a significant material evidence of a 
past civilization, thus spurning distinctions between high and low cultural 
and artistic expressions (Council of Europe 1995,27-28). Rossano and 
Rossano (2002,8) explain this evolution as the shift from a notion 
according to which the bene culturale is identified with a 'monument-as- 
object' (monumento-oggetto) to a conception of bene culturale as 
'document' of a cultural value (documento). 
Therefore, the vicissitudes of the legislative acts that have been trying to 
refine and clarify the notion of ben! cultural! rather than representing a 
mere manifestation of the all too typical Italian tendency to over-legislate, 
constitute - according to Montella (2003,30-31) - the progressive 
"negation of the cult of the Bel Paese", that is the denial of a vision that 
only recognises as valid "aristocratic" (Montella, ibid. ) cultural and artistic 
expressions, the denial of aesthetic hierarchies, of the intellectualism, the 
aestheticism and the Romantic veneration of the 'sublime' that had 
traditionally inspired cultural - and in particular heritage - policy in Italy. 
243 It is important to mention that, however, even when the law 1089 was still being 
enforced, the doctrine had come to interpret its definition of the object of heritage policy 
in a much more open and flexible way than a literal interpretation of the legal text would 
have suggested (Chiti 1998). 
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Therefore, Mantella (Ibid. ) concludes that the notion of beni culturali 
purports a concept of culture of an anthropological nature - what the 1995 
National Report defines as "the assertion of a 'middle view' of culture 
(Council of Europe 1995,3; see also Galasso 1996). It was thus 
established an explicit and direct link between the cultural objects at the 
centre of cultural policy and the material, historical, and cultural contexts 
in which they were produced, as well as the natural environment in which 
they existed. Indeed, in view of the fact that a significant proportion of 
Italy's archaeological and artistic heritage is to be found in open-air sites, 
environmental issues (such as the preservation of areas of particular 
naturalistic as well as cultural importance) has always been perceived as 
being closely related to debates over heritage policy and preservation, as 
well as with urban issues and planning. However, the 'environmental 
assets' (beni ambientali) are legally distinct entities from the beni 
culturali, and are subject to a separate set of norms and regulations 
(Sciullo 2003,29). Finally, in this new and more inclusive perspective, the 
traditional contraposition between arte maggiore and arte minore breaks 
down, and cultural expressions from everyday life also find - at least 
potentially -a place within the category of beni culturali (Cicerchia 2002, 
15-16). 
From a legal point of view, the inclusive nature of the concept of beni 
culturali that has come to be shaped, over the years, by the 
jurisprudential doctrine inevitably results in a very open legal notion of 
cultural assets which eludes any clear-cut definition. Commentators 
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generally agree that, in fact, the relevant legislation has failed so far to 
formulate norms and regulations that can do full justice to the complexity 
and density of the term (Montella 2003; Pitruzzella 2000; Jalla 2003, 
240). In particular, the Testo Unico of 1999 appeared to many legal 
commentators as a failed opportunity to ratify the more inclusive and 
broad notion of cultural assets that had come to be accepted, over the 
decades, within the legal doctrine (Zerboni 2001,120; Cammelli 2000; 
Pitruzzella 2000). The decreto legislativo n. 112/ of 1998 which paved 
the way for the 1999 legislative reorganization (and which, at the time of 
its promulgation, had been interpreted as the culmination of one of the 
most important trends in the legal thought on cultural assets) had 
legitimised the principle that the objects at the centre of policy should not 
be limited to the material ben! alone, but ought to be extended to each 
and every cultural expression from which a form of cultural activity 
originates (Giancotti, 1998,23). 
As chapter 6 has discussed, the 1999 reorganization of the extant 
legislation affecting the beni culturali, seemed to prefer a somewhat 
conservative and cautious definition of cultural assets. By stressing on 
the material nature of the beni (which are now explicitly limited to cose, 
that is, physical objects alone), the definition presented by the Testo 
Unico in many ways was felt to be reminiscent of the 1939 law, probably 
more than many commentators felt necessary, or even desirable (Zerboni 
2001,120; Sciullo 2003,28; Cammelli 2000) A possible explanation for 
this might be that the legislator was deeply aware of the risks and 
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practical difficulties involved in the ratification of a broader definition of 
what ought to be included in the category of cultural assets (thus coming 
under the responsibility of the State as far as preservation and 
valorisation are concerned -a very expensive situation) (Galasso 1996, 
13). However, as Pinna (2001,63) observes, it is precisely this emphasis 
on the material dimension of the beni that operated the transformation, 
within Italian cultural policy, from heritage to 'cultural assets'. In Pinna's 
opinion (ibid. ) this shift is also primarily responsible for the emphasis on 
conservation over citizen access to the beni which characterizes the 
Italian model. Pinna (ibid. ) further laments that: [h]owever absurd this 
might seem, in Italy the state museums are not museums, but offices of 
the 'superintendencies', with no administrative and financial autonomy, 
no authority to manage their own administrative personnel and 
attendants and no scientific or teaching role. The state's restrictive 
interpretation of 'cultural assets' and 'guarantors of ownership' meant that 
museums became places where being open to the public was tolerated 
as a minimum concession - to the true owners of the public heritage 
themselves! It is a fact that citizens are often regarded as a dangerous 
source of potential damage to valuable objects". 
Montella (2003,33) goes as far as to interpret such cautious attitude on 
the part of the legislator as a move towards a 'non-definition' of cultural 
assets in the Testo Unico. Indeed, the wording of the articles dealing 
with the definition of cultural assets seems to lead to the conclusion that 
the quality of being a bene culturale - rather than residing within the 
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cultural object itself - is conferred to it by the legislator via his or her 
categorization and definition of the bene. It would almost seem, Montella 
(ibid. ) argues, that it is the legislator himself who creates the bene 
culturale. This, together with other problems, both technical and 
concerning content, have been raised and discussed within the legal and 
academic communities. Further evidence of the widespread unease with 
the somewhat restrictive definition proposed by the Testo Unico is 
represented by the numerous expressions of concerns and perplexity 
that have come from a number of the higher institutions of the Italian 
State - such as the Consiglio Nazionale, the Consiglio di Stato, as well as 
the parliamentary commissions of both Camera and Senato, (the two 
houses that make up the Italian Parliament) (Zerboni 2001,121). Most 
significantly, the Constitutional Court, the highest institution in the Italian 
legal system, has recently passed a judgement (sentenza n. 94 del 2003) 
- to solve a case of conflict between the central State and the region of 
Lazio over respective competencies in the field of heritage preservation - 
which has been interpreted as an attempt to put forward a more open 
and flexible interpretation of the label of 'cultural assets' (Poggi 2003). 
The most recent articulation of the concept of beni culturali can be found 
in the legislative decree n. 42 of 22nd January 2004 (the so-called 
Decreto Urban! ). The second part of the decree focuses on the cultural 
assets, and presents a classification of the assets in three different and 
autonomous areas: The first paragraph of article 10 (1° comma 
dell'art. 10) identifies beni culturali with "those movable and unmoveable 
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objects244 belonging to the State, the Regions, other area-based 
authorities or to public bodies and institutions or to non-profit private 
bodies with legal personalities and displaying a historic, artistic, 
archaeological or ethno-anthropological interest" (Ferretti 2004,68). The 
second paragraph of article 10 (comma 2 dell'art. 10) identifies a second 
category of cultural asset. This consists of those assets that belong to 
public entities (the State, the Regions, other area-based authorities and 
any other public organisation and institution) and whose cultural 
importance is seen to be intrinsic (or, in legal terms, appears to exist ex 
se). These consist of museum collections, painting collections, art 
galleries, archives and libraries. Finally, the third category of assets is 
constituted by all privately owned assets, which are susceptible of a 
process of assessment (regulated by article 13 and following) to 
establish whether they are of artistic or cultural value (Ferretti 2004,68). 
The law imposes a number of limitations and requirements to the owners 
of cultural objects that, following the assessment process (referred to as 
processo di individuazione), are deemed to belong to the class of ben! 
culturali, since they automatically become subject to the State's policies 
for cultural preservation (tutela). The Codice of 2004, then, introduces an 
important innovation in the logic behind the classification of cultural 
assets. Whilst the Testo Unico had envisaged a list grouping all beni 
culturali, the 2004 legislation distinguishes the three categories of assets 
on the basis of their ownership (public/private). Furthermore, with 
regards to the assets of private property, the new Codice also introduces 
244 The law refers here to 'cose' that is physical objects. 
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a notion of 'different levels of cultural interest', limiting State's 
responsibility only to those assets that have a 'particularly important' 
cultural interest. This represents an interesting innovation with respect to 
the 1999 Testo Unico, which required the somewhat feebler quality of 
'remarkable cultural interest' (Ibid. 69-70). 
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Table 1: GLOSSARY OF ITALIAN LEGAL TERMS 
Decreto Legislativo (abbreviated as D. Lgs. and also referred to as 
Legge delegata) - This is a legal act with the same formal efficacy of a 
law. It is emanated by the Government on the basis (and within the limits) 
of a legislative DELEGA (called delega legislativa) from the Parliament. 
Only the Government (but not an individual minister), and more precisely 
the Consiglio dei Ministri (the Italian equivalent of the Cabinet) can 
receive a delega legislativa. 
Decreto Legge (abbreviated as D. L. ) - This type of legal act results in 
provisional measures (prowedimenti provvison) that have powers 
equivalent to those of actual laws. A Decreto Legge is initiated by the 
Government, of its own initiative and under its responsibility, whenever 
an extraordinary occurrence of great urgency and importance arises. For 
such measures to become permanent (definitivi) they have to go through 
Parliament in order to be converted into laws (this process is called 
conversione del decreti legge). A Decreto Legge is decided upon by the 
Consiglio dei Ministri (the Italian equivalent of the Cabinet) and emanated 
through a Presidential Decree (decreto del Presidente della Repubblica) 
and is then published in the Gazzetta Ufficiale, the ufficial state 
publication where all new legal acts and other official documents are 
published so as to be publicly available and 'consultable'. 
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Decreto Ministeriale (abbreviated D. M. - Ministerial decree) - This is 
a secondary legal act (alto di normazione secondaria) that is emanated 
by individual ministers on the basis of a preceding formal law that 
explicitly gives the minister in question such powers (within the ambit of 
his or her ministerial responsibilities) 
Demanio Pubblico - This is the term used to indicate the ensemble of 
the assets hat belong to the State, the Regions, the Provincie and the 
Comuni (Italy's local authorities) and that satisfy public interests. In order 
for these assets to be allowed to carry out their public functions, they are 
subjected to a set of norms and regulations that differs from those that 
are in force for objects of private property. In particular, the objects 
belonging to the Demanio Pubblico are subject to the principles of 
inalienabilitd, and incommerciabilitä; that is, they cannot be sold, and 
their property rights must always remain in the public sphere. The Italian 
amministrative authorities are in charge of protecting and looking after 
the assets that belong to the Demanio. 
Testo Unico - This is a legal text that brings together the norms and 
prescriptions contained in a number of different legal acts that concern a 
same issue that have been promulgated over a certain period of time. It 
is possible to distinguish two types of Testo Unico: 
393 
" Testo Unico di coordinamento (co-ordinating Testo Unico) - This 
has the same legal powers and enforceability of the laws that it 
aims to bring together. It therefore can abrogate or modify the 
preceding norms. 
9 Testo Unico di mera compilazione (Testo Unico of a compilative 
nature) - This type of Testo Unico has the only function of 'tidying 
up' the existing norms, by collating them in a single act. Therefore, 
it cannot innovate or change extant legislation, but, at best, can 
suggest an official interpretation of the already existing norms. 
Such interpretation, however, is in no way vincolante (binding) for 
judges. The Testo Unico for the beni culturali belongs to this latter 
category 
Vincolo - Whenever a cultural asset is subjected to a vincolo, this entails 
that the asset in question cannot be altered or modified in any way; nor 
can it be moved or removed from its usual site unless the body that is 
responsible for its protection provides an authorization to do so. 
Sources: Cammelli 2000; Rossano and Rossano 2002; 
httg: //www. simone. it/cgi-local/Dizionari/newdiz. cgi? index. 5, A 
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Table 2: A SUMMARY OF ESSENTIAL ITALIAN LEGISLATION 
Law n. 1089 of 1939 - This is one of the most influential laws in the field 
of heritage. A crucial element of the law was the central role of the 
process of identification of the particular historical and artistic importance 
(later referred to, more inclusively, as 'cultural importance') of the beni, 
Indeed, one of the principal features of the system of cultural 
preservation introduced by law n. 1089 was the reliance on a conception 
of beni culturali founded on the belief in their extraordinary nature and 
their rarity (what has been referred to, in chapter 6 as the 'cult of the 
masterpiece'). Another important feature of this law was the identification 
of preservation of the beni (from all types of potential threats, both 
material and juridical) as the principal objective of state heritage policy. 
Law n. 1497 of 1939 - Law n. 1497 of 1939 institutes a number of 
measures for environmental protection. In this act, the conception of the 
preservation of landscape is judged primarily on aesthetic terms. 
D. P. R. (Presidential Decree) n. 619 of 1977 - Article 49 of this 
Presidential decree extended responsibilities for cultural and educational 
promotion to the Regions. 
Law n. 64 of 1986 - This law established extraordinary funding 
measures for cultural projects in the South of the country, with the explicit 
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intent to promote employment and local economic development in 
economically disadvantaged areas. 
Law n. 449 of 1987 - This legal act focussed on the redirection of 
extraordinary funding to projects of heritage restoration targeted at the 
most damaged and degraded sections of the cultural patrimony. It was 
the intent of the law that these projects would result in enhanced public 
access to cultural assets, thus encouraging cultural tourism. 
Law n. 4 of 1993 (commonly known as Ronchey Act) - This is the 
law that introduced the possibility of contracting out to privates a number 
of services defines as servizi di assistenza culturale e di ospitalitä 
(services of cultural support and hospitality) referred to as servizi 
aggiuntivi (additional services), such as coffee shops, wardrobe services, 
etc. 
D. Lgs. (Legislative Decree) n. 41 of 1995 - The decree largely 
expanded the category of the servizi that a museum could outsource. 
The range of such services now included also guided tours, educational 
activities, the preparation (not just the sale) of catalogues, archives, and 
IT support, the setting up of exhibition and special events. 
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D. M. (Ministerial Decree) n. 139 of 1997 - This decree introduced a 
clarification of the conditions in place for the outsourcing of services, by 
confirming that this was to be limited to the services and activities that 
could not be successfully provided internally by the organisations' own 
financial or human resources. 
Law n. 59 of 1997 (more commonly known as Bassanini Act) - The 
Bassanini Act had three main strategic objectives: to simplify and slim the 
famously cumbersome Italian administrative structure; to decentralise 
administration wherever possible; and to reorganise public administration 
on the organizational and functional planes both at the central and local 
level. In order to do this, it introduced a number of measures aiming at 
promoting the practice of outsourcing (estemalizzazione) and broadening 
the scope of its application. 
D. Lgs. (Legislative Decree) n. 368 of 1998 - This decree established 
the new Ministero per i Beni e le Attivitd Culturali (Ministry for Cultural 
Assets and Activities). The remit of the new Ministry included, besides 
heritage policy, responsibilities for the live performing arts and sport. 
Article 10 of the law also opened up the possibility of a further extension 
of the services to be outsourced. One more important feature of this 
legislative decree is that, in defining the role and tasks of the restructured 
Ministry, it confirms and ratifies the distinction between activities of tutela 
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on the one hand and and gestione (management) and valorizzazione 
(valorisation) on the other. 
D. Lgs. n. 490 of 1999, usually referred to as Testo Unico of 1999 - 
This is the legal act that brought together the extant norms relative to the 
heritage sector. It also offered suggestions on the best interpretation of 
the preceding legislation (see Table 1). 
D. Lgs. n. 63 of 2002 (later converted into law n. 112 of 2002) - This 
decree introduces the Patrimonio dello Stato S. p. A. and Infrastrutture 
S. p. A.; as shown in chapter 7 this law represents a crucial moment in the 
progressive process of svendita of the Italian cultural patrimony lamented 
by Settis. 
D. Lgs n. 42 of 2004 (the so-called Decreto Urbani) - This decree 
presents the most recent articulation of the concept of ben! culturali can 
be found in the legislative decree n. 42 of 22nd January 2004 (the so- 
called Decreto Urban). The Codice of 2004, then, introduces an 
important innovation in the logic behind the classification of cultural 
assets. Whilst the Testo Unico had envisaged a list grouping all beni 
culturali, the 2004 legislation distinguishes the three categories of assets 
on the basis of their ownership (public/private). Furthermore, with 
regards to the assets of private property, the new Codice also introduces 
a notion of 'different levels of cultural interest', limiting State's 
responsibility only to those assets that have a 'particularly important' 
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cultural interest. This represents an interesting innovation with respect to 
the 1999 Testo Unico, which required the somewhat feebler quality of 
'remarkable cultural interest' (Ibid. 69-70). 
399 
References 
Aicardi, Nicola (2003) "Recenti sviluppi sulla distinzione tra "tutela" e 
"valorizzazione" dei beni culturali e sul ruolo del ministero per i 
Beni e le Attivitä culturali in materia di valorizzazione del 
patrimonio culturale di appartenenza statale" in Aedon, No. 1. 
ACE (2003) Ambitions for the Arts 2003-2006, London, Arts Council 
England. 
ACGB (1985) A Great British Success Story, London, Arts Council of 
Great Britain. 
ACGB (1992), Towards a National Arts and Media Strategy, London, Arts 
Council of Great Britain. 
Ahearne, J. (ed) (2002) French Cultural Policy Debates: A Reader, 
London and New York, Routledge. 
AIIin, P. (2000) The development of comparable European cultural 
statistics. Cultural Trends, no. 37: 65-75. 
Allum, P. (1990), "Uniformity undone: aspects of Catholic culture in 
postwar Italy, " in Culture and Conflict in Postwar Italy, Z. G. 
Baranski & R. Lumley, eds., London, Macmillan. 
400 
Allum, P. (2000), "Catholicism, " in The Cambridge Companion to Modern 
Italian Culture, Z. G. Baranski & R. J. West, eds., Cambridge , 
Cambridge University Press. 
Anderson, P. (2000) "Renewals" in New Left Review, vol. 1,2nd series, 
pp. 5-24. 
Antal, A. B., M. Dierkes, and H. N. Weiler (1996) Cross-national policy 
research: traditions, achievements, and challenges, in Inkeles, A. 
and M. Sasaki (eds) (1996) Comparing Nations and Cultures, 
London, Prentice Hall. 
Arie, S. (2004) "Hotel plan could ruin Aeolian Islands", Guardian. 
Arnold, M. (1932), Culture and Anarchy, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press. 
Asor Rosa, A. (1975), "La cultura, " in Storia D'Italia. Dall'Unita' ad Oggi, 
A. Asor Rosa (ed) Turin, Einaudi. 
Asor Rosa, A. (1975) Storia D'Italia. Dall'Unita' ad Oggi, Turin, Einaudi. 
Associazione Italiana Editori (2001), Catalogo dei Libri in Commercio: 
Soggetti, Milan, Editrice Bibliografica. 
Bagdadli, S. (1997), 11 Museo come Azienda, Etas, Milan, Etas. 
Balestrini, N. (1997), L'Orda D'Oro: 1968-1977. La grande ondata 
rivoluzionaria e creativa, politica ed esistenziale, Milan, Feltrinelli. 
401 
Banfield, E. (1958) The Moral Basis of a Backward Society. New York, 
The Free Press. 
Baranski, Z. G. (2001), "Introducing modern Italian culture, " in The 
Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture, Z. G. Baranski & 
R. J. West, (eds) (2001), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. 
Baranski, Z. G. and R. J. West (eds) (2001) The Cambridge Companion 
to Modern Italian Culture, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Baranski, Z. G. & Lumley, R. (eds. ) (1990), Culture and Conflict in 
Postwar Italy, London, Macmillan. 
Baranski, Z. G. & Lumley, R. (1990), "Turbulent transitions: an 
introduction, " in Culture and Conflict in Postwar Italy, Z. G. 
Baranski & R. Lumley (1990), (eds), London, Macmillan. 
Baranski, Z. G. (1988), "Crises and cultures in postwar Italy", The 
Italianist, vol. VIII, pp. 120-129. 
Baranski, Z. G. & Short, J. R. (eds) (1985), Developing Contemporary 
Marxism, London, Macmillan. 
Barbati, C., Cammelli, M., and Sciullo, G. (2003) 11 Diritto dei Beni 
Culturali: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Barbati, C. (2003a) 'Le forme di gestione' in Barbati, C., Cammelli, M., 
and Sciullo, G. (2003) 11 Diritto del Beni Culturali: Bologna, II 
Mulino. 
402 
Barbati, C. (2003b) 'I Soggetti' in Barbati, C., Cammelli, M., and Sciullo, 
G. (2003) 11 Diritto dei Beni Culturali: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Barbati, C. (2004) "L'attivita' di valorizzazzione (art. 111)" in Aedon 1. 
Barbati, C. (2005) "I rapporti con le autonomie territoriali", in Aedon, No. 
1. 
Barber, B. R. (2003) Jihad vs. McWorld: Terrorism's challenge to 
democracy, London, Corgi. 
Barca, F. (2000) "La valorizzazione della cultura, risorsa per lo sviluppo 
del Mezzogiorno" Economia della Cultura vol. 2, pp. 195-200. 
Bardouille, N. C. (2000) "The transformation of governance paradigms 
and modalities: insights into the marketization of the public service 
in response to globalization", in The Round Table, vol. 253, pp. 81- 
106. 
Barlera, P. (1998), "Toward a genealogy and methodology of Italian 
cultural studies", Annali d'Italianistica, vol. 16, pp. 15-30. 
Barry, P. (1995) Beginning Theory: An introduction to literary and cultural 
theory, Manchester and New York, Manchester University Press. 
Barzelay, M. (1997) "Researching the politics of New Public 
Management: changing the question, not the subject", paper 
delivered at the Summer Workshop of the International Public 
Management Network, Berlin/Potsdam, Germany, June 25-27, 
1997. 
403 
Beck, A. (1992) 'Politics and cultural policy in Great Britain' in Talking 
Politics, v. 4, issue 3, p. 139-142. 
Bedani, G. (2000), "The Christian Democrats and national identity, " in 
The Politics of Italian National Identity, G. Bedani & B. Haddock, 
(eds) (2000), Cardiff, University of Wales Press. 
Bedani, G. & Haddock, B. (eds) (2000), The Politics of Italian National 
Identity: A Multidisciplinary Perspective, Cardiff, University of 
Wales Press. 
Belfiore, E. (2002) "Art as a means towards alleviating social exclusion: 
does it really work? A critique of instrumental cultural policies and 
social impact studies in the UK" International Journal of Cultural 
Policy 8, no. 1, p. 91-106. 
Belfiore, E. (2003) "Economic impact: Inconclusive evidence", 
ArtsProfessional, no. 43, p. 9-10. 
Bellamy, R. (2000), "A modern interpreter: Benedetto Croce and the 
politics of Italian culture", The European Legacy, vol. 5, no. 6, pp. 
845-861. 
Bellamy, R. (2001a), "A Crocean critique of Gramsci on historicism, 
hegemony and intellectuals", Journal of Modern Italian Studies, 
vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 209-229. 
404 
Bellamy, R. (2001b), "Introduction - From philosophes to pundits: Italian 
intellectuals and politics from Vico to Eco", Journal of Modern 
Italian Studies, vol. 6, no. 2, pp. 151-156. 
Bello, W. (2002) De globalization: Ideas for a new world economy, 
London and New York Zed Books. 
Benedikter, R. (2004) "Privatisation of Italian Cultural Heritage", in 
International Journal of Heritage Studies vol. 10, n. 4, pp-369-389. 
Bennett, C. J. (1991) "How states utilize foreign evidence" in Journal of 
Public Policy, vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 31-54. 
Bennett, 0. (1995) 'Cultural policy in the United Kingdom: collapsing 
rationales and the end of a tradition' in International Journal of 
Cultural Policy, vol. 1, n. 2, p. 199-216. 
Bennett, 0. (1996) Cultural Policy and the Crisis of Legitimacy: 
Entrepreneurial Answers in the United Kingdom, Centre for 
Cultural Policy Studies, Coventry, University of Warwick. 
Bennett, 0. (1997) "Cultural policy, cultural pessimism and 
postmodernity", International Journal of Cultural Policy 4, no. 1, 
67-84. 
Bennett, 0. (2001) Cultural Pessimism, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University 
Press. 
405 
Bennett, 0. (2004) "The Torn Halves of Cultural Policy Research", in 
International Journal of Cultural Policy, 10, n. 3, p. 237-248. 
Bennett, 0. (2005), "Beyond machinery: The cultural policies of Matthew 
Arnold", History of Political Economy, vol. forthcoming. 
Berezin, M. (1997) Making the Fascist Self, Cornell University Press, 
London. 
Bernstein, G. L. (2004) The Myth of Decline: The rise of Britain since 
1945, London, Pimlico. 
Bewes, T. & Gilbert, J. (2000) Cultural Capitalism: Politics after New 
Labour, London, Lawrence & Wishart. 
Bianchini, F.; Torrigiani, M; Cere, R. (1996) 'Cultural policy' in Forgacs, 
D. and Lumley, R. (eds. ) (1996) Italian Cultural Studies. An 
Introduction, Oxford University Press. 
Bobbio, L. (1992) 'La politica dei beni culturali in Italia' in Bobbio, L. 
(1992) Le Politiche Culturali in Europa: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Bobbio, L. (1992) Le Politiche Culturali in Europa: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Bodo, C. (2002) Cultural Policies in Europe: A compendium of basic facts 
and Trends. Italy, Council of Europe/ERICarts. 
Boggs, C. (2000) The End of Politics: Corporate power and the decline of 
the public sphere, New York and London, The Guildford Press. 
406 
Borofsky, R. (1998), "Cultural possibilities, " in World Culture Report 1998, 
UNESCO, ed., UNESCO. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998) Acts of Resistance: Against the new myths of our 
time Cambridge, Polity. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998) "A reasoned utopia and economic fatalism", in New 
Left Review, vol. 227, pp. 125-130. 
Bourdieu, P. (1998) Utopia of endless exploitation: The essence of 
neoliberalism, in Le Monde Diplomatique. 
Braden, S. (1978), Artists and People, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
Bradley, A., Hall, T., & Harrison, M. (2002) "Selling Cities - Promoting 
New Images for Meetings Tourism" in Cities, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 61- 
70. 
Bradley, C. H. J (1998) Mrs. Thatcher's Cultural Policies: 1979-1990, 
New York, Boulder. 
Brecknock, R. (2004) "Reflecting culture: the people, the feel & the style 
of Brisbane", Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference 
on Cultural Policy Research, Montreal, August 25-28 2004. 
Brenner, N. and Theodore, N. (2002) "Cities and the geographies of 
"actually existing neoliberalism", in Antipode, Vol. 34, No. 2, pp. 
349-379. 
407 
Brighton, A. (1999) 'Towards a command culture: New Labour's cultural 
policy and Soviet Socialist Realism' in Critical Quarterly, v. 41, 
issue 3, p. 24-34. 
Bruford, W. H. (1962) Culture & Society in Classical Weimar 1775-1806, 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Bull, M. J. (1996) Contemporary Italy. A Research Guide, London, 
Greenwood Press. 
Byrne, T. (2000) Local Government in Britain, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Cafruny, A. W. & Ryner, M. (2003) A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal 
hegemony and transformation in Europe, Lanham & Oxford, 
Rowman & Litterfield Publishers. 
Calandra, P. (2002) /I Governo delta Repubblica: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Callinicos, A. (2001) Against the Third Way, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Calvesi, M. (2002) "Sui musei sventola bandiera bianca", L'Unitä. 
Cammelli, M. (1998) "II decentramento difficile, " in Aedon, No. 1. 
Cammelli, M. (2000a) "La semplificazione normativa alla prova: il Testo 
Unico dei beni culturali e ambientali. Introduzione al commento del 
d. lg. 490/1999, " in Aedon, No. 1. 
408 
Cammelli, M. (2000b) La Nuova Disciplina dei Beni Culturali e 
Ambientali. Tesfo Unico approvato con decreto legislativo 29 
ottobre 1999, n. 490, Bologna, II Mulino. 
Cammelli, M. (2003a) 'II Quadro' in Barbati, C., Cammelli, M., and 
Sciullo, G. (2003) /I Diritto dei Beni Culturali: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Cammelli, M. (2003b) "La riorganizzazione del ministero per i Beni e le 
Attivitä culturali (d. Ig. 8 gennaio 2004, n. 3). 
Cammelli, M. (2004) "II Codice dei beni culturali e del paesaggio: 
dall'analisi alI'applicazione, " in Aedon, No. 2. 
Cammelli, M. (2005) "Ministero pesante e Codice debole", in Aedon, 
No. 1. 
Cammelli, M. et al. (2002) Beni Culturali e Imprese, Rome, Editori Riuniti. 
Campbell, J. L. & Pedersen, 0. K. (2001) The Rise of Neoliberalism and 
Institutional Analysis, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University 
Press. 
Capano, G. (2003) 'Administrative traditions and policy change: When 
policy paradigms matter. The case of Italian administrative reform 
during the 1990s' in Public Administration, v. 81, issue 4, p. 781- 
801. 
Capati, M. (2000), 11 Maestro Abnorme: Benedetto Croce e 1'Italia del 
Novecento, Florence, Pagliai Polistampa. 
409 
Cappelli, R. (2002) Politiche e Poietiche Per I'Arte, Milan, Mondadori 
Electa. 
Carta, M. (1999) L'armatura Culturale del Territorio. Ii patrimonio culturale 
come matrice di identita' e strumento di sviluppo, Milan, Franco 
Angeli. 
Cassese, S. (2001) "Introduzione", in Cazzato, V. (ed) (2001) Istituzioni e 
Politiche Culturali in Italia negli Anni Trenta. Tomo I, Rome, Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Caughie, J. (1986), "Popular culture: notes and revisions, " in High 
Theory/Low Culture, in MacCabe, C. (ed) (1986), Manchester, 
Manchester University Press. 
Cazzato, V. (2001) (ed) Istituzioni e Politiche Culturali in Italia negli Anni 
Trenta. Tomo 1, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Cazzato, V. and Rizza, V., (2001) "Premessa, " in Cazzato, V. (ed) 
(2001) Istituzioni e Politiche Culturali in Italia negli Anni Trenta. 
Tomo 1, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Cerny, P. G. (2004) "Mapping varieties of Neoliberalism". Paper 
presented at the annual convention of the International Studies 
Association, Montreal, Quebec, 17-20 March 2004. 
Chambers, I. & Curti, L. (1984) "A volatile alliance: culture, popular 
culture and the Italian Left, " in W. AA. (1984) Formations of Nation 
and People, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul. 
410 
Charlton, B. and Andras, P. (2003) The Modernization Imperative, 
Exeter, Imprint Academic. 
Cheit, E. F. (1975) The Useful Arts and the Liberal Tradition, New York, 
McGraw-Hill. 
Chiti, M. P. (1998) La nuova nozione di "beni culturali" nel d. Ig. 112/1998: 
prime note esegetiche. Aedon, no. 1. 
Cicerchia, A. (2002) 11 Bellissimo Vecchio: Argomenti per una geografia 
del patrimonlo culturale, Milan, Franco Angeli. 
Clancy, P. et al. (1994) The Public and the Arts, Dublin, Arts Council of 
Ireland. 
Clarke, J. (2001) "Dissolving the public realm? ", paper delivered at the 
Workshop Local Democracy... An Uncertain Future?, University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2-3 March 2001. 
Coalter, F. (2001) Realising the Potential of Cultural Services: Research 
Agenda, London, LGA Publications. 
Cofrancesco, G. (1999) "Aspetti del regime dei beni culturali pubblici, " in 
Toscano, A. M. (ed) (1999) Dall'incuria all'illegalita'. I beni culturali 
alla prova della coscienza collettiva, Milan, Jaca Book. 
Cohen, N. (1999) Cruel Britannia, London and New York, Verso. 
411 
Cohen, J. and Federico, G. (2001) Lo Sviluppo Economico Italiano, 
Bologna, II Mulino. 
Contini, G. (1967) L'Influenza Culturale di Benedetto Croce, Milan and 
Naples, Riccardo Ricciardi Editore. 
Corso, G. (2000) "Articoli 112. Serivizi di assistenza culturale e di 
ospitalitä; 113. Concessione dei servizi, " in Cammelli, M. (ed) 
(2000) La Nuova Disciplina dei Beni Culturali e Ambientali. Testo 
Unico approvato con decreto legislativo 29 ottobre 1999, n. 490, 
Bologna, II Mulino. 
Cortese, F. (2004), "La Biennale di Venezia, il Centro sperimentale di 
cinematografia e I'Istituto nazionale per il dramma antico nel 
quadro delle recenti riforme culturali", in Aedon, No. 2. 
Council of Europe (1995) Cultural Policy in Italy. National Report 
presented by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Italy. Strasbourg, 
Council of Europe, Culture Committee. 
Cowen, T. (1998) In Praise of Commercial Culture, Cambridge, MA and 
London, Harward University Press. 
Cowen, T. (2002) Creative Destruction: How globalization is changing the 
world's cultures, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press. 
Cummings, M. C. and Katz, R. S. (1987) The Patron State. Government 
and the Arts in Europe, North America and Japan: New York and 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
412 
Cummings, M. C. and Katz, R. S. (1987b) 'Government and the Arts: An 
Overview' in Cummings, M. C. and Katz, R. S. (1987) The Patron 
State. Government and the Arts in Europe, North America and 
Japan: New York and Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Cummings, M. C. and Schuster, J. D. (1989) Who's to pay for the arts? 
The International Search for Models of Arts Support. American 
Council for the Arts. 
D'Amico, J. (1999) "Croce and the Commedia dell'arte of Naples, " in The 
Legacy of Benedetto Croce: Contemporary critical views, J. 
D'Amico, D. A. Trafton, & M. Verdicchio, (eds) (1999), Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press. 
D'Angelo, G. (1995) "La tutela del patrimonio culturale ed ambientale e la 
gestione del territorio nella legislazione italiana vigente, " in 
Genovese R. A. (ed) (1995) La Politica dei Beni Culturali, Naples, 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. 
D'Angelo, M. and Vesperini, P. (1998) Cultural Policies in Europe: A 
Comparative Approach. Council of Europe. 
D'Auria, G. (2005) "L'organizzazione centrale", in Aedon, No. 1. 
D'Orsi, A. (2001) Intellettuali nel Novecento Italiano, Turin, Einaudi. 
Davis, H. (2004) Understanding Stuart Hall, London, Sage. 
413 
DCMS (1999) Policy Action Team 10; A Report to the Social Exclusion 
Unit: Arts and Sport, London, Department of Culture, Media and 
Sport. 
DCMS (2000) Centres for Social Change: Museums, Galleries and 
Archives for All, London, Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 
De Castris, A. L. (1981) Egemonia e Fascismo, Bologna, II Mulino. 
Della Rocca, G. (2000) 'The public administration paradox: An 
organisation with a low degree of institutionalisation' in 
Scandinavian Journal of Management, v. 16, p. 375-389. 
Dell'Orso, S. (2002) Altro the Musei. La questione dei beni culturali in 
Italia, Rome-Bari, Laterza. 
De Luca, M. N. (2001 a) "Musei statali ai privati: 6 scontro", Repubblica. 
De Luca, M. N. (2001 b) "Musei, rivolta contro I privati; I custodi scendono 
in piazza", Repubblica. 
De Mauro, T. (1987) L'Italia delle Italie, Rome, Editori Riuniti. 
De Mauro, T. (2004) La Cultura degli Italian!, Rome and Bari, Laterza. 
De Seta (2001) "Ma cost e soltanto un miraggio pericoloso", Repubblica. 
414 
DETR (1998) Modernising Local Government: Improving Local Services 
Through Best Value, London, Department of Environment, 
Transport and the Regions. 
Dickie, J. (1996) 'Imagined Italies' in Forgacs, D. and Lumley, R. (eds. ) 
(1996) Italian Cultural Studies. An Introduction: Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Dickie, J. (2001) "The notion of Italy, " in The Cambridge Companion to 
Modern Italian Culture, Z. G. Barahski & R. J. West (eds) (2001), 
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Di Stefano, R. (1995) "Introduzione" in La Politica dei Beni Culturali, in La 
Politica dei Beni Culturali, Genovese, R. A. (ed) (1995), Naples, 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. 
Dolowitz, D. & Marsh, D. (1996) 'Who learns what from whom? A review 
of the policy transfer literature" in Political Studies, vol. 44, pp. 
343-357. 
Dolowitz, D. & Marsh, D. (2000) "Learning from abroad: the role of policy 
transfer in contemporary policy-making" in Governance, vol. 13, 
pp. 5-24. 
Dolowitz, D. (2000a) Policy Transfer and British Social Policy: Learning 
from the USA? Buckingham and Philadelphia, Open University 
Press. 
415 
Dolowitz, D. (2000b) "Introduction: a new face to British public policy, " in 
Dolowitz, D. (ed) (2000), Policy Transfer and British Social Policy: 
Learning from the USA? Buckingham and Philadelphia, Open 
University Press. 
Dolowitz, D. (2000c) "Policy transfer: a new framework of policy 
analysis, " in D. Dolowitz, (ed) (2000) Policy Transfer and British 
Social Policy: Learning from the USA?, Buckingham and 
Philadelphia, Open University Press. 
Dolowitz, D. (2003) "A policy-maker's guide to policy transfer" in Political 
Quarterly, vol. 74, n. 1, pp. 101-108. 
Dolowitz, D Greenwold, S. and Marsh, D. (1999) "Policy transfer: 
Something old, something new, something borrowed, but why red 
white and blue? " in Parliamentary Affairs, vol. 52, n. 4, pp. 719- 
730. 
Dombroski, R. S. (1998) "Forward", Annali d'Italianistica, vol. 16 (Italian 
Cultural Studies, Special Issue), pp. 11-14. 
Dombroski, R. S. & Cervigni, D. S. (1998) "Italian Cultural Studies". 
Annali d'Italianistica, vol. 16 (Italian Cultural Studies, Special 
Issue) 
Dorffes, G. (1953) "New currents in Italian Aesthetics", The Journal of 
Aesthetics and Art Criticism, vol. 12, no. 2, pp. 184-196. 
Doumanis, N. (2001) Italy, London, Arnold. 
416 
Driver, S and Martell, L. (1998) New Labour: Politics after Thatcherism, 
Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Driver, S and Martell, L. (2002) Blair's Britain, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Duggan, L. (2003) The Twilight of Equality? Neoliberalism, cultural 
politics and the attack on democracy, Boston, Beacon Press. 
Dye, T. R. (1975) Understanding Public Policy, London, Prentice Hall. 
Eagleton, T. (1990) The Ideology of the Aesthetic, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Eagleton, T. (2000) The Idea of Culture, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Eco, U. (1983) Sette Anni di Desiderio, Milan, Bompiani. 
Eco, U. (1988) "Osservazioni sulla nozione di giacimento culturale", in 
Eco, U; Zeri, F.; Piano, R. and Graziani, A. (eds) (1988) Le Iso/e 
del Tesoro, Milan, Mondadori Electa. 
Edgar, D. (2004) "Where's the challenge? ", in Guardian, Saturday May 
22. 
Elias, N. (1994) The Civilizing Process, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Eliot, T. S. (1962) Notes Towards the Definition of Culture, London, 
Faber & Faber. 
Etzioni, A. (1995) The Spirit if Community: Rights, responsibilities and the 
communitarian agenda, London, Fontana Press. 
Etzioni, A. (2000) The Third Way to a Good Society, London, Demos. 
417 
Evans, M. & Davies, J. (1999) "Understanding policy transfer: a multi- 
level, multi-disciplinary perspective" in Public Administration, vol. 
77, pp. 361-386. 
Evans, M. (2004) Policy Transfer in Global Perspective, Aldershot, 
Ashgate. 
Eve, M. (1996) 'Comparing Italy: The case of corruption' in Forgacs, D. 
and Lumley, R. (eds. ) (1996) Italian Cultural Studies. An 
Introduction: Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Fabbrini, S. (2000) "Political Change without Institutional Transformation: 
What Can We Learn from the Italian Crisis of the 1990s? " in 
International Political Science Review, vol. 21, no. 2, pp. 173-196. 
Favretto, I. (2000) "New Labour and the Italian Left compared: a review 
essay" in Journal of Modern Italian Studies, vol. 5, no. 1, pp. 101- 
117. 
Feist, A., R. Fisher, C. Gordon, C Morgan, and O'Brien Jane. (1998) 
International Data on Public Spending on the Arts in Eleven 
Countries. Arts Council of England. 
Feist, A. and Hutchison, R. (1990) Funding the Arts in Seven Western 
Countries: Canada, Federal Republic of Germany, France, The 
Netherlands, Sweden, United Kingdom, United States. Cultural 
Trends, no. 5. 
418 
Fenton, J. (2004) "Down with this access pottiness", in Guardian, 
Saturday May 28. 
Ferguson (2002) "Rethinking youth transitions: Policy transfer and new 
exclusions in New Labour's New Deal" in Policy Studies, vol. 23, 
n. 3/4, pp. 173-190. 
Ferretti, A. (2004) La Riforma dei Beni Culturali, Naples, Edizioni 
Giuridiche Simone. 
Filippucci, P. (1996) 'Anthropological perspectives on culture in Italy' 
Forgacs, D. and Lumley, R. (eds. ) (1996) Italian Cultural Studies. 
An Introduction, Oxford University Press. 
Finlayson, A. (2003) Making Sense of New Labour, Lawrence & Wishart. 
Flinders, M. V. and McConnel, H. (1999) 'Diversity and complexity: The 
quango-continuum' in Flinders, M. V. and Smith, M. J. (1999) 
Quangos, Accountability and Reform: London, Macmillan Press. 
Flinders, M. V. (1999a) 'Setting the scene: Quangos in context' in 
Flinders, M. V. and Smith, M. J. (1999) Quangos, Accountability 
and Reform: London, Macmillan Press. 
Flinders, M. V. (1999b) 'Quangos: Why do governments love them? ' in 
Flinders, M. V. and Smith, M. J. (1999) Quangos, Accountability 
and Reform: London, Macmillan Press. 
419 
Flinders, M. V. and Smith, M. J. (1999) Quangos, Accountability and 
Reform: London, Macmillan Press. 
Florida, R. (2002) The Rise of the Creative Class, New York, Basic 
Books. 
Floridia, A. (2000) La Toscana sulla Scena: Lo spettacolo dal vivo in 
Toscana, Milan, Franco Angeli. 
Floridia, A. (2001) Beni Culturali in Toscana: Politiche, esperienze, 
strumenti, Milan, Franco Angell. 
Floridia, A. and Misiti, M. (2003) Musei in Toscana: Beni cultural! e 
sviluppo regionale, Milan, Franco Angeli. 
Foä, S. (2005) "1 raccordi fra ministero e privati" in Aedon, No. 1. 
Ford, B. (1992) The Cambridge Cultural History: Volume 9, Modern 
Britain: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Forgacs, D. and Lumley, R. (eds. ) (1996b) Italian Cultural Studies. An 
Introduction, Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Forgacs, D. & Lumley, R. (1996a), "Introduction: Approaches to culture in 
Italy, " in Italian Cultural Studies. An Introduction, D. Forgacs & R. 
Lumley, (eds) (1996), Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Forgacs, D. (1990) "The Italian Communist Party and culture, " in Culture 
and Conflict in Postwar Italy, Z. G. Baranski & R. Lumley (eds) 
(1990), London, Macmillan. 
420 
Forgacs, D. (1990b) Italian Culture in the Industrial Era: Cultural 
industries, politics and the public, Manchester, Manchester 
University Press. 
Foster, H. (ed. ) (1990) The Anti-aesthetic. Essays on Postmodern 
Culture, Bay Press. 
Frank, T. (2000) One Market Under God: Extreme capitalism, market 
populism and the end of economic democracy, London, Vintage. 
Furedi, F. (2004) Where Have All the Intellectuals Gone? Confronting 
21st century philistinism, Continuum, London. 
Galasso, G. (1996) Beni e Mali Culturali, Milan, Editoriale Scientifica. 
Galasso, G. (2002) Croce e Lo Spirito del Suo Tempo, Roma and Bari, 
Laterza. 
Galli Della Loggia, E. (1998) L'Identita' Italiana: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Gamble, A. (1994) Britain in Decline: Economic policy, political strategy 
and the British state, Basingstoke and London, St. Martin's Press. 
Gamble, A. (2001) "Neo-liberalism" in Capital & Class, vol. 75, pp. 127- 
134. 
Genovese, R. A. (1995) "La tutela del patrimonio storico-artistico, " in La 
Politica dei Beni Culturali, Genovese, R. A. (ed) (1995), Naples, 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. 
421 
Genovese, R. A. (1995) La Politica dei Beni Culturali, Naples, Edizioni 
Scientifiche Italiane. 
Giancotti, W. V. (1998) Beni e Attivita' Culturali nell'Evoluzione del 
Sistema Giuridico, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Giannola, A. (2000) Le Politiche per il Rilancio dello Sviluppo del 
Mezzogiorno, Bologna, II Mulino. 
Giddens, A. (1998) The Third Way: The renewal of social democracy, 
Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Ginsborg, P. (1996) "Explaining Italy's crisis", in Gundle, S. and Parker, 
S. (1996) The New Italian Republic: From the fall of the Berlin wall 
to Berlusconi, London, Routledge. 
Ginsborg, P. (2001) Italy and Its Discontents: 1980-2001, London, 
Penguin. 
Girard, A. (1996) `For a cultural revival in Italy: Report on the Council of 
Europe review of Italian cultural policy' in International Journal of 
Cultural Policy, v. 3, issue 1, p. 55-64. 
Giuliani, F. (2001) "II governo: "Musei ai privati I'unica soluzione", 
Repubblica. 
Gordon, C. (1991) "Government rationality: An introduction" in Burchell, 
G., Gordon, C. and Miller, P. (eds) (1991) The Foucault Effect: 
Studies in governmentality, Chicago, The University of Chicago 
Press. 
422 
Gordon, C. (1995) Cultural Policy in Italy, Strasbourg, Council of Europe, 
Culture Committee. 
Gordon, C. (2005) "Central reservation", in Arts Professional, issue 93. 
Gordon, R. C. (2000) "Impegno and the encounter with modernity: 'high' 
culture in post-war Italy, " in Italy Since 1945, P. McCarthy (ed) 
(2000), Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Gottfried, P. E. (1999) After Liberalism: Mass democracy in the 
managerial state, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Gould, P. (1998) The Unfinished Revolution: How the modernisers saved 
the Labour Party, London, Little, Brown and Company. 
Gray, A. and McGuigan, J. (1997) Studying Culture. An Introductory 
Reader, London, Arnold. 
Gray, C. (1996) Comparing cultural policy: a reformulation. International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 2, no. 2, p. 213-222. 
Gray, C. (2000) The Politics of the Arts in Britain, London, Macmillan. 
Gray, C. (2002) "Local Government and the Arts", Local Government 
Studies, vol. 28, no. 1,77-90. 
Green, S. J. D. (2000) "A land unfit for ideas? British intellectual history, 
1750-1950", History of European Ideas, vol. 26, no. 3-4, pp. 225- 
264. 
423 
Grew, R. (2000) "Culture and society, 1796-1896, " in Italy in the 
Nineteenth Century 1796- 1900, J. A. Davis (ed) (2000), Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Guerzoni, G. and Stabile, S. (2003) I Diritti dei Musei, Milan, Mondadori 
Etas. 
Gundle, S. and Parker, S. (1996) The New Italian Republic: From the fall 
of the Berlin wall to Berlusconi, London, Routledge. 
Gundle, S. and Parker, S. (1996) "Introduction: The new Italian Republic", 
in Gundle, S. and Parker, S. (1996) The New Italian Republic: 
From the fall of the Berlin wall to Berlusconi, London, Routledge. 
Gundle, S. (1996) "The rise and fall of Craxi's Socialist Party", in Gundle, 
S. and Parker, S. (1996) The New Italian Republic: From the fall of 
the Berlin wall to Berlusconi, London, Routledge. 
Gundle, S. (2000) "ll bel paese: Art, beauty and the cult of appearance, " 
in The Politics of Italian National Identity, G. Bedani & B. Haddock, 
(eds) (2000), Cardiff, University of Wales Press. 
Hall, S. and Whannel, P. (1967) The Popular Arts: A critical guide to the 
mass media, Boston, Beacon Press. 
Hammermeister, K. (2002) The German Aesthetic Tradition, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press. 
Hansen, T. B. (1995) "Measuring the value of culture", International 
Journal of Cultural Policy 1, no. 2,309-322. 
424 
Hantrais, L. (1999) "Contextualization in cross-national comparative 
research", Social Research Methodology 2, no. 2: 93-108. 
Hantrais, L. and Mangen. S. (1999) "Preface: Cross-national research". 
Social Research Methodology 2, no. 2: 91-92. 
Harrison, L. E. (2000) Underdevelopment is a State of Mind, Madison 
Books, New York and Oxford, Lanham. 
Harrison, L. E. & Huntington, S. P. (2000) Culture Matters: How values 
shape human progress, New York, Basic Books. 
Hay, C. & Watson, M. (2003) "Diminishing Expectations: The strategic 
discourse of globalization in the political economy of New Labour, " 
in Cafruny, A. W. & Ryner, M. (eds) A Ruined Fortress? Neoliberal 
hegemony and transformation in Europe, Lanham and Oxford, 
Rowman & Litterfield Publishers. 
Hay, V. (2004) "The normalizing role of rationalist assumptions in the 
institutional embedding of neoliberalism", in Economy and Society, 
Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 500-527. 
Heartfield, J. (2000) Great Expectations: The creative industries in the 
new economy, London, Design Agenda. 
Heidenheimer, J. (1986) 'Politics, Policy and Policey as concepts in 
English and Continental Languages: An attempt to explain 
divergences' in The Review of Politics, v. 48, issue 1, p. 3-30. 
425 
Hewison, R. (1987) The Heritage Industry, London, Methuen. 
Hewison, R. (1995) Culture and Consensus: London, Methuen. 
Hillman-Chartrand, H. and McCaughey, C. (1989) The arm's length 
principle and the arts: An international perspective - Past, present 
and future, in Cummings, M. C. and Schuster, J. D. (1989) Who's 
to pay for the arts? The International Search for Models of Arts 
Support. American Council for the Arts. 
Haycraft, J. (1985) Italian Labyrinth. Italy in the 1980s, London, Secker & 
Warburg. 
Hitchens, P. (2000) The Abolition of Britain, London, Quartet Books. 
Hobsbawm, E. (1998) "The death of Neo-liberalism" in Marxism Today 
November/December issue, pp. 4-8. 
Hogwood, B. (1995) 'The 'growth' of quangos: evidence and 
explanations' in Ridley, F. F. and Wilson, D. (1995) The Quango 
Debate: Oxford University Press. 
Holden, J. (2004) Capturing Cultural Value: How culture has become a 
tool of government policy, London, Demos. 
Holland, P. (1980) The Quango Death List, London, Adam Smith 
Institute. 
Hood, C. (1991) "A public management for all seasons? " in Public 
Administration, vol. 69, p. 3-19. 
426 
Horak, R. (1999) "Cultural studies in Germany (and Austria) and why 
there is no such thing", European Journal of Cultural Studies, vol. 
2, no. 1, pp. 109-115. 
Hughson, J. & Inglis, D. (2001) "Creative industries and the arts in Britain: 
towards a "third way" in cultural policy? " in International Journal of 
Cultural Policy, vol. 7, no. 3, pp. 457-478. 
Hulme, R. (2004) "Borrowing or learning? The role of policy transfer in 
assessing the impact of American ideas on British social policy". 
Paper presented at GASPP 7 seminar, McCaster University, 
Canada, September 11 2004: The Rise and Fall (? ) of the 
International Influence of US Social Policy, pp. 1-22. 
Hutchison, R. (1985) The Politics of the Arts Council, London, Sinclair 
Browne. 
Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) (2002) All Change at the Top? 
Government Appointed Regulators under New Labour. London, 
IPPR. 
Jalta, D. (2003) /I Museo Contemporaneo, Turin, Utet. 
Jenkins, H. (1979) The Culture Gap. An Experience of Government and 
the Arts, London, Marion Boyars. 
Jenkins, S. (1995) Accountable to None, London, Hamish Hamilton. 
427 
Jenks, C. (1993) Culture, London, Routledge. 
Jermyn, H. and Joy, A. (2002) Local Authority Expenditure on the Arts in 
England, 2000/01, London, Arts Council England. 
Jessop, B. (2002) "Liberalism, neoliberalism, and urban governance: A 
state-theoretical perspective", Antipode, Vol. 34, No. 3, pp. 452- 
471. 
John, P. (1998) Analysing Public Policy, London and New York, Pinter. 
Jones, B., Kavanagh, D., Morcellini, M., and Norton, P. (2001) Politics 
UK: Longman. 
Jordan, G. and Weedon, C. (1995) Cultural politics. Class, gender, race 
and the postmodern world, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Jowell, Tessa (2004) Government and the Value of Culture. London, 
DCMS. 
Kavanagh, D. (2000) British Politics: Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Kawashima, N. (1995) "Comparing cultural policy: towards the 
development of comparative study". International Journal of 
Cultural Policy 1, no. 2: 289-307. 
Kawashima, N. (1999), Cultural Policy Research: An Emerging Discipline 
Between Theory and Practice, Coventry, University of Warwick. 
428 
Kelly, G; Mulgan, G. and Muers, S. (2002) Creating Public Value: An 
analytical framework for public service reform, London, Cabinet 
Office. 
Kendall, G. & Wickam, G. (2001) Understanding Culture: Cultural studies, 
order, ordering, London, Sage. 
Kendall, G. (2003) "From liberalism to neoliberalism". Paper presented at 
the "Social Change in the 21st Century" Conference held in 
November 2003 at the Centre for Social Change Research, 
Queensland University of Technology. 
Kertzer, D. I. (2000) "Religion and society, 1789-1892, " in Italy in the 
Nineteenth Century 1796-1900, J. A. Davis (ed) (2000), Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Kettl, D. F. (2000) The Global Public Management Revolution, Washigton 
DC, Brookings Institution Press. 
Kiser, E. & Laing, M. (2001) "Have we overestimated the effects of 
neoliberalism and globalization? " in Campbell, J. L. and 
Pedersen, 0. K. (eds) The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional 
Analysis, Princeton and Oxford, Princeton University Press. 
Klees, S. J. (1999) "Privatization and neo-liberalism: Ideology and 
evidence in rhetorical reforms", in Current Issues in Comparative 
Education, Vol. 1, No. 2, pp. 1-7. 
Kroeber, A. L., Kluckhohn, C., & Untereiner, W. (1952) Culture: A critical 
review of concepts and definitions, New York, Vintage Books. 
429 
LaPalombara, J. (1987) Democracy Italian Style, New Haven and 
London, Yale University Press. 
Larner, W. (2004) Neoliberalism in (regional) theory and practice: The 
Stronger Communities Action Fund, Research Paper Number 14, 
Local Partnership and Governance Group, Auckland, University of 
Auckland. 
Lawley, I. (2003) "Local authority museums and the modernizing 
government agenda in England", Museum and Society vol 1, no. 
2, p. 75-86. 
Leadbeater, C. & Oakley, K. (1999) The Independents, London, Demos. 
Leadbeater, C. (2000) Living on Thin Air. " The new economy, London, 
Penguin. 
Leadbeater, C. (2001) Surfing the Long Wave: The rise of the knowledge 
entrepreneur, London, Demos. 
Lewis, J. (1990) Art, Culture and Enterprise. The politics of art and the 
cultural industries, London, Routledge. 
Lewis, J. (2003) Introduction to Part II, in Lewis, J and Miller, T. (eds) 
(2003) Critical Cultural Policy Studies. A reader, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Lewis, J. and Miller, T. (2003) Critical Cultural Policy Studies. A reader, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
430 
Leys, C. (2003) Market-Driven Politics: Neoliberal democracy and the 
public interest, London and New York, Verso. 
Littler, J. (2000) "Creative accounting: consumer culture, the 'creative 
economy' and the cultural policies of New Labour, " in Bewes, T. 
and Gilbert, J. (eds) (2000) Cultural capitalism: Politics after New 
Labour, London, Lawrence & Wishart. 
Lo Schiavo, L. (2000) 'Quality standards in the public sector: Differences 
between Italy and the UK in the Citizen's Charter initiative' in 
Public Administration, v. 78, issue 3, p. 679-698. 
Looseley, D. L. (1997). The Politics of Fun, Oxford, Berg. 
Looseley, D. L. (2004) "The development of a social exclusion agenda in 
French cultural policy", Cultural Trends, vol. 13, no. 2, pp. 15-27. 
Lumley, R. & O'Shaughnessey, M. (1985) "Media and cultural studies, " in 
Baranski, Z. G. & Short, J. R. (eds) (1985) Developing 
Contemporary Marxism, London, Macmillan. 
Lumley, R. (1988) "Some thoughts on the mass/popular culture 
question", The Italianist, vol. VIII, pp. 130-134. 
Lumley, R. (1990) States of Emergency. Cultures of Revolt in Italy from 
1968 to 1978, London, Verso. 
Lumley, R. (1994) "Introduction, " in Apocalypse Postponed. Umberto 
Eco, R. Lumley, (ed) (1994), Bloomington/London, Indiana 
University Press/British Film Institute. 
431 
Lyotard, J. (1991) The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge 
Manchester University Press, Manchester. 
Marchesi, G. (2000) "Risorse culturali e sviluppo delle aree in ritardo: I 
Fondi Strutturali 2000-2006, " in Economia delta Cu/tura, Vol. 1, pp. 
21-26. 
Margozzi, M. (2001a) "L"azione" per I'arte contemporanea - 
Introduzione, " in Cazzato, V. (ed) (2001) Istituzioni e Polstiche 
Culturali in Italia negli Anni Trenta. Tomo I, Rome, Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Margozzi, M. (2001b) "L'arte negli edifici pubblici e la legge del due per 
cento - Introduzione, " in Cazzato, V. (ed) (2001) Istituzioni e 
Politiche Culturali in Italia negli Anni Trenta. Tomo I, Rome, Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Marino, G. C. (2004) Biografia del Sessantotto, Milan, Bompiani. 
Marquand, D. (2004) Decline of the Public, Cambridge, Polity. 
Matarasso, F. (1997) Use or Ornament? The social impact of 
participation in the Arts, London, Comedia. 
May, T. (1997) Social Research. Issues, methods and process, 
Buckingham, Open University Press. 
Mbac (2004a) Per La Musica e l/ Teatro, Rome, Ministero per I Beni e le 
Attivitä Culturali. 
432 
Mbac (2004b) MiBAC: Un Ministero completamente rinnovato, Rome, 
Ministero per I Beni e le Attivitä Culturali. 
Mbac (2004c) Per il Bel Paese: 11 patrimonio storico-artistico e il 
paesaggio, Rome, Ministero per I Beni e le Attivitä Culturali. 
McCarthy, P. (2000) "The Italian Communists and Italian national identity: 
the question of difference, " in The Politics of Italian National 
Identity, G. Bedani & B. Haddock (eds) (2000), Cardiff, University 
of Wales Press. 
McGuigan, J. (1996) Culture and the Public Sphere, London, Routledge. 
McGuigan, J. (2004) Rethinking Cultural Policy, Maidenhead, Open 
University Press. 
Mclllroy, J. & Westwood, S. (1993) Border Country. Raymond Williams in 
adult education, Leicester, NIACE. 
Merli, P. (2002) "Evaluating the social impact of participation in arts 
activities", International Journal of Cultural Policy 8, no. 1, p. 107- 
118. 
Merusi, F. (2005) "Qualche osservazione finale sulla recente 
riorganizzazione del Mbac", in Aedon, No. 1. 
Milberg, W. (2004) "The end of welfare economics are we know it: A 
review essay", in Rethinking Marxism, Vol. 16, No. 4, pp. 347-353. 
433 
Miller, T. (2001) "What it is and what it isn't: Introducing... Cultural 
Studies" in Miller, T. (ed) (2001) A Companion to Cultural Studies, 
Oxford, Blackwell. 
Miller, T. (ed) (2001) A Companion to Cultural Studies, Oxford, Blackwell. 
Miller, T. and Yudice, G. (2002) Cultural Policy. London, Thousand Oaks 
and New Delhi, Sage. 
Milner, A. & Browitt, J. (2002) Contemporary Cultural Theory: An 
introduction, London, Routledge. 
Minihan, J. (1977) The Nationalization of Culture, London, Hamish 
Hamilton. 
Mirri, M. B. (2000) La Cultura del Bello - Le Ragioni delta Tutela. Studi di 
legislazione dei beni culturali, Rome, Bulzoni Editore. 
Montella, M. (2003) Musei e Beni Cultural!: Verso un modello di 
governance, Milan, Mondadori Electa. 
Moore, M. (2003) A World Without Walls: Freedom, development, free 
trade and global governance, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press. 
Morris, E. (2003) Check Against Delivery, A speech delivered at the 2003 
Cheltenham Festival of literature (available on www. culture. gov. uk). 
434 
Moscati, R. (2001) "Italian university professors in transition", Higher 
Education, vol. 41, pp. 103-129. 
Moss, M. E. (1987) Benedetto Croce Reconsidered, Hanover and 
London, University Press of New England. 
Moss, M. E. (1990) Benedetto Croce. Essays on Literature and Literary 
Criticism, New York, State University of New York Press. 
Musi, A. (1995) "La tutela del patrimonio storico-artistico prima e dopo 
I'Unita' d'Italia, " in Genovese, R. A. (ed) (1995) La Politica dei Beni 
Culturali, Naples, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. 
Mussari, R. (1994) 'Accounting and accountability in Italian local 
governments: Recent changes and challenges for the future' in 
Public Budgeting & Finance, Winter issue, p. 54-70. 
Myerscough, J. (1988) The Economic Importance of the Arts in Britain, 
London, Policy Studies Institute. 
Nardella, D. (2004) "Un nuovo indirizzo giurisprudenziale per superare le 
difficolta' nell'attuazione del Titolo V in materia di beni culturali? " in 
Aedon, No. 2. 
Nelken, D. (1996) °A legal revolution? The judges and TangentopolP, in 
Gundle, S. and Parker, S. (1996) The New Italian Republic: From 
the fall of the Berlin wall to Berlusconi, London, Routledge. 
435 
Norton, P. (1994) The British Polity. New York and London, Longman. 
Osborne, T. (2004) "On mediators: Intellectuals and the ideas trade in the 
knowledge society", in Economy and Society, Vol. 33, No. 4, pp. 
430-447. 
Overbeek, H. (ed) (1993) Restructuring Hegemony in the Global Political 
Economy: The rise of transnational neo-liberalism in the 1980s, 
London and New York, Routledge. 
Overbeek, H. and Van Der Pijl (1993) "Restructuring capital and 
restructuring hegemony: Neo-liberalism and the unmaking of the 
post-war order" in Overbeek, H. (ed) (1993) Restructuring 
Hegemony in the Global Political Economy: The rise of 
transnational neo-liberalism in the 1980s, London and New York, 
Routledge. 
Oyen, E. (1990a) Comparative Methodology in O yen, E. (1990), Studies 
in International Sociology. Sage. 
Oyen, E. 1990b. The Imperfection of Comparisons. In Comparative 
Methodology, edited by O yen, E. Studies in International 
Socioogy. Sage. 
Owens, C. (1990) "The discourse of others: feminism and 
postmodernism, " in The Anti-aesthetic. Essays on Postmodern 
Culture, H. Foster (ed) (1990), Seattle, Bay Press. 
436 
Paladini Musitelli, M. (1992) La Critica ei Suol Metodi, Palermo, 
Palumbo. 
Palma, G. and Clemente di San Luca, G. (1987) `State intervention in 
the arts in Italy from 1945 to 1982' in Cummings, M. C. and Katz, 
R. S. (1987) The Patron State. Government and the Arts in 
Europe, North America and Japan: New York and Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Paolozzi, E. (2002) L'Estetica di Benedetto Croce, Naples, Guida. 
Paolucci, A. (1996) Museo Italia: diario di un soprintendente-ministro, 
Livorno, Sillabe 
Parker, S. (1996) "Electoral reform and political change in Italy, 1991- 
1994", in Gundle, S. and Parker, S. (1996) The New Italian 
Republic: From the fall of the Berlin wall to Berlusconi, London, 
Routledge. 
Pastori, G. (2004a) "La cooperazione delle regioni e degli altri enti 
pubblici territoriali in materia di tutela del patrimonio culturale (art. 
5)" in Aedon, No. 1. 
Pastori, G. (2004b) "Le funzioni dello Stato in materia di tutela del 
patrimonio culturale (art. 4), " in Aedon, No. 1. 
Pastori, G. (2005) "Le funzioni", in Aedon, No. 1. 
Pearson, N. M. (1982) The State and the Visual Arts, Milton Keynes, The 
Open University Press. 
437 
Peck, J. (2001) "Itinerary of a thought: Stuart Hall, cultural studies and 
the unresolved problem of the relation of culture to 'not culture"', 
Cultural Critique no. 48, p. 200-249. 
Peck, J. and Tickell, A. (2002) "Neoliberalizing space", in Antipode, Vol. 
34, No. 2, pp. 380-403. 
Peters, A. A. (2001) Poststructuralism, Marxism, and Neoliberalism: 
Between theory and politics, Lanham and Oxford, Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers. 
Pick, J. (191) Vile Jelly. The birth, life and lingering death of the Arts 
Council of Great Britain, London, Brynmill. 
Pinna, G. (2001) "Heritage and 'cultural assets"' in Museum 
International, Vol. 53, No. 2, pp. 62-64. 
Piperata, G. (2005) "Sponsorizzazione ed interventi di restauro sui beni 
culturali", in Aedon, No. 1. 
Pitruzzella, G. (2000) "La nozione di bene culturale (artt. 1,2,3 e4d. Ig. 
490/1999)" in Aedon, No. 1. 
Poggi, A. (2002) "Dopo la revisione costituzionale: i beni culturali e gli 
scogli del 'decentramento possibile"', in Aedon, No. 1. 
Poggi, A. (2003) "Verso una definizione aperta di "bene culturale"? (a 
proposito della sentenza n. 94/2003 della Corte Costituzionale)" in 
Aedon, No. 1. 
438 
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert G. (eds. ) (1995) Quality Improvement in 
European Public Services, London, Sage. 
Pollitt, C. and Bouckaert G. (1995) "Defining Quality", in Quality 
Improvement in European Public Services, edited by Pollitt, C. and 
Bouckaert G, London, Sage. 
Posner, R. A. (2001) Public Intellectuals: A study of decline, Cambridge 
(MA) and London, Harvard University Press. 
Power, M. (1994) The Audit Explosion, London, Demos. 
Power, M. (1997) The Audit Society: Rituals of Verification, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press. 
Pratt, J. (1996) "Catholic Culture" in Italian Cultural Studies, in Forgacs, 
D. and Lumley, R. (eds. ) (1996) Italian Cultural Studies. An 
Introduction, Oxford University Press. 
Protherough, R. and Pick, J. (2002) Managing Britannia, Exeter, Imprint 
Academic. 
Pulcini, V. (1997) "Attitudes toward the spread of English in Italy", World 
Englishes, vol. 16, no. 1, pp. 77-85. 
Putnam, R. D. (1993) Making Democracy Work: Civic traditions in 
modern Italy, Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
439 
QUEST (2000) Modernising the Relationship (Part One): A New 
Approach to Funding Agreements, London Department for 
Culture, Media and Sport. 
Quinn, R. M. (1997) 'Distance or intimacy? The arm's length principle, the 
British government and the Arts Council of Great Britain' in 
International Journal of Cultural Policy, v. 4, issue 1, p. 127-130. 
Quinn, R. M. (1998) Public Policy and the Arts: A Comparative Study of 
Great Britain and Ireland, Aldershot, Ashgate. 
Radin, B. A. (2000) Beyond Machiavelli: Policy analysis comes of age: 
Washington D. C., Georgetown University Press. 
Regonini, G. (2001) Capire le Politiche Pubbliche: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Ridley, F. F. and Wilson, D. (1995) The Quango Debate, Oxford, Oxford 
University Press. 
Ridley, F. F. (1987) "Tradition, change and crisis in Great Britain", in 
Cummings, M. C. and Katz, R. S. (1987) The Patron State. 
Government and the Arts in Europe, North America and Japan, 
Oxford, Oxford University Press. 
Ritzer, G. (2004) The McDonaldization of Society, Thousand Oaks and 
London, Pine Forge Press. 
Rizi, F. F. (2003) Benedetto Croce and Italian Fascism, Toronto, 
University of Toronto Press. 
440 
Roberts, D. D. (1987) Benedetto Croce and the Uses of Historicism, 
Berkeley and London, University of California Press. 
Roberts, D. D. (2002) "Maggi"s Croce, Sasso"s Gentile and the riddles of 
twentieth-century Italian intellectual history", Journal of Modern 
Italian Studies, vol. 7, no. 1, pp. 116-144. 
Rojek, C. (2003) Stuart Hall, Cambridge, Polity Press. 
Romagnoli, S. (1977) "Una storia della cultura dell'Italia unita", Studi 
Storici, vol. 18, no. 2, pp. 21-33. 
Romano, S. (1984) "The weight of heritage, " in Appignanesi, L. (ed) 
(1984) Culture and the State, London, Institute of Contemporary 
Arts, pp. 12-15. 
Rose, R. (1991a) "Comparing forms of comparative analysis", Political 
Studies 39, no. 3: 446-462. 
Rose, R. (1991b) 'What is lesson-drawing? " in Journal of Public Policy, 
vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 3-30. 
Rose, R. (1993) Lesson-Drawing in Public Policy: A guide to learning 
across time and space, Chatam, Chatam House Publishers. 
Rose, R. (2001) Ten Steps in Learning Lessons from Abroad, ERSC 
Future Governance Programme. 
Rossano, D. and Rossano, F. (2002) Beni, Diritti ed Istituti Cultural!, 
Naples, Edizioni Giuridiche Simone. 
441 
Rubinstein, W. D. (1993) Capitalism, Culture & Decline in Britain: 1750- 
1990, London and New York, Routledge. 
Salvati, M. (2003) "Behind the Cold War: Rethinking the left, the state 
and civil society in Italy (1940s-1970s)" in Journal of Modern 
Italian Studies, vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 556-577. 
Santoro, M. (1995) Fare cultura. La produzione culturale nel 
Mezzogiorno, Bologna, II Mulino. 
Sartori, G. (1973) 'What is "politics"' in Political Theory, v. 1, issue 1, p. 5- 
26. 
Sartori, G. (1984) 'Guidelines for concept analysis' in Sartori, G. (1984) 
Social Science Concepts: A systematic analysis: Beverly Hills, 
London and New Delhi, Sage. 
Sawers, D. (1993) Should the Taxpayer Support the Arts?, London, 
Institute of Economic Affairs. 
Schuster, J. D. (1988) Making compromises to make comparisons in 
cross-national arts policy research. Journal of Cultural Economics 
11, no. 2: 1-36. 
Schuster, J. D. (1996) "Thoughts on the arts and practice of comparative 
cultural research", in Van Hamersveld, I. and Van der Wielen, N. 
(1996) Cultural Research in Europe 1996. Boekman Foundation). 
Schuster, J. D. (2002) Informing Cultural Policy. Center for Urban Policy 
Research, The State University of New Jersey. 
442 
Sciullo, G. (2003) "I beni", in Barbati, C., Cammelli, M., and Sciullo, G. 
(2003) /I Diritto dei Beni Cultural!: Bologna, II Mulino. 
Sciullo, G. (2005), "L'organizzazione periferica", in Aedon, No. 1. 
Scotto di Luzio, A. (1999) /I Liceo Classico, Bologna, II Mulino. 
Scruton, R. (2004) England. An Elegy, London, Pimlico. 
Selwood, S. (2001) The UK Cultural Sector, London, Policy Studies 
Institute. 
Selwood, S. (2002a) "What difference do museums make? Producing 
evidence on the impact of museums", Critical Quarterly 44, no. 4, 
65-81. 
Selwood, S. (2002b) "Beyond statistics? The politics of data collection in 
the English cultural sector", paper delivered at the International 
Symposium on Culture Statistics, 21-23rd October 2002, Montreal. 
Sennett, R. (1999) The Corrosion of Character., The personal 
consequences of work in the new capitalism, New York and 
London, Norton. 
Sennett, R. (2003) The Fall of Public Man, London, Penguin. 
Serio, M. (2001a) "La legge sulla tutela delle cose di interesse artistico o 
storico - Introduzione", in Cazzato, V. (ed) (2001) Istituzioni e 
443 
Politiche Culturali in Italia negli Anni Trenta. Tomo I, Rome, Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Serio, M. (2001b) "ll riordinamento delle strutture centrali e periferiche - 
Introduzione", in Cazzato, V. (ed) (2001) Istituzioni e Politiche 
Culturali in Italia negli Anni Trenta. Tomo I, Rome, Istituto 
Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Serravalle, P. D. (1995) "La tutela del patrimonio culturale ed ambientale 
e la gestione del territorio nella legislazione italiana vigente, " in 
Genovese, R. A. (ed) (1995) La Politica dei Beni Culturali, Naples, 
Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane. 
Settis, S. (2002) Italia S. p. A., Turin, Einaudi. 
Shaw, R. (1987) The Arts and the People, London, Jonathan Cape. 
Shaw, R. and Shaw, G. (1992) 'The Cultural and Social Setting' in Ford, 
B. (1992) The Cambridge Cultural History: Volume 9, Modern 
Britain: Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Sicca, L. M. and Zan, L. (2004) °Alla faccia del management. La retorica 
del management nei processi di trasformazione degli enti lirici in 
fondazioni", in Aedon, No. 2. 
Simoni, F. S. (1952) "Benedetto Croce: A case of international 
misunderstanding", The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism, 
vol. 11, no. 1, pp. 7-14. 
444 
Simonin, H. (2003) "The contingency of the cultural policy sector: An 
hermeneutic comparison of cultural policies", in International 
Journal of Cultural Policy, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 109-123. 
Simpson, J. A (1976) Towards Cultural Democracy, Strasbourg, Council 
of Europe. 
Sinclair, A. (1995) Arts and Cultures, London, Sinclair - Stevenson. 
Slaughter, A. (2004) A New World Order, Princeton and Oxford, 
Princeton University Press. 
Smart, B. (2003) Economy, Culture and Society, Buckingham and 
Philadelphia, Open University Press. 
Smith, C. (1999) The Contribution of Arts and Sports to Combating Social 
Exclusion, A Speech by the Secretary of State for Culture, Media 
and Sport, London, Department of Culture, Media and Sport. 
Solomon, R. (1994) The Transformation of the World Economy, 1980-93, 
Basingstoke and London, Macmillan. 
Stajano, C. (ed) (1996), La Cultura Italiana del Novecento, Bari, Laterza. 
Stanbridge, A. (2004) "Old habits die hard: The bumpy road from "arts" to 
"industries"". Paper presented at the 3rd International Conference 
on Cultural Policy Research, Montreal, August 25-28 2004. 
445 
Stanbridge, A. (2002) "Detour or dead-end? Contemporary cultural theory 
and the search for new cultural policy models", International 
Journal of Cultural Policy, vol. 8, no. 2, pp. 121-134. 
Stepney, P., Lynch, R., & Jordan, B. (1999) "Poverty, Exclusion and New 
Labour", Critical Social Policy, vol. 19, no. 1, pp. 109-127. 
Stevenson, D. (2004) "'Civic gold' rush: cultural planning and the politics 
of the Third Way". Paper presented at the 3rd International 
Conference on Cultural Policy Research, Montreal, August 25-28 
2004. 
Stone, D. (1999) "Learning lessons and transferring policy across time, 
space and disciplines" in Politics, vol. 19, n. 1, pp. 51-59. 
Stone, D. (2001 a) Learning Lessons, Policy Transfer and the 
International Diffusion of Policy Ideas, Centre for the Study of 
Globalization and Regionalization, Coventry, University of 
Warwick. 
Stone, D. (2001b) "Think tanks, global lesson drawing and networking 
social policy ideas" in Global Social Policy, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 338- 
360. 
Stone, M. S. (1998) The Patron State: Culture & politics in Fascist Italy, 
Princeton, Princeton University Press. 
Storey, J. (1993) An Introduction to Cultural Theory and Popular Culture, 
London, Harvester Wheatsheaf. 
446 
Swingewood, A. (1998) Cultural Theory and the Problem of Modernity, 
New York, Palgrave. 
Taylor, A. (1994) 'Policy chaos or chaotic policy? The arts and politics in 
post-war Britain' in Talking Politics, v. 7, p. 131-136. 
Taylor, A. (1995) 'How political is the Arts Council? ' in The Political 
Quarterly, v. 66, p. 184-196. 
Taylor, A. (1997) "Arm's length but hands on'. Mapping the new 
governance: The Department of National Heritage and cultural 
politics in Britain' in Public Administration, v. 75, p. 441-466. 
Thorpe, V. (2000) "Labour urged to allow art for art's sake", Guardian, 
3/12/2000. 
Tomlinson, J. (2001) The Politics of Decline: Understanding post-war 
Britain Harlow Longman. 
Torriglia, A. M. (2002, ) Broken Time, Fragmented Space: A cultural map 
for postwar Italy, Toronto and London, University of Toronto Press. 
Trafton, D. A. & Verdicchio, M. (1999) "Introduction, " in The Legacy of 
Benedetto Croce: Contemporary critical views, J. D'Amico, D. A. 
Trafton, & M. Verdicchio (eds) (1999), Toronto, University of 
Toronto Press. 
Trezzini, L. (1997) Rapporto sull'economia dello Spettacolo dal Vivo in 
Italia (1980-1990), Rome, Buizoni Editore 
447 
Trigilia, C. (1994) Sviluppo senza Autonomia. Effetti perversi delle 
politiche nel Mezzogiorno, Bologna, II Mulino. 
Trimarchi, M. (2000) "'Vengan denari... '. Risorse, criteri e meccanismi 
per il finanziamento dello spettacolo dal vivo", in Aedon, No. 3. 
Trimarchi, M. (2002) 'Lo spettacolo dal vivo tra le responsabilitä 
istituzionali e opportunitä economiche", in Aedon, No. 2. 
Tubertini, C. (2004) "La disciplina dello spettacolo dal vivo tra continuitä e 
nuovo statuto delle autonomie, in Aedon, No, 3. 
Tusa, J. (1999), Art Matters. Reflecting on culture, London, Methuen. 
Urbani, G. (2002) /1 Tesoro degli Italiani, Milan, Mondadori. 
Vaccaro Giancotti, W. (1998) Beni e Attivita' Cultural! nell'Evoluzione del 
Sistema Giuridico, Roma, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello Stato. 
Valentino, P. A., Musacchio, A., and Perego, F. (1999a) "Introduzione" in 
Valentino, P. A., Musacchio, A., and Perego, F. (1999) La Storia al 
Futuro. Beni cultural% specializzazione del territorio e nuova 
occupazione, Florence, Giunti. 
Valentino, P. A. (1999) "Politiche per i beni culturali" in Valentino, P. A., 
Musacchio, A., and Perego, F. (1999) La Storia al Futuro. Beni 
culturali, specializzazione del territorio e nuova occupazione, 
Florence, Giunti. 
448 
Valentino, P. A. (2003) Le Trame del Territorio, Milan, Sperling & Kupfer 
Editori. 
Van Puffelen, F. (1996) "Abuses of Coventional Impact Studies in the 
Arts", International Journal of Cultural Policy 2, no. 2, p. 241-254. 
Ventura, F. (2001) "La legge sulla protezione delle bellezze naturali, " in 
Cazzato, V. (ed) (2001) Istituzioni e Politiche Culturali in Italia negli 
Anni Trenta. Tomo 1, Rome, Istituto Poligrafico e Zecca dello 
Stato. 
Vestheim, G. (1994) "Instrumental cultural policy in Scandinavian 
countries: a critical historical perspective". International Journal of 
Cultural Policy 1, no. 1,57-71. 
Viskovatoff, A. (2002) "Liberty and autonomy in Hayek, Kant, and social 
theory". Paper presented at the Society for the Development of 
Austrian Economics session "Kant, Continental Philosophy, and 
Austrian Economics" held at the Southern Economics Association 
meetings in New Orleans, November 2002). 
Volkerling, M. (2004) "Testing the concept of the "Creative City": urban 
development theory and practice in the South Pacific". Paper 
presented at the 3rd International Conference on Cultural Policy 
Research, Montreal, August 25-28 2004. 
449 
Volonte', P. (2002) Le Imprese Sociali ei Beni Culturali, Milan, Franco 
Angeli. 
Ward, D. (1996) Antifascisms: Cultural politics in Italy, 1943-46, London, 
Associated University Presses. 
Ward, D. (2001) "Intellectuals, culture and power in modern Italy, " in The 
Cambridge Companion to Modern Italian Culture, Z. G. Baranski & 
R. J. West (eds) (2001), Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 
Watkins, S. (2004) "A weightless hegemony: New Labour's role in the 
neoliberal order" in New Left Review, vol. 25,2nd series, pp. 5-33. 
Webster, M. (1997) Finding Voices Making Choices: Creativity for social 
change, Nottingham, Educational Heretics Press. 
White, E. W (1975), The Arts Council of Great Britain, London, Davis - 
Poynter. 
Wiener, M. J. (1985) English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial 
Spirit, 1850-1980, Harmondsworth, Penguin. 
Wiesand, A. J. (2002) "Comparative cultural policy research in Europe: A 
paradigm shift", Canadian Journal of Communication 27, no. 2-3. 
Willette, T. (1999) "E stata opera di critica onesta, liberale, italiana: Croce 
and Napoli nobilissima (1892-1906), " in The Legacy of Benedetto 
Croce: Contemporary critical views, J. D'Amico, D. A. Trafton, & 
M. Verdicchio, (eds) (1999), Toronto, University of Toronto Press. 
450 
Williams, R. (1958) Culture and Society, London, Chatto & Windus. 
Williams, R. (1976) Keywords, London, Fontana. 
Williams, R. (1979) 'The Arts Council', Political Quarterly, v. 50, Spring 
issue, p. 157-171. 
Williams, R. (1993 - first published in 1958), "The idea of culture, " in 
Border Counfry: Raymond Williams in adult education, J. McIIIroy 
& S. Westwood (eds) (1993), Leicester, NIACE. 
Wilson, D. (1995) 'Quangos in the skeletal state' in Ridley, F. F. and 
Wilson, D. (1995) The Quango Debate: Oxford University Press. 
Witts, R. (1998) Artist Unknown, London, Little, Brown and Company. 
Wright, T. (1999) 'Reforming the patronage state' in Flinders, M. V. and 
Smith, M. J. (1999) Quangos, Accountability and Reform: London, 
Macmillan Press. 
Wright, T. (2000) The British Political Process: London and New York, 
Routledge. 
Wu, C. (2002) Privatising Culture: Corporate art intervention since the 
1980s London and New York, Verso. 
Yregin, D. & Stanislaw, J. (1998) The Commanding Heights: The battle 
between government and the marketplace that is remaking the 
modern world, New York, Simon & Schuster. 
451 
Zan, L. (2003a) Economia dei Musei e Retorica del Management, Milan, 
Mondadori Electa. 
Zan, L. (2003b) "La trasformazione delle organizzazioni culturali in 
fondazione: la prospettiva manageriale, " in Aedon, Vol. 2. 
Zerboni, N. (2001) 1 Finanziamenti alla Cultura, Milan, II Sole 24 Ore. 
Zeri, F. (1988) "II patrimonio storico-artistico italiano. Grandezza e 
nobiltä", in Eco, U; Zeri, F.; Piano, R. and Graziani, A. (eds) (1988) 
Le Iso/e del Tesoro, Milan, Mondadori Electa. 
Zink, S. (1950) "The moral effect of art", Ethics, vol. 60, no. 4, pp. 261- 
274. 
452 
